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The Philosophy of the Face and 20th Century Literature and Art
Abstract
This dissertation explores the importance of the human face in modern literature, philosophy, and art.
"Meaning is a physiognomy," wrote Wittgenstein--quite literally, if somewhat cryptically--in the
Philosophical Investigations. My project takes this remark seriously and begins, in chapters one and two,
by reading Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect-seeing alongside recent work in cognitive science and the
philosophy of mind in order to explain how we perceive mentality in the appearance of a human face. I
then trace the surprising ways in which our ability to understand facial expressions informs not only the
way we understand language, but also other minds and the concept of personhood itself. Chapters three
and four extend these findings into an analysis of visual portraiture, focusing on the paintings of Francis
Bacon. Regarding the sense of injury often associated with Bacon's violently distorted likenesses, I ask
why such "magical" feelings arise at all with respect to images of human faces. Reading Wittgenstein
along with Gombrich and Wollheim, I find that the mind naturally responds to images of faces as
expressive of mentality: we not only see faces in images but also to an extent see the images as persons.
My final chapter looks into the ethics of physiognomy, asking what difference it makes whether we see
the mind as a private substance or, as John Ashbery has suggested, a "visible core." This chapter reads
two narratives about faces that dramatize the solipsistic consequences of a Cartesian commitment to
mental privacy: that of the faceless woman in Rilke's Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge and the
Magistrate's dreams about the tortured woman in Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians . I next consider
Levinas' ethics of the face, an ambivalent critique of Husserlian phenomenology that tries, but ultimately
fails, to escape this Cartesian predicament. In the end, the convergence of ethics and physiognomy may
explain the face's importance to the modern imagination: perhaps, as Wittgenstein's writings suggest,
faces grip us so because they call upon the same powers of pattern recognition that enable us to grasp
the reality of other minds and moral values as well.
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ABSTRACT

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FACE
AND 20TH CENTURY LITERATURE AND ART

Bernard J. Rhie
Adviser: Susan Stewart

This dissertation explores the importance of the human face in modem literature,
philosophy, and art. “Meaning is a physiognomy,” wrote Wittgenstein—quite literally,
if somewhat cryptically—in the Philosophical Investigations. My project takes this
remark seriously and begins, in chapters one and two, by reading Wittgenstein’s
discussion of aspect-seeing alongside recent work in cognitive science and the
philosophy of mind in order to explain how we perceive mentality in the appearance of
a human face. I then trace the surprising ways in which our ability to understand facial
expressions informs not only the way we understand language, but also other minds and
the concept of personhood itself. Chapters three and four extend these findings into an
analysis of visual portraiture, focusing on the paintings of Francis Bacon. Regarding
the sense of injury often associated with Bacon’s violently distorted likenesses, I ask
why such “magical” feelings arise at all with respect to images of human faces.
Reading Wittgenstein along with Gombrich and Wollheim, I find that the mind
naturally responds to images of faces as expressive of mentality: we not only see faces
in images but also to an extent see the images as persons. My final chapter looks into
the ethics of physiognomy, asking what difference it makes whether we see the mind as
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a private substance or, as John Ashbery has suggested, a “visible core,” This chapter
reads two narratives about faces that dramatize the solipsistic consequences of a
Cartesian commitment to mental privacy: that of the faceless woman in Rilke’s
Notebooks o f Matte Laurids Brigge and the Magistrate’s dreams about the tortured
woman in Coetzee’s Waiting fo r the Barbarians. I next consider Levinas’ ethics of the
face, an ambivalent critique of Husserlian phenomenology that tries, but ultimately
fails, to escape this Cartesian predicament. In the end, the convergence of ethics and
physiognomy may explain the face’s importance to the modem imagination: perhaps,
as Wittgenstein’s writings suggest, faces grip us so because they call upon the same
powers of pattern recognition that enable us to grasp the reality of other minds and
moral values as well.
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Preface

Faces play a truly special role in human cognition. To begin with, no other
visual object communicates as many different types of social information. As Andrew
Young and Vicki Bruce put it:
We use them not only to recognise people we know, but also to
infer moods and feelings, to regulate social interaction through
eye contact and facial gestures, to assist in speech comprehension
(e.g., when lip reading;... even people with normal hearing do
this), to determine age and sex, and even to attribute
characteristics on the basis of social stereotypes.1
One linguistic measure of the centrality of the human face to social life is its common
figurative employment as a synecdoche for the whole person. Consider such idiomatic
phrases as “face-to-face,” “say it to his face,” “set one’s face against,” “to lose face,”
“shut the door in his face” and “to show one’s face in public.” The referent of the word
“face” in these examples quite obviously extends far beyond the front of the human
head, rhetorically encompassing the whole person.
It is this everyday linguistic association between faces and persons that enables
literary and artistic representations of faces to serve so naturally as indices of
psychological states. Toni Morrison, for example, employs this logic in her novel, Song
o f Solomon, at a moment when the main character, named Milkman, engages in a bit of
long-overdue self-scrutiny:

5 Young, A., Brace, V., “Perceptual Categories and the Computation of ‘Grandmother’” in Vicki Brace,
ed., Face Recognition: a Special Issue o f the European Journal o f Cognitive Psychology 3 (1), pp. 5-49,
p. 7. The parenthetical remarks on lip reading refer to a study by McGurk, H., MacDonald, J. (1976).
“Hearing lips and seeing voices” in Nature (264), pp. 746-8.

1

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Milkman stood before his mirror and glanced, in the low light of
the wall lamp, at his reflection. He was. as usual, unimpressed
with what he saw. He had a fine enough face. Eyes women
complimented him on, a firm jaw line, splendid teeth. Taken
apart, it looked all right. Even better than all right. But it lacked
coherence, a coming together of the features into a total self. It
was all very tentative, the way he looked, like a man peeping
around a comer of someplace he is not supposed to be, trying to
make up his mind whether to go forward or to turn back.2
The apparent disjuncture of the features of Milkman’s face betrays a hesitant
personality that is developmentally incomplete, and thus manifestly out of joint. Here,
as elsewhere in Morrison’s novel, Milkman shows himself to be something of a modem
Hamlet, whose literary spirit haunts Morrison’s own meditation on ghosts and
intergenerational inheritance. The great themes of Shakespeare’s drama—the spectral
presence of a dead father, the troubled affective bonds between a mother and her son,
the inverse relationship between thought and action, and the psychological mood of
melancholy—all figure prominently in Morrison’s fable about African-American
masculinity. The importance of the face to its figurative logic as well is therefore
unsurprising, since the legibility of the face is naturally a question of great urgency in
Shakespeare’s drama of deceit and betrayal.
Morrison’s faith in the meaningfulness of the face’s appearance, however,
inverts the profound mistrust with which faces are consistently (and understandably)
regarded throughout Hamlet. Shakespeare’s play is, if anything, a skeptical meditation
on the incommensurability of surfaces and depths. In Claudius’ Denmark, one would
be a fool to trust appearances, especially those of a person’s face: after all, “one may

2 Toni Morrison, Song o f Solomon (New York: Plume, 1977), p. 69-70.
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smile and smile and be a villain,” as Hamlet bitterly notes (1.5.115),3 Of course,
Claudius knows this as well, as he reveals in a telling aside that more than hints at the
deed that weighs heavily upon his soul: “The harlot’s cheek beautied with plast’ring art
/ Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it / Than is my deed to my most painted word. /
O heavy burden!” (3.1.59-62). Here the king’s public face is shown to be a kind of
mask, and we can see why in a world rendered so rotten by political theater, Hamlet
would perversely insist that the “fruitful river in the eye” and the “dejected havior of the
visage” should not be taken as reliable signs of his inner grief: “For they are actions that
a man might play” - “but the trappings and the suits of woe” - whereas he has “that
within which passes show” (1.2.83-88). Perhaps Shakespeare’s point is that politics is
but a debased form of theater and that therefore politics and the hermeneutic faith of
physiognomy are radically incompatible: after all, in another of Shakespeare’s great
political dramas we hear the ill-fated Duncan, who has just bestowed the title of the
Thane of Cawdor upon Macbeth, declare the ironically self-confirming sentiment that
“There’s no art / To find the mind’s construction in the face” (1.4.11-12).4
Unfortunately for the hapless king, Macbeth will soon conceal his own treachery with
“fairest show,” having learned that “False face must hide what the false heart doth
know” (1.7.82-83).
Claudius’ rhetorical play on conscience and cosmetics, and Hamlet’s obsession
with the difference between sincerity and theatricality, both suggest that faces can, and
often do, serve as deceitful masks. But, of course, masks need not be equated with
J William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Ed. Harold Jenkins (London: Routledge, 1982).
4 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Eds. David Bevington et al. (New York: Bantam, 1980).
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disguise, regarded, that is, as merely theatrical, in the pejorative sense that is common in
the modem West. Shakespeare’s notion of deceit presupposes a doubling of the face
(captured nicely in the idiom “two-faced”); but what if there is no “inner” face beneath
which to search for that which “passes show”? Then, the face might be called a mask,
but a mask might also be understood as a kind of face: the distinction would lose its
hold on us. The ancient Greeks understood this well when they used the same word,
prosopon, to refer to both masks and faces. Eliot’s Prufrock, perhaps Hamlet’s canniest
modem reader, understood this too in his own neurotic way: “There will be time, there
will be time / To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet” (11. 26-27).5 But even
when the conceptual line between face and mask becomes so utterly blurred, the face
nonetheless remains a privileged index of personhood, even if the person is now
regarded as a persona.
Twentieth-century investigations into the philosophy and science of mind tell us
a great deal about why the human face and personhood are so inextricably linked.
Much remarkable work has been done exploring the central role that faces play in
human life. Wittgenstein, especially, attributed great importance to the face in his later
philosophical reflections. In fact, the ways in which the workings of the whole body
make visible the life of the mind was an abiding concern of Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy; for as he declared in the Philosophical Investigations, “the human body is

5 T.S. Eliot, “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” in The Waste Land and Other Poems, Ed. Frank
Kermode (New York: Penguin, 1998), pp. 3-8.
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the best picture of the human soul” (PI p, 152).° But it is clear that he regarded the face,
of all the parts of the body, as the most special. As we will see, Wittgenstein cared
deeply about understanding the nature of facial perception; however, he was interested
not only in how we see actual faces (cf., for instance, PI §§536-539), but how the way
we see faces informs numerous other aspects of human life as well, including the very
possibility of philosophical reflection itself. During his discussion of rule-following in
the Investigations, for example, we find the ancient art of face-reading invoked in order
to illustrate an important point about semantics: “Meaning is a physiognomy [Die
Bedeutung eine Physiognomie]” he concludes while musing upon the “character” of the
game of chess (PI §568). Physiognomy turns up again in the discussion of seeing
aspects and aspect-blindness in Part II (sec. xi), where he goes so far as to endow words
with faces: “The familiar physiognomy [Gesicht] of a word, the feeling that it has taken
up its meaning into itself, that it is an actual likeness of its meaning—there could be
human beings to whom all this was alien” (PI p. 186). The aspect-blind (those who
could not see a word as its meaning) would regard words as purely arbitrary signs, the
connections between their letters and their meanings entirely conventional (as in
structuralist linguistics), just as those who look at faces un-physiognomically (like
Hamlet) would regard the relationship between a face’s appearance and a person’s
thoughts and emotions as contingent or even non-existent. For Wittgenstein, meaning is
to a word as mind is to a face; but he can express his understanding of how we

6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001). References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation PI.
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experience the meaning of a word by likening a word to a face (Gesicht) only because
he already regards faces physiognomical!y: that is, as expressive of mind.
Just as a word, in our everyday use of language, is not taken as an arbitrary' sign
of a transcendent meaning, a face is likewise not an essentially “outer” sign to be
interpreted or deciphered for some contingently associated “inner” mental state. As he
puts it in a passage in Zettel:
“We see emotion.”—We do not see facial contortions and make
inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy,
grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant,
bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of
the features.—Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the
face. (Z 220)7
Of course, someone may feign (or suppress) a facial expression to deceive us, just as
someone may lie with words (as with silence), yet the possibility of deceit is grounded
upon the prior and more fundamental ability of the face to express: “We say ‘The
expression in his voice was genuine’. If it was spurious we think as it were of another
one behind it.— This face he shews the world, inwardly he has another one.—But this
does not mean that when his expression is genuine he has two the same” (PI §606).
Mental states, as physiognomists have long insisted, are readily recognizable in the
faces of others:
Consciousness in another’s face. Look into someone else’s face,
and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of
consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest,
excitement, torpor and so on. The light in other people’s faces.
Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his
face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast. (Z 220)
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, Eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright,, Trans. Anscorabe
(Berkeley: UC Press, 1970). References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation Z.
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Wittgenstein’s later writings, that is, somewhat surprisingly ask us to take the art of
physiognomy quite seriously, certainly more seriously, I suspect, than most of us are
accustomed to doing.
For if physiognomists—from Aristotle to Montaigne, and Lavater to
Lombroso—have always tried to read the mind or soul of the individual exhibited
outwardly by the human face, our late modernity has tended to dismiss this desire as a
deluded, even pernicious, dream. Indeed, the art historian James Elkins declares the
practice of physiognomy a “dead issue” for contemporary art, and he even goes so far as
to characterize the twentieth-century in general as “antiphysiognomic”:
As a science, physiognomy has entirely vanished: not only do
current art historians and artists not believe it but also they do not
care about it, and contemporary artworks that concern the face
avoid implying recoverable or specific psychological meaning.
The twentieth-century is immoderate and skeptical.8
Of course, as Hamlet’s skeptical remarks about faces clearly suggest, doubts about even
its basic presuppositions have long dogged the practice of physiognomy and are
therefore far from being unique to the twentieth century. For instance, Hegel’s critique
of Lavater in the Phenomenology o f Spirit was neither the first nor the last of its kind to
argue explicitly against the physiognomic assumption that “the reality of a man is his
face.”9 Nonetheless, our late modem disaffection with physiognomy is of an entirely
different, and I would argue higher, order. Hegel at least shared with Ms physiognomist
opponents a fundamental belief in the mental or spiritual expressiveness of the human
8 James Elkins, Pictures o f the Body: Pain and Metamorphosis (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1999), p.
73.
9 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit. Trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 193.
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face. As he remarked in his Lectures on the Philosophy o f Fine Art, “Although the
expression of spirit must be diffused over the appearance of the entire body, it is most
concentrated in the face, whereas the other members can reflect the spirit only in their
position.”10 But during the twentieth-century, the once widely shared physiognomic
belief in the expressive meaningfulness of the face was cast into doubt. The explicit
affirmation of physiognomic views and ideas, especially in art and critical theory,
became questionable, even ideologically suspect. Of course, our everyday faith in
physiognomy remains untouched. As ever, people continue to interpret each other’s
faces on a daily basis, either tacitly or unconsciously. But a wide range of cultural
forms such as portraiture and the philosophy of art; poetry and poetic theory; even the
fields of semantics and ethics, all bear evidence of the problematic nature of the face in
modernity.
A number of factors have surely contributed to the attenuation or rupture of the
physiognomic link between the face and the meaningfulness of its expressions. Perhaps
many of us simply doubt whether the varieties of emotional experience considered
typical of modernity (such as anomie, angst, shock and trauma) can be expressed at all,
let alone by the features of the face. An absolute absence of expression, according to
this view, may very well characterize the modem face at its most “expressive,” calling
into doubt whether expression of any kind can convey what is most meaningful (or
meaningless) about our troubled modernity. Moreover, some particularly baleful

10 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Vol. 1. Trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975), p. 727.
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aspects of the twentieth-century are directly related to the ideological distortion and
misuse of physiognomy itself: for example, we might recall such repellent
physiognomic theories as Lombroso’s “criminal anthropology,” which correlated
craniofacial features to propensities for criminality, and Otto Weininger’s Sex and
Character (1903), with its misogynistic and anti-Semitic theory of human morphology.
As recently as the 1920’s, Lombrosian measurements were admissible as prosecutorial
evidence in American courtrooms, while Weininger’s ideas were valued and
disseminated by Nazi propagandists.11 In the wake of such dark associations as these, it
is no wonder that physiognomy as a whole became suspect. And further contributing to
this theoretical distrust may be various forms of postmodern skepticism about
personhood itself: such skepticism, after all, entails doubt about the meaningfulness of
the face. In Paul de M an’s deconstructive notion that literary images of “defacement”
symbolize the figurative destiny of the psychological “subject” (itself regarded as
nothing but a linguistic trope), it is as if the truth of physiognomy were being affirmed
in an inverted and ironic manner, the fate of the face bound yet to the fate of the “inner”
person.
Whatever the reasons may be, the physiognomic face, understood as expressive
of a person’s character, thoughts and emotions, has now receded from sight into the
shadows cast by the doubts of a skeptical age. One measure of the widespread cultural
suspicion regarding physiognomy and the meaningfulness of the face is the frequency
with which modem artworks reduce the face to the plasticity of a mask or the
11 On Weininger’s use by the Nazis, cf. Ray Monk, Wittgenstein: The Duty o f Genius (New York:
Penguin, 1990), p. 23.
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contingency of a sign, aesthetic tendencies exemplified by the silkscreens of Andy
Warhol and the photographs of Cindy Sherman. Early in the twentieth-century,
Guillaume Apollinaire’s musician from Saint-Merry “with no eyes no nose no ears” and
Giorgio de Chirico’s faceless mannequins prefigured but one limit of a generalized
occulting or eclipse of the face.12 And yet, despite the radical questioning of the
meaningfulness of the face, or indeed perhaps because of it, the meaning of the face as
such remains very much in question. Doubt, after all, is not the same as indifference.
That is, the face, even when treated with profound skepticism by modem thinkers and
artists, nonetheless remains a matter of great urgency, crucial to any understanding of
what it means to be human, including what it means to be able to mean anything at all.
In a foreword that J.M. Coetzee wrote for Cecile Pineda’s novel Face, a
harrowing tale of a man who becomes badly disfigured (in effect, faceless) after a
terrible accident, Coetzee suggestively remarks that one thing Pineda’s novel shows us
is that our culture has yet to give adequate thought to the meaning of the human face:
Helio Cara is a man who loses his face and leams what it is to live
without a face in a society that is neither particularly cruel nor
particularly kind, just has no philosophy of the face, has given no
thought to the face, and therefore reacts to facelessness with
bewilderment and anger.13
I doubt Coetzee himself believes that we have given no thought at all to the face:
indeed, as I will show in chapter five, his own novel Waiting fo r the Barbarians,
published four years before Pineda’s, is an important contribution to what might be
12 On Apollinaire’s faceless flute-player and his influence on surrealism and other modernist movements,
see Willard Bohn, Apollinaire and the Faceless Man: The Creation and Evolution o f a Modern M otif
(London: Associated Univ. Presses, 1991).
!3 J.M. Coetzee, “Foreward” in Cecile Pineda, Face, Rev. ed. (San Antonio: Wings Press, 2003), p. xi.
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called the moral philosophy of the face. Moreover, the rich insights about faces culled
from the writings of many others and gathered together in the pages of this dissertation
also belie the sweep of Coetzee’s remarks. Yet I would agree with the spirit of his
words. If the face has certainly been an object of reflection, nonetheless still much
more remains to be discovered, synthesized, and thought through before we can answer
such fundamental questions about the face as Coetzee poses here:
What is this thing, this structure of skin and bone and gristle and
muscle, that we are condemned to carry around with us wherever
we go? Where does it begin, where does it end? And why does
everyone see it rather than seeing me? Or - turning the questions
on their head: Who is this I that dares to think of itself as concealed
behind its face, other than its face, so that its face is not it? (xi)
So with Coetzee’s remarks in mind, and with the intention of making a modest
contribution to some still incomplete philosophy of the face, this dissertation will
explore the important role representations of the human face play in twentieth-century
aesthetic experimentation and philosophical reflection.
My dissertation begins, in chapter one, with a survey of recent scientific studies
of the connection between face and mind. From the writings of investigators such as
Andrew Young and Martha Farah, I gather together research findings which show that
humans are biologically predisposed to treat faces and face-like visual patterns as
special perceptual objects. In addition, research on autism conducted by developmental
psychologists such as Uta Frith and Simon Baron-Cohen suggests that our innate
sensitivity to faces, in turn, plays an important role in the normal development of our
understanding of other minds as well as the acquisition of language. I conclude chapter
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one by integrating these scientific findings about human psychology with philosophical
writings by Quine, Dennett and Davidson which offer a complementary, yet more
theoretically comprehensive, explanation of how we understand the behaviour,
linguistic utterances, and mental states of other persons.
Chapter two continues tracing the surprising ways in which our ability to
understand the expressions of the human face informs not only the way we understand
language, but also other minds and the very concept of personhood itself, attesting to
the deep truth of ancient correlations between faces, masks and persons. This chapter
supplements the findings of chapter one with a sustained reading of Wittgenstein’s
writings on aspect-seeing in order to more fully explain how we perceive mentality in
the appearance of a human face. Mental states are neither facts of the matter in the
features of the face (a face is only flesh, after all), nor subjective projections on the part
of the beholder, but rather perceptual phenomena—Wittgenstein calls them “aspects”—
that we naturally see by adopting a certain attitude towards the face’s appearance: “My
attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul,” as the Investigations puts it.
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing, like Dennett’s notion of the “intentional
stance” and Davidson’s theory of “radical interpretation,” shows that the human mind is
not a private Cartesian substance but what we “see” by virtue of a complex, though
utterly natural, process of intersubjective response and pattern recognition— and the
human face is the paradigmatic visual pattern in which such recognition of mind occurs.
Chapters three and four extend these findings into an analysis of visual
portraiture, focusing on the paintings of Francis Bacon. Beginning with Bacon’s
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remarks during interviews with David Sylvester about the sense of injury often
associated with his physiognomic distortions, chapter three begins by asking why such
“magical” feelings arise at all with respect to visual representations of human faces.
Reading Wittgenstein with the work of art historians Ernst Gombrich and Richard
Wollheim, I find that the human mind naturally responds to images of faces as
expressive of mentality: we do not simply see faces in the images, but to an extent we
see, and thus respond to, the images as persons. Chapter four then goes on to argue that
the violent “sensations” Bacon’s paintings provoke is directly linked to this natural
cognitive confusion, explaining why Bacon’s art necessarily steered clear of total
abstraction: the affective force of his portraits depended upon the perceptual
recognizability of his faces as faces. Seen this way, Bacon’s portraiture comes into
focus as a sustained meditation on the nature of modem personhood in the wake of a
post-Darwinian acceptance of the contingency of life. I find, however, that a profound
ambivalence about personhood runs through Bacon’s portraiture: on the one hand, his
art affirms that personality is wholly visible, a cloud-like emanation that floats upon the
surface of a person’s face, while on the other hand, it implies that the self is a hidden
substance requiring an invasive and violent disclosure in order to be captured in paint.
In the end, though, this chapter argues that Bacon’s greatest obsession was with the
wonder of creation itself: that chance procedures in the studio might somehow replicate
and capture on canvas the total accident of personal existence.
My fifth and final chapter looks into the ethics of physiognomy, asking after the
moral consequences of whether we see the mind as a private substance or, as John
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Ashbery has suggested, a “visible core.” This chapter reads two narratives about faces
that dramatize the solipsistic consequences of a Cartesian commitment to mental
privacy: that of the faceless woman in Rilke’s Notebooks ofMalte Laurids Brigge and
the Magistrate’s dreams about the tortured woman in Coetzee’s Waiting fo r the
Barbarians. Anticipating elements of Bacon’s portraiture, Rilke’s vignette is a gory
dramatization of the epistemological violence entailed by any conception of the mind as
essentially private. Coetzee’s novel too cautions us against such Cartesian imaginings,
suggesting that they are conceptually Isomorphic with the psychological views that
motivate Invasive interrogation practices used in the name of state power. I next
consider Levinas’ paradoxically iconoclastic phenomenology of the face, an ambivalent
critique of Husserlian phenomenology that aims, but ultimately fails, to escape this
Cartesian predicament. Levinas shows himself still to be in the grip of a fundamentally
Cartesian picture of mind, which explains why he would feel himself able to respect the
alterity of the other person’s face only by refusing to see it. Wittgenstein’s writings, on
the other hand, show how the expressive meaningfulness of the face can play a positive,
even essential, role in ethical life. I conclude by arguing that his theory of aspect-seeing
explains not only how we can understand the expressions of a human face but also how
we can perceive ethical truths, preserving the reality of moral claims while steering
clear of both moral subjectivism and fundamentalism.
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1, Face and Mind: Scientific and Philosophical Investigations

Developmental psychologists have shown that we
enter the world predisposed to treat faces unlike all other
perceptual objects. Human neonates, for example, will track
a moving face further than any other pattern of comparable
complexity.14 In one study (by Goren et al. [1975]), forty
infants with a median age of nine minutes were presented
with four different visual stimuli: a regular face pattern, two
scrambled faces, and a blank face. Each pattern was moved
back and forth in front of the newborns through a 180Fig. 1

degree arc, while their head and eye movements in response

to the stimulus were noted. Responsiveness to the regular face pattern was significantly
greater than to any of the other stimuli. As the researchers summarize the important
implications of their findings, which have since been replicated by others (Johnson et
al. [1991]): “These results imply that organized visual perception is an unlearned
capacity of the human organism. The preference for the proper face stimulus by infants

54 These results were first reported in Goren, C.C., Sarty, M., and Wu, R.W.K. (1975). “Visual following
and pattern discrimination of face-like stimuli by newborn infants” in Pediatrics 56, pp. 544-9. Goren et
al.’s findings were replicated and expanded upon by Johnson, M. H., Dziurawiec, S., Ellis, H., Morton, J.
(1991). “Newborns’ preferential tracking of face-like stimuli and its subsequent decline” in Cognition 40
(no. 1-2): 1-19. Goren et al. (1975) cited in Andrew Young, Face and Mind (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1998), pp. 71-2. Subsequent references to Face and Mind will be given parenthetically with the
abbreviation FM. Johnson et al. (1991) cited in Martha Farah, The Cognitive Neuroscience o f Vision
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), pp. 116-7. Subsequent references to The Cognitive Neuroscience
o f Vision will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation CNV.

15

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

who had not seen a real face prior to testing suggests that an unlearned or ‘evolved’
responsiveness to faces may be present in human neonates” (Goren et aI, p. 544).
Moreover, in addition to showing an innate preferential attentiveness to face-like
patterns, humans also seem able to perceptually discriminate between different facial
expressions at a remarkably young age. One study (Field et al. [1982]) observed that
infants with an average age of but thirty-six hours could discriminate between at least
three different facial expressions (happy, sad and surprised).15 Repeated exposure to
one of these facial expressions modeled by a live adult would result in a gradual
diminishment of the infant’s visual attentiveness, while a presentation of a new
expression would result in a renewal of visual fixation, demonstrating that infant’s even
this young must be able to perceive differences among facial expressions. The
researchers also noted that the neonate subjects tended to imitate the facial expressions
with which they were presented (see fig. 1, from Field et al. [1982]), suggesting that
“there is an innate ability to compare the sensory information of a visually perceived
expression... with the proprioceptive feedback of the movements involved in matching
the expression” (Field et al., p. 181). These studies show that even at birth, humans
possess a special sensitivity to faces and their expressions.
As we grow older, faces retain their cognitive status as special perceptual
objects. Robert Yin, for example, demonstrated that our recognition of faces is
uniquely sensitive to spatial orientation. As Andrew Young describes Yin’s influential
work:
15 Field, T.M., Woodson, R„ Greenberg, R. and Cohen, D. (1982). “Discrimination and imitation of facial
expressions by neonates,” in Science 281, pp. 179-81. Cited in Young, Face and Mind, pp. 72-3.

16

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Yin (1969) began by comparing face recognition with recognition
of other objects normally seen in one orientation (aeroplanes,
houses, stick figures). Not surprisingly faces proved easier to
recognize which, Yin realized, did not tell us anything very
profound. Faces may be well remembered simply because of
greater task familiarity or even because the particular set of faces
used may have been especially easy to remember. For this reason
Yin included a second condition in which the stimuli were
inverted both at study and test. This condition produced a
reversal in rank order, with faces now proving hardest to
recognize.16
Yin hypothesized that this startling inversion effect indicated that faces are perceived in
a different manner than other classes of objects. Whereas most visual objects are
perceived by means of decomposition into discrete features, faces, Yin argued, are not
decomposed into parts and thus face recognition is disproportionately affected by
inversion.
Martha Farah and others have since provided confirmation of the hypothesized
link between the inversion effect and the special “holistic” nature of facial perception.
In one study, Farah et al. encouraged half of a group of human subjects to leam to
recognize a set of faces by familiarizing themselves with the various “parts” or
individual features of the faces. The other half of the subjects were presented with faces
presented in a normal format (that is, not broken up into parts). Remarkably, the
subjects who learned the faces in parts showed no inversion effect, while those who
learned the faces in a normal fashion did. Farah writes that “these results suggest that
what is special about face recognition, by virtue of which it is so sensitive to

16 Andrew Young, Face and Mind, p. 76. Citing Yin, R. K. (1969) “Looking at upside-down faces” in
Journal o f Experimental Psychology (81), pp. 141-5.
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orientation, is that it involves representations with relatively little or no part
decomposition” (CNV 138).
Recent neuroanatomical studies in lower primates suggest that face perception is
special not only because of its holistic manner of visual processing, but also because it
is localized in different regions of the brain than are the systems for perceiving nonface
objects. A neuroscientific technique known as single cell recording, which measures
the neuronal activity of a given brain cell, has shown that there are individual cells
selectively responsive to the presence of face-like visual patterns. Face cells, as they
are called, “respond vigorously to faces yet show little response to nonface objects or
scrambled arrays of face parts” (CNV 119). In monkeys, face cells are particularly
concentrated in a single region of the brain (anterior superior temporal sulcus), where
they comprise up to 20 percent of all the cells in that area. While brain cells have been
found that are selectively sensitive to other types of visual objects, no other objects
except faces have so many cells devoted to their perception. Consistent with the
findings that facial perception is holistic in nature, “analyses of the aspects of facial
appearance that drive the cells suggest that configurational relations among multiple
facial features are critical” (CNV 119).17 However, it is not the case that a single cell is
devoted to a single face: while different cells respond differentially to different faces,
“each cell has a gradient of responsiveness to a range of faces, and any given face will
evoke activity at different levels over a subset of the face cell population” (CNV 121).
This suggests that face cells comprise a “system of distributed representation” in the
17 Citing Yamane, S., Kaji, S. and Kawano, K. (1988) “What facial features activate face neurons in the
inferotemporai cortex of the monkey?” in Experimental Brain Research (73), pp. 209-214.
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brain, consistent with recent connection!st and neural network theories of cognition in
the philosophy of mind.
The specialness and specificity of facial perception is also indicated by the
nature of prosopagnosia, which is “an inability to recognize familiar faces following
cerebral injury” (FM 81) despite “intact intellectual functioning and even apparently
intact visual recognition of most other stimuli” (VA 69).18 Andrew Young explains that
people who suffer from this condition “are often unable to identify any familiar faces
including famous faces, friends, family, and their own faces when seen in a mirror...
They can distinguish faces as a category quite easily from other visual object... but have
no idea to which individual a specific face belongs” (FM 81). One study examined a
prosopagnosic (named W.J.) who happened to raise sheep. The researchers assembled
groups of photographs of three different classes of visual objects: human faces, sheep
faces of the same breed kept by W.J., and sheep faces of a different breed. They then
trained W J. along with a group of other, non-prosopagnosic, subjects to associate
names with each of the faces. The normal subjects performed better with the human
faces than with the sheep faces (even some who raised sheep themselves). W J., on the
other hand, performed poorly with the human faces and normally with the sheep faces.
Farah notes that the “data suggest that W.J.’s recognition impairment does not affect the
recognition of all groups of visually similar patterns, but is selective for human faces”
(CNV 123). This, and other types of related studies of normal and prosopagnosic

18 Martha J. Farah, Visual Agnosia: Disorders o f Object Recognition and What They Tell Us about
Normal Vision (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). References to this text will be given parenthetically
with the abbreviation VA.
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subjects, show that “prosopagnosia represents the selective loss of visual mechanisms
necessary for face recognition, and not necessary (or less necessary) for other types of
object recognition.... [TJhis implies that the face recognition system is separately
lesionable and hence anatomically distinct from the object recognition system” (CNV
127).
Findings such as these provide strong evidence that faces are in a perceptual and
cognitive category of their own. And indeed, it is not difficult to imagine evolutionary
reasons that such perceptual sensitivities would be selected for. The importance to an
infant’s survival of recognizing and responding to the faces of adult caretakers is
obvious. But, of course, our relationship to faces is far from entirely instinctual!
Surely, very few parts of the human body are as freighted with cultural associations as
is the face. One need only consider the types of headshots that are so common on the
covers of high-fashion magazines in order to appreciate the extent to which the
appearance of the face can be encoded with social meaning. But the evident extent to
which culture informs our responses to faces needs to be understood against the
background of scientific findings such as the ones we have already discussed; they
show clearly that the importance of the face to human forms of life has as much to do
with the kind of biological life we are as with what cultural forms we might socially
construct. The recent discoveries of cognitive neuroscience are important for
philosophically-minded reflection on the nature of human thought not only because of
what they can add to our knowledge about such issues as perception and imagination,
but also, and perhaps primarily, because of the constraints they put on our theoretical
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and philosophical speculations. If there are ways in which culture shapes our ideas
about faces - and certainly there are many - that does not mean that the role of the face
in the lives of humans is wholly cultural, as has been maintained by some.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, for example, argue in A Thousand Plateaus
that the human face is ideologically determined, through and through.19 They see the
face as the repressive product of something they call an “abstract machine of faciality”
that, among other things, distributes to each member of a society “facial units” that are
structured by a binary semiotic logic: “a man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one,
an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, ‘an x or a y’” (TP 177). Sounding very much
like a postmodern parody of Lavater’s eighteenth-century Essays on Physiognomy, they
argue that the various “concrete individualized faces are produced and transformed on
the basis of these units, these combinations of units—like the face of a rich child in
which a military calling is already discernible, that West Point chin” (TP 177).20 In
other words, Deleuze and Guattari see the human face as a social construct—“You
don’t so much have a face as slide into one” (TP 177). They therefore regard the face
as a thoroughly political issue. In accord with their analysis of the ideological

19 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Trans. Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987). References to this text will be given
parenthetically with the abbreviation TP.
0 Johann Caspar Lavater, Essays on Physiognomy, 3 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1789-98). For example,
here is a typical analysis of Lavater’s: “A portrait by Colla, which... we may affirm to be a great likeness.
Nature, precision, harmony, exactness, are discoverable in every part. The flat, somewhat sinking
forehead, agreeable to the whole, denotes an unpolished person, confined within a small circle of
domestic economy. The strong eyebrows do not speak mental, but bodily power. Eyebrows are only
significant of the former when they are unperplexed, equal, and well disposed. Nose, chin, neck, hair, all
are characteristic of rude, narrow insensibility. Rustic sincerity is evident in the mouth” (p. 177). Cited
in John Graham, Lavater’s Essays on Physiognomy: A Study in the History o f Ideas (Berne: Peter Lang,
1979), p. 46.
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constitution of “facial units,” they (logically enough) call for the “dismantling” of the
face (TP 188). Such a politics would amount to an overcoming of both the ideology of
subjectivity and the semiotics of the signifier that motivates the social constaiction of
human faces in the first place, for they explicitly position faces at the intersection of
language and subjectivity: the “faciality machine,” as they put it, is “the condition of
possibility” of both the “signifier” and the “subject” (TP 180). To dismantle one’s face
would therefore amount to breaking through both language and identity as we know it a heady possibility that Deleuze and Guattari find not only intelligible but deeply
attractive as well: “If the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics
involving real becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine. Dismantling the face is the
same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of
subjectivity” (TP 188). Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of “faciality,” however, is
predicated upon a thoroughly constructivist understanding of the role the face plays in
human societies, which therefore presupposes that that role might be fundamentally
altered. Recent work in cognitive neuroscience, however, enables us to see that such
views are entirely misguided: dreams of “dismantling” the face are but idle flights of
fancy. There can be no social constructivist understanding of the face.

• Life and Logos: Faces and the Development of Mind

In fact, not only do human sensitivities to the face clearly exist at birth - prior to
any kind of enculturation - we will see that such innate capacities actually enable and
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facilitate subsequent developmental steps towards full-blown socialization, If, as
Aristotle put it, humans are “rational animals” (zoon logon echon), our sensitivity to
faces can be understood to straddle or bridge the conceptual and developmental chasm
that separates the animal from the rational sides of our being. Aristotle’s apt
description of human beings can, of course, also be translated as speech-possessing life:
logos is at once reason and speech, and along with Aristotle countless philosophers have
claimed that the possession of language is a necessary condition of rationality. This is
Donald Davidson’s view, for example, and in an essay entitled “Rational Animals” he
explains why he thinks that rationality depends on the possession of language.21 To
begin with, he sees rationality as consisting in “having propositional attitudes such as
belief, desire, intention, and shame”: “to be a rational animal is just to have
propositional attitudes, no matter how confused, contradictory, absurd, unjustified, or
erroneous those attitudes may be” (SIO 95). A substantial degree of actual irrationality
in a given human is fully consistent with Davidson’s fundamental claim, for “the
possibility of irrationality depends on a large degree of rationality. Irrationality is not
mere lack of reason but a disease or perturbation of reason” (SIO 99). This is what
distinguishes the rationality of a normal adult from the mere animal existence of a snail
or an infant one week old:
Neither an infant 1 week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If
the infant survives long enough, he or she will probably become
rational, while this is not true of the snail. If we like, we may say
of the infant from the start that he is a rational creature because
Donald Davidson, “Rational Animals” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: OUP, 2001),
pp. 95-105. References to Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective will be given parenthetically with the
abbreviation SIO.
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he will probably become rational if he survives, or because he
belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk,
there remains the difference, with respect to rationality, between
the infant and the snail on the one hand, and the normal adult
person on the other. (SIO 95)
Davidson goes on to note that propositional attitudes only come “as a matched set”: “to
have one is to have a large complement. One belief requires many beliefs, and beliefs
demand other basic attitudes such as intentions, desires, and, if I am right, the gift of
tongues.... [T]he intrinsically holistic character of the propositional attitudes makes the
distinction between having any and having none dramatic” (SIO 96). But the key
element in Davidson’s argument is that the basic propositional attitude of belief itself
requires one to possess a conceptual distinction between “what is believed and what is
the case.” Interestingly, this makes the ability to experience surprise criterial of
rationality: “surprise about some things is a necessary and sufficient condition of
thought in general.” Davidson’s point is that the ability to feel surprise about one’s
beliefs (to find that a belief one holds is false) indicates that one possesses “the idea of
an objective reality which is independent of [one’s] belief’ (SIO 104). For Davidson,
this does not prove that linguistic communication is necessary for rationality (after all,
nothing could), but he also has no “idea how else one could arrive at the concept of an
objective truth” (105). He therefore concludes that “rationality is a social trait. Only
communicators have it” (105).
But how do we to come to possess the language that enables us to have a
concept of an objective truth in the first place? That is, how do we enter the space of
reasons, the interdependent web of propositional attitudes that constitutes rationality?
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In an essay on “The Emergence of Thought,” Davidson discusses this question, which
he acknowledges is a profoundly difficult one.22 For we are asking what happens to a
human infant between the time it is a non-rational animal and the time at which it
possesses the full-blown rationality of an intentional agent who possesses beliefs and
other related propositional attitudes. Because of the holism of the mental, as Davidson
terms the interdependency of the various aspects of mentality, it is difficult to describe
the intermediate steps that link the two sides of the Aristotelian phrase “rational
animal”:
We have many vocabularies for describing nature when we
regard it as mindless, and we have a mentalistic vocabulary for
describing thought and intentional action; what we lack is a way
of describing what is in between. This is particularly evident
when we speak of the “intentions” and “desires” of simple
animals. We have no better way to explain what they do. It is
not that we have a clear idea what sort of language we could use
to describe half-formed minds; there may be a very deep
conceptual difficulty or impossibility involved. (SIO 128)
For Davidson, meaning, like mentality, is holistic in nature: “words, like thoughts, have
a familiar meaning, a propositional content, only if they occur in a rich context, for such
a context is required to give the words or thoughts a location and a meaningful
function” (SIO 127). Therefore, if we happened to come upon a mouse who had the
right kind of vocal cords and trained it to say the word “cheese,” that “word would not
have a meaning when uttered by the mouse, nor would the mouse understand what it
‘said’” (127). The early verbal sounds emitted by an infant would be of the same
nature: “Infants utter words in this way; if they did not, they would never come to have

22 Donald Davidson, “The Emergence of Thought” in SIO, pp. 123-134.
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a language. But if you want to describe what is going on in the head of the child when
it has a few words which it utters in appropriate situations, you will fail for lack of the
right sort of words of your own” (SIO 127-8).
While he acknowledges the profound difficulties involved, Davidson
nonetheless goes on to suggest one developmental step, which he calls “triangulation,”
that he sees as a “necessary condition for thought and language, a condition that can
exist independent of thought, and can therefore precede it”:
The basic situation is one that involves two or more creatures
simultaneously in interaction with each other and with the world
they share; it is what I call triangulation. It is the result of a
threefold interaction, an interaction which is twofold from the
point of view of each of the two agents: each is interacting
simultaneously with the world and with the other agent. To put
this in a slightly different way, each creature learns to correlate
the reactions of other creatures with changes or objects in the
world to which it also reacts.... [T]he triangle I have indicated is
essential to the existence, and hence to the emergence, of
thought. For without the triangle, there are two aspects of
thought for which we cannot account. These two aspects are the
objectivity of thought and the empirical content of thoughts about
the external world. (SIO 128-9)
Tri angulation is a situation of shared attention and response: two creatures attending
and responding to the same objects or events in the external world while, at the same
time, being aware that they are doing so. If we imagine the reactions of one of the
agents as taking a linguistic form (“Here’s your bottle”), then we have a picture of the
very common way in which infants are taught numerous basic words, such as milk,
mommy, doggie, or ouch.
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Those familiar with the work of Quine will recognize the basic outlines of this
scenario from the “radical translation” thought experiment in Word and Object, which
9^

had a profound influence on the development of Davidson’s ideas." There, Quine
imagines a situation in which a linguist attempts to translate a foreign language for
which no translation manual exists: “radical translation, i.e., translation of the language
of a hitherto untouched people” (WO 28). Quine notes that the kinds of sentences most
likely to be translated first under such conditions would refer to “present events that are
conspicuous to the linguist and his informant,” to events, that is, that can be readily
triangulated in Davidson’s sense: “A rabbit scurries by, the native says ‘Gavagai’, and
the linguist notes down the sentence ‘Rabbit’ (or ‘Lo, a rabbit’) as tentative translation,
subject to testing in further cases” (WO 29). In order to be sure that the one-word
observation sentence “Gavagai” means the same thing as the English “Rabbit,” the
linguist must repeatedly test the correlation, stating “Gavagai” himself in the presence
of a rabbit while checking to see if this utterance consistently prompts the native’s
assent. If the correlation is confirmed frequently enough, the linguist can conclude that
the meanings of the two observation sentences are the same. Unlike Davidson, who did
not follow him on this score, Quine views the meaning of observation sentences as the
disposition of speakers to utter certain sounds in response to certain patterns of sensory
stimulation: thus Quine calls the meanings of observation sentences “stimulus
meanings” (Davidson, on the other hand, came to view the distal object itself, rather
than the proximal pattern of sensory stimulation, as the third point of the triangulated
23 Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960). References to this
text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation WO.
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relationship24). In Word and Object, therefore, Quine states that the sameness of the
meaning of the two sentences (“Gavagai” and “Rabbit”) is attributable to the sameness
of sensory stimulation for both speakers (WO 43). One point of the thought experiment
was to show that it was possible to explain linguistic meaning and translation simply by
reference to the relationship between behavior and patterns of stimulation; in other
words, Quine saw no need to posit the existence of non-physical (mental or intentional)
objects in order to explain effective translation. As Quine later put it:
The point of my thought experiment in radical translations was
philosophical: a critique of the uncritical notion of meanings and,
therewith, of introspective semantics. I was concerned to expose
its empirical limits. A sentence has a meaning, people thought,
and another sentence is its translation if it has the same meaning.
This, we see, will not do.25
Quine’s point, of course, went beyond the situation of translation and was intended to
account for linguistic meaning in general: “There is nothing in linguistic meaning
beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behaviour in observable circumstances,” as he
later put it (PoT 37-8). Quine, however, is no crude behaviorist: he does not deny the
existence of mental states that are inner and not publicly observable. Rather, he merely
notes that “as long as our command of our language fits all external checkpoints, where
our utterance or our reaction to someone’s utterance can be appraised in the light of
some shared situation, so long all is well. Our mental life between checkpoints is
indifferent to our rating as a master of the language” (PoT 37-8). Because the meanings

24 On the differences between Quine and Davidson on this matter, see Quine’s The Pursuit o f Truth
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 41-2. Subsequent references to this text will be given
parenthetically with the abbreviation PoT.
23 Quine, W.V.G. “Indeterminacy of translation again” (1987), p. 9.
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of sentences are not intentional objects, it follows that there is no fact of the matter
whether a given sentence in one language correctly translates a given sentence in
another. If a translation works, it works: the pragmatic fact that it works is the only
“fact” that might settle the matter. It is conceivable, therefore, that two radical
translators might produce perfectly adequate, but incompatible, translation manuals for
a single native language. This possibility is what Quine called the thesis of the
indeterminacy of radical translation.
However, the positing of an intersubjective likeness of stimulation for the two
speakers in the radical translation thought-experiment posed conceptual problems that
Quine eventually came to view as intractable. As he later put it:
an event of stimulation... is the activation of some subset of the
subject’s sensory receptors. Since the linguist and his informant
share no receptors, how can they be said to share a stimulation?
We might say rather that they undergo similar stimulation, but
that would assume still an approximate homology of nerve
endings from one individual to another. Surely such anatomical
minutiae ought not to matter here. (PoT 40)
In The Pursuit o f Truth, Quine therefore decided to discard the notion of likeness of
stimulus meaning first presented in Word and Object: “The view that I have come to,
regarding intersubjective likeness of stimulation, is rather that we can simply do without
it. The observation sentence ‘Rabbit’ has its stimulus meaning for the linguist and
‘Gavagai’ has its stimulus meaning for the native” (PoT 42). The linguist observes the
native informant consistently assenting to “Gavagai” when he imagines that he himself,
in the same position, would do so as well. The linguist’s grasping of the likeness of
meaning is therefore the result of an “uncanny” kind of interpersonal imaginative
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projection, which Quine terms empathy: “We all have an uncanny knack for
empathizing another’s perceptual situation, however ignorant of the physiological or
optical mechanism of his perception” (PoT 43). Our knack for empathy obviates any
need to make reference to “anatomical minutiae” of any sort. Quine then goes on to
offer a striking analogy in order to illustrate what he means by empathy: “The knack is
comparable, almost, to our ability to recognize faces while unable to sketch or describe
them” (PoT 43). It is by means of such empathy, Quine explains, that the linguist can
come to feel that the two words mean the same thing. It follows that empathic response
must be an essential component of all language acquisition:
Empathy dominates the learning of language, both by child and
by field linguist. In the child’s case it is the parent’s empathy.
The parent assesses the appropriateness of the child’s observation
sentence by noting the child’s orientation and how the scene
would look from there. In the field linguist’s case it is empathy
on his own part when he makes his first conjecture about
“Gavagai” on the strength of the native’s utterance and
orientation, and again when he queries “Gavagai” for the native’s
assent in a promising subsequent situation. (PoT 42)
It is unclear why Quine would feel compelled to specify which party (child or parent,
linguist or native) would need to exercise empathy for effective language-learning to
occur, for it is obvious that in each case the empathy of both parties is necessary.
Imagine the linguist attempting to prompt the assent of the native informant to an
utterance of “Gavagai” if the native happened to be indifferent to the state of the
linguist’s mind. And what good would the empathy of the parent be without the
simultaneous and mutual attentiveness of the child? Any parent knows how pointless it
is to point to an object and name it if the child is not “tuned in” at the same moment.
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And certainly young children are familiar with the frustration of questioning an adult
about the name of an object when that adult’s attention is directed elsewhere.
Davidson’s model of tri angulation, therefore, while based on Quine’s discussion
of radical translation, better captures the mutuality of both agents necessary for
linguistic training to occur. But Quine’s point about the similarities between empathy
and facial perception provides a fascinating clue as to how the experience of mutuality
itself might arise. As it so happens, recent findings in developmental psychology
(especially concerning the condition of autism) support Quine’s intuitive association
between language learning, empathy and facial perception. If we consider it, the way
we can empathetically grasp a person’s state of mind in the appearance of his or her
face is a remarkable ability. As everyday as the experience is, how is it that we so
readily know when another person is attending to the same event or object that we are?
Davidson’s presentation of the idea of tri angulation presupposes the presence of this
social and cognitive capacity, and yet if we consider how remarkable that ability truly
is, it is clear that it is hardly something to be taken for granted. Indeed, research by Uta
Frith, Alan Leslie, Simon Baron-Cohen and their colleagues into the disorder of autism
has shown that it is this very ability to experience what they call “joint attention” that is
severely impaired or even absent in autistic children.26

26 See Uta Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Alan Leslie,
“Pretense and representation: The origins of ‘theory of mind’” in Psychological Review (94), pp. 412-26;
and Simon Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory o f Mind (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1995), pp. 64-96. Subsequent references to Frith’s text will be given parenthetically with the
abbreviation AEE; subsequent reference to Baron-Cohen’s text will be given parenthetically with the
abbreviation MB.
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• Seeing Eye to Eye: Autism, Mindblmdness and the Intentional Stance

The explanation of autism developed by Frith, Leslie and Baron-Cohen, widely
acknowledged to be the best one currently available, sees it as an impairment in the
normal human ability to “mind-read”: that is, to regard other humans as intentional
agents interpretable according to mentalistic descriptions. Children with autism, BaronCohen explains, fail to develop this basic ability and therefore suffer from what he and
his colleagues calls “mindblmdness”: that is, they do not see others, to use Dennett’s
phrase, as “intentional systems.” In fact, Baron-Cohen’s explanation of autism adopts
wholesale Dennett’s notion of the “intentional stance,” and the great clinical success he
has had using Dennett’s theory provides some of the most compelling empirical
evidence in favor of its explanatory power. Baron-Cohen glosses the intentional stance
as our ability to attribute to others “the full set of intentional states (beliefs, desires,
thoughts, intentions, hopes, memories, fears, promises, etc)” (MB 21). Dennett himself
describes the intentional stance this way: “the tactic of interpreting an entity by
adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally
designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent” (CPM 238).27 Dennett’s formulation may
recall the sort of rational agent that is familiar from decision theory, which, as Davidson
points out, is “often derided as a false description of how people actually act” (SIO
126). However, Davidson believes such criticisms miss the mark:

2/ Ed. Samuel Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosophy o f Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation CPM.
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... the theory answers to our intuitions about how actual decisions
are made; in effect it simply spells out our commonsense
apparatus for explaining intentional action. For we all, whether
we think about it or not, make our decisions in terms of how we
weigh the values of various possible outcomes of our actions, and
how likely we think one or another course of action is to attain
those values. We understand why someone acts as he does only
by supposing that he or she values to various degrees the possible
results of action, and how probable he or she thinks a given
action is to produce one or another result. So although not
capable of precise predictions of actual choices, decision theory
nevertheless corresponds to our intuitions about how actual
decisions are made, and so is part of our commonsense apparatus
for explaining intentional behavior. (SIO 126)
Consistent with Davidson’s talk of a “commonsense apparatus,” Dennett calls the
“intentional stance” a version of “folk psychology” (a phrase that Dennett himself
coined and which has become a major subject of debate in the analytic philosophy of
mind).28 While we may become philosophically reflective about what is entailed in
taking up the intentional stance, Dennett sees such theoretical explanations as
Davidson’s and his own as nothing but the explicit elaboration of what all normal
humans already do implicitly without thinking twice about it.
Dennett, along with Quine and Davidson, is a non-reductive physicalist (a
position distinguished, on the one hand, from mind-body dualism, and on the other,
from eliminative materialism, which sees “folk psychology” as illusory and dispensable,

28 Barbara Von Eckardt provides the following bare-bones preliminary description of what the phrase
“folk psychology” means in the current philosophy of mind literature: “Human beings are social
creatures. And they are reflective creatures. As such, they continually engage in a host of cognitive
practices that help them get along in their social world. In particular, they attempt to understand, explain,
and predict their own and others’ psychological states and overt behaviour; and they do so by making use
of an array of ordinary psychological notions concerning various internal mental states, both occurent and
dispositional. Let us then consider [folk psychology] to consist, at a minimum, of (a) a set of attributive,
explanatory, and predictive practices, and (b) a set of notions or concepts used in those practices” (CPM
300).
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ultimately to be superceded by scientific explanations2*). While there are important
differences among their individual versions of non-reductive physicalism, they are each
fully committed to the idea that there is nothing in the universe but entities of the Mud
posited in (an ideally completed) physics, but at the same time hold that the mentalistic
vocabulary we use to talk about intentional agents (i.e. persons) is indispensable and
irreducible to the physical descriptions available to us from the various core natural
sciences. Quine, in Word and Object, therefore calls the attribution of propositional
attitudes to ourselves and others an “essentially dramatic idiom”: mind is something we
thereby project into ourselves and others (WO 219). As unreal as the referents of such
idiomatic usages may be, however, Quine nonetheless regards this form of theater as
“humanly” and “practically” indispensable (WO 218, 221). But it is because the
attribution of intentionality is a fundamentally projective act that we are, in practice,
unsure where to draw the line: that is, there is no fact of the matter that would decisively
settle when such projections have gone too far. As Davidson put it, “we speak of the
‘intentions’ and ‘desires’ of simple animals” because we don’t know how else to talk

29 As Paul Churchland, one of the most prominent eliminative materialists, puts it: “FP [folk psychology]
does indeed portray human cognition in terms of overtly sentential prototypes, viz. in terms of the many
propositional attitudes. But there is no reason why it must be correct in so representing our cognition,
nor in representing itself in particular. Perhaps the internal kinematics and dynamics of human and
animal cognition is not at all like the sentential dance portrayed in FP.... Perhaps we harbour instead a
kinematics of activation patterns and a dynamics of vector-to-vector transformations driven by learned
configurations of synaptic connections. Evidently it is not inconceivable that FP might someday be
challenged by a better account of human nature. Evidently the process is already underway” (CPM 315).
Dennett and other non-reductive physicalists would not fundamentally disagree with Churchland’s
account of the physical processes that must underlie human cognition (to use a term that has become
common in the philosophy of mind, Dennett and Davidson agree that the mental must supervene on a
physical base), yet they would disagree with Churchland’s notion that folk psychology could (and should)
ever be superceded by a non-intentional, purely scientific, vocabulary. On supervenience, see: Jaegwon
Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
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about them: “We have no better way to explain what they do” (SIO 128). Or as Quine
puts it:
Casting our real selves thus in unreal roles, we do not generally
know how much reality to hold constant. Quandaries arise. But
despite them we find ourselves attributing beliefs, wishes, and
striving even to creatures lacking the power of speech, such is our
dramatic virtuosity. We project ourselves even into what from
his behavior we imagine a mouse’s state of mind to have been,
and dramatize it as a belief, wish, or striving, verbalized as seems
relevant and natural to us in the state thus feigned. In the strictest
scientific spirit we can report all the behavior, verbal and
otherwise, that may underlie our imputations of propositional
attitudes, and we may go on to speculate as we please upon the
causes and effects of this behavior; but, so long as we do not
switch muses, the essentially dramatic idiom of propositional
attitudes will find no place. (WO 219)
According to Quine’s view of mentality, in other words, the first objects of
anthropomorphism and the pathetic fallacy must needs be ourselves.
Adapting and extending Quine’s insights, Dennett argues that we may describe a
living human organism (any many other things besides) from three different
perspectives (or stances): the physical stance, the design stance, and the intentional
stance (Dennett’s version of Quine’s “dramatic idiom”). The physical stance simply
describes an object’s material make-up, while the design stance treats a thing
functionally: a physical description of a computer, for example, would account for all of
the materials that constitute its physical make-up, while a design description would
explain that pressing the “backspace” key will cause the cursor to move one space to the
left on the screen. The higher level intentional stance, however, treats entities like
humans (and sometimes even mice) as rational agents whose behavior can be
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characterized and predicted by means of intentional or men tali stic interpretations. But
along with Quine, Dennett does not believe there is any fact of the matter to which our
intentional idioms refer. The intentional states (such as ones of belief) postulated by the
intentional stance have no ontological existence: they are non-factual and only “appear”
when we assume the right attitude towards another human being. Dennett explains that
attributions of intentionality are
interpretations of the phenomena - a “heuristic overlay,”
describing an inescapably idealized “real pattern.” Like such
abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the
beliefs and desires posited by the highest stance have no
independent and concrete existence, and since this is the case,
there would be no deeper facts that could settle the issue if - most
improbably - rival intentional interpretations arose that did
equally well at rationalizing the history of behavior of an entity.
Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation carries
all the way in, as the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical
interpretation of mental states and processes. (CPM 239)
According to Baron-Cohen’s theory of autism, four different cognitive
subsystems or “mechanisms” make up what he terms the normal “mindreading system,”
which as a whole enables us to adopt the intentional stance towards others. The first is
called the “intentionality detector” (ID): “ID is a perceptual device that interprets
motion stimuli in terms of the primitive volitional mental states of goal and desire. I see
these as primitive mental states in that they are the basic ones that are needed in order to
be able to make sense of the universal movements of all animals: approach and
avoidance” (MB 32-3). In support of the existence of this subsystem Baron-Cohen cites
a number of studies: one (Reddy 1991) shows “that very young infants are sensitive to
changes in an adult’s goal. For example, they respond to the distinction between a give
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and a tease” (35).',0 Studies of lower primates have “identified cells in the temporal
lobe of the monkey brain that respond selectively to the sight of another animal facing
forward, even if seen in profile. One can think of these as part of ID, detecting the
animal’s goal (to move forward). Yet other cells fire selectively to tactile stimulation
by an agent other than oneself, which suggests that there may be specific neural
structures sensitive to another agent having a goal of doing something to the observer”
(MB 38);31 And in support of the subsystem’s localization and dissociability, he cites a
study that has shown that “some patients with focal brain damage have been found to
lose the specific ability to categorize things as animate or inanimate” (MB 38).

32

The second mechanism in the mindreading system is what Baron-Cohen calls
the “eye-direction detector” (EDD). The EDD has three basic functions: “it detects the
presence of eyes or eye-like stimuli, it computes whether eyes are directed toward it or
toward something else, and it infers from its own case that if another organism’s eyes
are directed at something then that organism sees that thing” (MB 38-9). A number of
studies have shown that for the human perceptual system, eyes are the most important
part of the whole face. Daphne Maurer, for example, found “that 2-month-old infants
looked almost as long at the eyes as at a whole face but looked significantly less at other
parts of the face” (MB 39). Six months old have also been found to look two to three
30 Reddy, V., “Playing with other’s expectations: Teasing and mucking about in the first year” in Natural
Theories o f Mind, ed. A. Whiten. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
31 Baron-Cohen cites: Perrett, D., and Mistlin, A. “Perception of facial characteristics by monkeys” in
Comparative Perception, vol. 2: Complex Signals, ed. W. Stebbins and M. Berkeley (Wiley, 1990);
Hietanen, J., and Perrett, D. “A role of expectation in visual and tactile processing within temporal
cortex” in Brain Mechanisms of Perception and Memory: From Neuron to Behavior, ed. T. Ono et al.
(Oxford: OUP, 1991).
32 Warrington, E., and Shall ice, T. “Category specific semantic impairments” in Brain 107 (1984), pp.
829-854.
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times longer at a face looking at them than at a face looking away. In a study conducted
by Baron-Cohen and a colleague, they found that “computation of eye direction was
easily within the ability of normal 3-year-olds” (MB 40).33 Moreover, studies have
shown that we are particularly sensitive to mutual eye-contact: “there is clear evidence
of physiological arousal produced by mutual eye contact. For example, galvanic skin
responses increase with mutual eye contact, and brain-stem activation has been reported
in response to eye stimuli in monkeys” (MB 42).34 While physiological arousal can of
course be felt as both negative and positive in quality, in the case of human infants the
evidence suggests that the responses are usually pleasurable, “since eye contact reliably
triggers smiling” (MB 42).35 Indeed, it appears that the self-manipulation of arousal in
response to eye-stimuli is a very important part of an infant’s life:
Stem (1985)36 points out that an infant’s control over its visual
system is precociously mature, enabling the infant to make or
break eye contact and thus regulate the degree of eye contact and
the amount of physiological arousal that the infant can cope with
at a time. Too much might be uncomfortable; too little might be
understimulating. Since what constitutes a comfortable level of
arousal is likely to vary from one infant to another, it makes good
sense that the infant should have its own regulatory mechanism to
control this. There is mounting evidence that infants have a drive

33 Baron-Cohen, S., and Cross, P., “Reading the eyes: Evidence for the role of perception in the
development of a theory of mind” in Mind and Language 6 (1992), pp. 173-186.
34 Nichols, K., and Champness, B., “Eye gaze and the GSR” in Journal o f Experimental Social
Psychology 1 (1971), pp. 623-626; Wada, 1., “Modification of conically induced responses in brainstem
by shift of attention in monkeys” in Science 133 (1961), pp. 40-42.
33 Wolff, P., “Observations on the early development of smiling” in Determinants o f Infant Behavior, vol.
2, ed. B. Foss (Wiley, 1963); Stem, D., The First Relationship: Infant and Mother (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1977); Schaffer, H., “Early interactive development” in Studies in Mother-Infant
Interaction, ed. H. Schaffer (Academic Press, 1977).
36 Stem, D., The Interpersonal World o f the Infant (Basic Books, 1985).
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to maintain an optimal level of stimulation/' Furthermore, as all
parents know, infants and toddlers love to play peekaboo, which
is all about occluding the eyes and then revealing them. (MB 42)
According to Baron-Cohen, the intentionality and eye-direction detectors
together allow the infant to produce what he calls dyadic “representations” of various
states of affairs, such as: A wants food; B wants to open drawer; C sees me; D sees the
door. (Talk of “representations” is common in the cognitive scientific literature, but
such terminology should not be confused with representations in the philosophical
sense: there is no suggestion that these representations are in any way conscious or
linguistic in nature - rather, they are explicitly sub-personal and should be understood
as the “contents” of information-processing systems.) As Baron-Cohen explains, such
dyadic representations are obviously important but do not yet constitute the kind of
intersubjective cognitive relationships that would enable one “to be aware of a shared
universe,” the concept of an “objective reality” that Davidson argued can only be
produced by triangulation:
All these representations can be described as dyadic, since they
only specify the intentional (i.e. mentalistic) relation between two
objects (Agent and Object, or Agent and Self). Though that gets
you pretty far, these mechanisms do not allow you to represent
that you and someone else (whom we have been calling the
Agent) are both attending to the same object or event. And yet
that is exactly what one would need in order to be able to
communicate about a shared reality and to feel that you and the
other person are focusing on and thinking about the same thing.
(MB 44)

37 Maurer, D., “Neonatal synaesthesia: Implications for the processing of speech and faces” in
Developmental Neurocognition: Speech and Face Processing in the First Year of Life, ed. B. de BoyssonBardies et a!. (Kluwer, 1993).
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Joint attention, or triangulation, is the result of the third component in. BaronCohen’s theoretical model, which he calls the “shared-attention mechanism” (SAM):
“SAM’s key function is to build rather interesting things called triadic
representations.... Essentially, triadic representations specify the relations among an
Agent, the Self, and a (third) Object. (The Object can be another Agent, too.)” (MB 445). As an example of a triadic representation, Baron-Cohen offers the following: “You
and I see that we are looking at the same object” (MB 45). Research findings suggest
that the shared-attention mechanism depends heavily (though not exclusively) upon our
perception of eye-direction and begins quite early in life: “gaze monitoring is seen in
infants from around 9 months of age, and which all children, the world over, show by
14 months or so. In this phenomenon, the infant turns in the same direction that another
person is looking at and then shows gaze alternation, checking back and forth a few
times to make sure (as it appears) that it and the other person are both looking at the
same thing, thus establishing shared visual attention on the same object” (MB 48).

38

Moreover, children around the same time will begin to produce a “so-called
protodeclarative pointing gesture—that is, pointing with an outstretched index finger at
an object and then alternating the gaze again, checking back and forth a few times to
make sure (as it appears) that the other person has turned to look at the same thing the
toddler is looking at. This is a simple but effective way to direct someone else’s visual

38 Scaife, M., and Bruner, J., “The capacity for joint visual attention in the infant” in Nature 253 (1975),
pp. 265-266; Butterworth, G., ‘T he ontogeny and phyiogeny of joint visual attention” in Natural Theories
o f Mind, ed. A. Whiten (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
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attention to a shared focal object” ( 4 8 ) : Such proto-declaratives constitute an. early,
pre-linguistic, form of ostensive communication that will flower into the wide range of
indexicals that are such an important part of mature language use. What makes the joint
attention that is the goal of proto-declarative behavior so important to the development
of an intentional stance is that it evinces interest not merely in the object itself but in the
mental attitude of another person towards that object as well. As Uta Frith puts it:
“Attending to the object that another person is also attending to is a major
developmental milestone, which presents the child with a multitude of learning
opportunities”(AEE 101). But the first thing such joint attention behavior shows is that
the infant has already grasped the existence of other minds as such: and the faces and
eyes of others appears to be the most natural places for infants to look for signs of
mentality.
Studies show that the eyes are particularly important. At a very young age,
children regard the eyes of others as providing privileged access to their mental states.
“When the goal of an action is uncertain,” experiments have demonstrated, “the first
place young children (and indeed adults) look for information to disambiguate the goal
is the person’s eyes” (MB 49).40 Moreover, it has also been shown that children use eye
direction as a way of detecting another agent’s goal. “When 3-4-year-olds were asked
W hich chocolate will Charlie take?’ after being shown a display of four chocolates and
39 Bates, E., Benigni, L., Bretherton, I., Camaioni, K., and Volterra, V., “Cognition and communication
from 9-13 months: Correlational findings” in The Emergence o f Symbols: Cognition and Communication
in Infancy, ed. E. Bates (Academic Press, 1979).
40 Phillips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., and Rutter, M., “The role of eye-contact in the detection of goals:
Evidence from normal toddlers, and children with autism or mental handicap” in Development and
Psychopathology 4 (1992), pp. 375-383.
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Charlie’s face looking at one of these, they tended to pick the one he was looking at as
the goal of his next action” (MB 49). In a variation on this study, the face of Charlie
was again depicted as looking at one of the four sweets and the 3 to 4 year olds were
asked “Which one does Charlie want?” As Baron-Cohen reports, “children of this age
had no difficulty at all in inferring Charlie’s desire... from his eye direction. This was
particularly striking, as in a retest of this experiment the display also included a
distracter cue: a big, bold, black arrow pointing at another of the four chocolates.
Normal 3-4-year-olds appeared to ignore this ‘unnatural’ cue, and predominantly used
the ‘natural’ cue of eye direction” to determine Charlie’s mental state (MB 49-50).
The research of Baron-Cohen and his colleagues has shown that the
“intentionality detector” and the “eye-direction detector” are intact and normally
functioning in children with autism. However, it has been shown that autistic children
suffer a massive impairment in the functioning of the shared-attention mechanism, and
therefore do not seem capable of social triangulation: “Children with autism often do
not show any of the main forms of joint-attention behavior. Thus, they do not show
gaze monitoring,41 nor do they show the related behaviors of attempting to direct the
visual attention of others by using the pointing gesture in its ‘protodeclarative’ form”42

41 Mundy, P., Sigman, M., Ungerer, J., and Sherman, T., “Defining the social deficits in autism: The
contribution of nonverbal communication measures” in Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 27
(1986), pp. 657-669; Loveland, K., and Landry, S., “Joint attention and language in autism and
developmental language delay” in Journal o f Autism and Developmental Disorders 16 (1986), pp. 335349.
42 Baron-Cohen, S., “Perceptual role-taking and protodeclarative pointing in autism” in British Journal of
Developmental Psychology 1 (1989), pp. 113-127; Mundy et al. “Defining the social deficits in autism:
The contribution of nonverbal communication measures” (1986); Curcio, F., “Sensorimotor functioning
and communication in mute autistic children” in Journal o f Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 8
(1978), pp. 281-292.
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(MB 66). Interestingly, this is not because they cannot point at all. Baron-Cohen
reports that “they do use the pointing gesture for some other, non-joint attentional
functions, such as to request objects that are out of reach” (66).4j The crucial difference
between “proto-imperative” and “proto-declarative” pointing behavior is that the former
treats other agents in a purely behavioral goal-directed way (i.e. “give me that!”) while
the latter is directed at affecting the mental states of other persons: “look at that!”
When these three subsystems are working properly, they lead to the
development of a fourth component that finally provides a full-blown intentional stance:
Baron-Cohen calls this final component the “theory-of-mind mechanism” (ToMM).44
(The use of the word “theory” in this phrase can be misleading, for it is not meant to
suggest anything consciously grasped: it is rather like Davidson’s “commonsense
apparatus” or Dennett’s “folk psychology”.) The theory-of-mind mechanism is what
allows us to so easily and intuitively “mind-read” other humans, regardless of the fact
that “mind” itself is clearly not a fact that is visible in the way that our bodies or
behavior are. Along with the “shared attention mechanism,” this cognitive subsystem is
either missing or severely impaired in children who suffer from autism: thus, as it is
commonly put in the scientific literature, they lack an intuitive “theory of mind,”
rendering them “mind-blind.” According to Baron-Cohen, the “theory-of-mind
mechanism” utilizes the output of the other three in order to enable one to grasp the full
range of “epistemic mental states (which include pretending, thinking, knowing,
4j Baron-Cohen, S., “Perceptual role-taking and protodeclarative pointing in autism” (1989).
44 Baron-Cohen notes that he is taking the phrase “theory-of-mind” from Leslie, A., “ToMM, ToBy, and
Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity” in Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in
Cognition and Culture, eds. L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994).
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believing, imagining, dreaming, guessing, and deceiving)” and to tie them, together
“into a coherent understanding of how mental states and actions are related” (MB 51).
Interestingly, Leslie has argued that the earliest and most important epistemic mental
state for the development of a full-blown theory of mind is pretence, which underlies
the spontaneous pretend play that is common among very young children but which has
been shown to be absent in those with autism. Leslie finds the early onset of the ability
to pretend remarkable:
Pretending ought to strike the cognitive psychologist as a very
odd sort of ability. After all, from an evolutionary point of view,
there ought to be a high premium on the veridicality of cognitive
processes. The perceiving, thinking organism ought, as far as
possible, to get things right. Yet pretense flies in the face of this
fundamental principle. In pretence we deliberately distort
reality. How odd then that this ability is not the sober
culmination of intellectual development but instead makes its
appearance playfully and precociously at the very beginning of
childhood.... How is it possible for a child to think about a banana
as if it were a telephone, a lump of plastic as if it were alive, or an
empty soap dish as if it contained soap?45
According to Leslie, the reason pretence is so important, along with the reason it is so
essential that it appear this early in childhood development (usually around 18 months),
is that pretend play involves the same distinction between prepositional attitudes and
prepositional contents that enables subsequent attributions of mental states (such as
belief) to other persons. That is, before the full-blown acquisition of language and the
web of propositional attitudes as such, pretend play enacts the logical distinction

43 Alan Leslie, “Pretence and representation: The origins of ‘theory of mind’” in Psychological Review 94
(1987), pp. 412-426, p. 412. Cited in AEE 81.

44

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

between prepositional attitudes and contents that constitute the building blocks of the
space of reasons.
In pretend play, a three-way relationship is established, between an agent
(usually the child), a primary representation (the actual object being played with) and a
secondary representation that is de-eoupied from the primary one (which represents the
content of the pretence). Thus a child can pretend that a banana is a telephone while
remaining aware that it is a banana as well: as Karmiloff-Smith and Russell explain,
“the primary and decoupled representations involve different and separate levels of
processing and obey distinct causal and logical inferential constraints” (CPM 254).
Reality, in other words, is no longer identical with what someone may think about it.
As Frith explains, once this decoupling is accomplished, the child can go on to attribute
thoughts to others that are distinct from reality as well: “When decoupled, the
representation are no longer copies of the real world. Therefore, they can be attached to
a person’s wishes, thoughts, or memories. For instance, the child understands: mother
thinks about the banana ‘I t’s a telephone,'' and laughs” (AEE 81). This is an absolutely
crucial step in the development of the child’s “theory of mind.” Once the innate ability
to decouple is activated, the attribution of prepositional attitudes such as belief towards
others becomes common. As Frith notes: “Given sufficient learning experience, the
mentalizing mechanism enables the child to leam surprisingly fast about beliefs and
deception” (AEE 81).
Leslie’s theory of pretence therefore predicts that children with autism, who do
not exhibit spontaneous pretend play, should not be able to grasp the concept of belief,
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since the understanding of this prepositional attitude is developmental!}' dependent
upon the earlier mastery of the ability to pretend. Dennett has argued that the best way
to test if a child has a concept of belief is to see if the child understands that another
person might hold a false belief: “this,” explains Baron-Cohen, “might constitute a
litmus test of whether an organism had a ‘theory of mind,’ in that in such cases it
becomes possible to distinguish unambiguously between the child’s (true) belief and the
child’s awareness of someone else’s different (false) belief’ (MB 69-70). Following
Dennett’s suggestion, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith devised an experiment using two
dolls (named Sally and Anne) in order to test the understanding of belief among three
different child populations: children with autism, children with Down’s syndrome and
normal children. Frith describes the “Sally-Anne Experiment” this way:
Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. Sally has a marble and
she puts it into her basket. She then goes out. Anne takes out
Sally’s marble and puts it into her box while Sally is away. Now
Sally comes back and wants to play with her marble. At this point
we ask the critical question: “Where will Sally look for her
marble?” The answer is, of course, “In the basket.” This answer
is correct because Sally has put the marble into the basket and has
not seen it being moved. She believes the marble is still where
she put it. Therefore she will look in the basket even though the
marble is not there any more. (AEE 83-84)
As Frith remarks, the “results were striking”: most of the normal children and children
with Down syndrome correctly answered the question “Where will Sally look for her
marble?” In contrast, nearly all of the children with autism pointed to the box. (The
results were later replicated using live humans in the roles of Sally and Anne.) In
accordance with the predictions of Leslie’s theory of the developmental role of
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pretence, they were unable to infer from the situation that Sally would have a false
belief about the location of her marble: in other words, they showed that they had no
intuitive grasp of the concept of belief and thus could not see that another person’s
thoughts might be different from their own. Without prior mastery of the ability to
decouple representations from reality through pretence, the autistic children were
unable to attribute the prepositional attitude of belief to Sally: they were blind to the
otherness of Sally’s mind.
In a negative way, this confirms Davidson’s point that surprise is criterial of
rationality. As we already noted, Davidson holds that “surprise about some things is a
necessary and sufficient condition of thought in general,” for it demonstrates that the surprised person grasps the distinction between “what is believed and what is the case”
(SIO 96). Here, however, it seem that we need to add to Davidson’s criterion (though
perhaps it is already implicit in it) the requirement that one be able to understand the
possibility of another person experiencing surprise. Interestingly, Frith notes that the
anticipation and observation of surprise in others are important and regular aspects of
children’s entertainments (as, of course, are deception and disguise, which also
presuppose the ability to understand that other people might hold false beliefs):
A common feature in children’s stories and puppet plays all over
the world is the surprise created by one actor knowing something
that another actor does not. For instance, Punch is hit over the
head by Judy. This is funny because, unbeknown to Punch, Judy
was coming up behind him with a rolling pin. Children from
about age three watch such shows with every sign of apparent
pleasure and anticipation. They know that something that a
person has not seen cannot be in the mind of that person, and will
therefore cause a surprise. If a child can implicitly take account
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of another person’s thoughts, this kind of inference will be
obvious. (AEE 82)
Sadly, it is this very “obvious” kind of inference that children with autism are blocked
from readily seeing, as the Sally-Anne experiment clearly demonstrated.
The studies and analyses of autistic mindblindness by Baron-Cohen and his
colleagues foreground what kinds of cognitive capacities are taken for granted in the
theories of philosophers such as Quine and Davidson, while at the same time
confirming that empathy (Quine) and triangulation (Davidson) are absolutely necessary
aspects of normal human cognitive development. Indeed, it appears that the
fundamental role of pretence in our ability to grasp the mental states of another person
obliquely supports Quine’s treatment of the attribution of propositional attitudes as a
kind of dramatic idiom: without the ability to pretend, we are blind to the existence of
other minds (other behavioral entities will be perceptible, for sure, but those entities
will not be endowed with the full range of propositional attitudes absent the prior
mastery of pretence). Quine, it turns out, is also absolutely right when he suggests that
empathy plays a crucial role in language acquisition: Baron-Cohen’s findings about the
centrality of the eyes to the establishment of joint attention corroborates Quine’s
intuitive analogy between empathetic response and facial recognition. Indeed, it seems
that mindblindness is intimately related to abnormalities in facial recognition and
perception. As Frith reports, “experiments have shown that people with autism cannot
remember faces as well as they can remember buildings or landscapes”46 and a

46 Blair, R.J.R., Frith, U., Smith, N., Abell, F., and Cipolotti, L., “Fractionation of visual memory:
Agency detection and its impairment in autism” in Neuropsychologia 40 (200), pp. 108-118.
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“neuropilysiological study by Robert Shultz and colleagues at Yale has demonstrated
that the part of the brain that is normally specialized for faces is not specialized in
autistic people”47 (AEE 104). In fact, the studies of Shultz showed that when
processing faces the brains of autistic subjects showed activity in the same areas
activated by the visual processing of nonface objects in normal control subjects (AEE
204). For people with autism, it appears that there does not seem to be anything
particularly special about the human face.
The inattentiveness of autistics to the appearance of mentality in the face
negatively affects their ability to team language, consistent with Quine’s correlation of
empathy with language acquisition. Studies of language learning by the developmental
scientist Paul Bloom show that a meeting of minds by means of a meeting of the eyes
plays a crucial role in normal language learning.

JO

As Frith describes Bloom’s findings:

One old idea is that the sound of a word has to be paired with the
sight of a stimulus, and that from such pairings lasting
representations are formed in memory. According to Bloom such
a mechanism will not be sufficient. It would lead to frequent
incorrect pairings of word sound and word meaning, which are
actually quite rare in young children’s language. Consider the
novel word “fendle” spoken when looking at a novel object, an
unusual red ball with yellow spikes. Does “fendle” refer to the
whole object, to the yellow spikes, or perhaps to one particular
spike? If you follow the speaker’s gaze, and if you take into
account what they said before (e.g., “Here is a strange one”), you
would get clues to what the speaker meant (e.g., “fendle” refers
to a red ball with yellow spikes). To understand the speaker’s
intention, the intuitive mentalizing mechanism... will play a role.
The 18-months revolution, which may coincide with a leap in the
47 Schultz, R.T., Gauthier, I., Klin, A., et al., “Abnormal ventral temporal cortical activity during face
discrimination among individuals with autism and Asperger’s syndrome” in Archives o f General
Psychiatry 57 (2000), pp. 331-340.
48 Paul Bloom, How Children Lean the Meaning o f Words (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
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maturation of the brain system that underpins mentalizing, also
coincides with a leap in word learning. Bloom argues that this is
more than coincidence. (AEE 120)
Consistent with the theories of mind-reading and mind-blindness proposed by BaronCohen and others, Bloom has shown that the direction of the adult’s gaze plays a crucial
role in the child’s acquisition of words: after all, we have already noted that the first
place people generally look in order to detect another person’s goal or mental state is
his or her eyes. It is unsurprising, therefore, that autistic children, while showing
themselves capable of learning language, acquire it in ways radically different from
normal children. In one study, for example, both normal and autistic children were
individually placed in a room in which no other person was present. Instead, a voice
was pumped in from a speaker above, saying “fendle” at the same time as the child
touched a novel object. As Frith explains, “this situation has all the prerequisites for
learning a sound and sight association, but not the prerequisites for intention tracking,
as there is only a disembodied voice” (AEE 120). Consistent with the mindblindness
explanation, the children with autism were able to learn the novel word under these
conditions while the normally developing children did not. As Frith comments, “While
normal children ignored the sound from above when no speaker was present, so autistic
children may well ignore the subtle cues to intentions when face to face with a speaker”
(AEE 120-121). Of course, as we noted earlier, it makes no sense to suggest, as Quine
does, that in a normal language-learning situation, empathy is exercised by one or
another of the parties: clearly both teacher and student, adult and child, native and
linguist need to be empathetic for effective language training to occur. Bloom agrees:
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he suggests that “given the ability to attribute intentions and other mental states to
others, it is after all not such a mystery that young normal children manage to acquire
language without much trial and error. It is not only the children, but the other people
around them, who continuously monitor mental states.... When a child leams the word
for ‘pudding,’ it is most likely that the word will have been uttered at exactly the right
moment so that the child does not mistakenly learn to use the word ‘pudding’ to mean
‘raisin,’ or ‘yellow,’ or ‘stop it’” (AEE 121). So when we read the literary critic Paul de
Man declare that “Man can address and face other men... because he has a face,” we can
nod and agree.49 But when he goes on to add that “he has a face only because he
partakes of a mode of discourse that is neither entirely natural nor entirely human,” we
can understand that he is almost exactly wrong. Whatever “modes of discourse” we
may be able to partake of, we can do so only because we always already (as the saying
goes) perceive the significance of the human face beforehand: the meaningfulness of the
face lies at the cognitive ground of our linguistic capacities and is certainly not the mere
“product” of any figures of speech.50 By arguing that self and interpersonal
communication are reducible to the autonomous workings of “language” (whatever that

49 Paul de Man, The Rhetoric o f Romanticism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1984), p. 90.
50 For example, prosopopoeia. On de Man’s view of the rhetorical trope of prosopopoeia, see esp.
“Autobiography As De-Facement” and “Shelley Disfigured” in The Rhetoric o f Romanticism, pp. 67-81
and pp. 93-123. In “Shelley Disfigured,” for example, we are told that the human face (along with the
sense of subjectivity the figure of the “face” is said rhetorically to produce) endlessly emerges and
dissolves within a tropological play of face-giving and defacement, which he calls “prosopopoeia” (from
“prosopon poien, to confer a mask or a face”). For de Man, there is no end to prosopopoeia for it is the
very “madness of words” and “no degree of knowledge” can stop it (122). Incurable, the only therapy
possible for this condition is the ironic insight that there is no point celebrating or denouncing it, since we
readers and subjects “are its product rather than its agent” (122).
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word might mean abstracted from the intentions of humans who actually use words), de
Man has put matters entirely backwards.

• The Nature of Reason: Brains and Minds, Syntax and Semantics

As I hope is evident, the study of autism has added immensely to our
understanding of the crucial role played by the human face and facial perception in the
normal development of the human mind, including our ability to acquire, to recall
Davidson’s phrase, “the gift of tongues.” If the intentional stance is, as Dennett likes to
say, a kind of pattern recognition, it seems that one of the most important perceptual
patterns may be that of the human face (cf. Dennett’s “Real Patterns”51). To return full
circle to the Aristotelian view of humans as “rational animals” with which we began,
developmental psychology so far bears out our contention that faces do play a special
role in the cognitive transformations that bridge the animal and the rational sides of our
being, while at the same time making clear that, of course, no real chasm exists between
these two terms. In a way, the conceit of a bridge is an idle one: as developmental
psychology and cognitive neuroscience (often working in concert) continue to show,

51 Daniel Dennett, “Real Patterns” in Brainstorms: Essays on Designing Minds (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1998), pp. 95-120. On p. 98 we find: “Where utter pattemlessness or randomness prevails, nothing
is predictable. The success of folk-psychological prediction, like the success of any prediction, depends
on there being some order or pattern in the world to exploit. Exactly where in the world does this pattern
exist? What is the pattern of! Some have thought, with Fodor, that the pattern of belief must in the end
be a pattern of structures in the brain, formulae written in the language of thought. Where else could it
be? Gibsonians might say the pattern is ‘in the light’— and Quinians (such as Davidson and I) could
almost agree: the pattern is discernible in agents’ (observable) behavior when we subject it to ‘radical
interpretation’ (Davidson) ‘from the intentional stance’ (Dennett).”
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rationality is inextricable from the particular biological nature of the human organism.
The development of reason, while wondrous, is nonetheless utterly natural.
However, while it seems .reasonable to assume that no one has come across a
rational being that is not at the same time an animal as well, there are aspects of
rationality that seem to resist reduction to mere biology. Descartes’ untenable
distinction between the mental (res cogitans) and the corporeal (res extensd) is only the
most exaggerated form that the perceived antinomy between reason and nature has
taken in the philosophical tradition. But even to many anti-Cartesian philosophers, the
web of propositional attitudes that constitute the space of reasons seems clearly sui
generis when judged against the kind of law-like causal regularities that structure the
space of nature. This was Davidson’s point when he remarked that “whichever way we
talk, there remains the difference, with respect to rationality, between the infant and the
snail on the one hand, and the normal adult person on the other” (SIO 95). For
Davidson, the normative—that is, rational—inter-relationships that characterize the
propositional attitudes “have no echo in physical theory” and therefore cannot be
reduced to the kinds of empirical descriptions available from the natural sciences.
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This is consistent with Wilfrid Sellars’ point that since mental states are inherently
normative, descriptions of them cannot be characterized as empirical: “In characterizing
an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of
that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and

32 Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 231.
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being able to justify what one says,”5'1 Sellars' point is that mental states or episodes
are not law-bound as are phenomena in the space of nature. John McDowell, who has
made Sellars’ distinction between the space of reasons and the space of nature the
conceptual crux of his own philosophical views, explains the distinction this way:
What would the logical space of nature be? I think we capture
the essentials of Sellars’s thinking if we take it that the logical
space of nature is the logical space in which the natural sciences
function, as we have been enabled to conceive them by a wellcharted, and in itself admirable, development of modem thought.
We might say that to place something in nature on the relevant
conception, as contrasted with placing it in the logical space of
reasons, is to situate it in the realm of law. But what matters for
Sellars’s point is not that or any other positive characterization,
but the negative claim: whatever the relations are that constitute
the logical space of nature, they are different in kind from the
normative relations that constitute the logical space of reasons.
The relations that constitute the logical space of nature, on the
relevant conception, do not include relations such as one thing’s
being warranted, or—for the general case—correct, in the light of
another. This is what Sellars is saying when he insists that
“empirical description” cannot amount to placing something in
the logical space of reasons. (MW xv)54
Sellars’ point, surely correct, poses a serious challenge to the integration of scientific
research (especially that of contemporary cognitive neuroscience) with philosophical
reflection. After all, the distinction Sellars and McDowell are insisting on can easily be
interpreted as one between the brain as a physical object studied by the natural sciences

33 Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, eds.,
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1956), pp. 253-329, pp. 298-9.
54 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994). Reference to this text
will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation MW.
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and the mind as a rational consciousness understandable only according to what
Davidson likes to call the “constitutive ideal of rationality.”55
Indeed, McDowell has tackled this very issue in a critique of Dennett’s essay
“Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness”: as its title suggests, Dennett’s piece
attempts to explain consciousness by means of the kinds of sub-personal cognitive
mechanisms that play such an important explanatory role in the theories of BaronCohen and others working at the forefront of contemporary science of mind.56
McDowell has no problem with cognitive science as such: he disavows any “knownothing refusal to acknowledge the rich promise of cognitive science” (MVR 356).
However, he believes that we must be careful when interpreting and articulating the
relationship between a person’s mind and the cognitive mechanisms that play an
enabling causal role in the biological existence of that mind: that is, between two levels
of being and explanation that McDowell calls the “personal” and the “sub-personal.”
The sub-personal cognitive systems, such as the clustered populations of face cells that
Martha Farah hypothesized make up a distributed neural network geared toward the
recognition of particular faces, belong, according to McDowell, to the space of nature:
they are bound, as are all physical matter and energy, by causal laws. Such face cells
may, and clearly do, ultimately enable a rich phenomenological experience of the faces
of family, friends and strangers, yet the full-blown conscious experience of facial
55 This phrase comes from Davidson’s “Mental Events” in Essays on Actions and Events, p. 223.
36 Daniel Dennett, “Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness” in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays
on Mind and Psychology (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978), pp. 149-173. McDowell’s critique
is called “The Content of Perceptual Experience” in John McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 341-358. References to Mind, Value and Reality will
be given parenthetically with the abbreviation MVR.
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recognition and perception is distinct in kind, and not merely in degree, from the
information-processing that goes on at the sub-personal levels in various regions of the
brain. McDowell’s fundamental point is that a whole person recognize the faces of
others, not parts of that person’s brain: to identify the brain with the person is to
conceptually confuse radically distinct levels of description. The brain is a physical part
of the space of nature, while the person lives and thinks in the space of reasons.
However, this point is not fundamentally incompatible with Dennett’s own (though
Dennett does open himself up to criticism by occasionally blurring the distinction, but I
think this is often simply due to rhetorical and conceptual enthusiasm). Intentional
states, according to Dennett are after all only attributable to whole “systems,” not parts
or subsystems. As Andrew Brook and Don Ross explain: “...intentional states are not
ascribed to parts of a person, even parts as large as the brain. Intentional states are
states of the whole person, indeed a person/environment whole. If intentional states are
complex triangulations of behavior/brain/environment interactions, then they cannot be
reduced to brain-states.”57
Another way of getting at the distinction that McDowell is keen to bring forth is
by thinking of the gap between syntax and semantics. In fact, Dennett himself is the
one who first articulated the conceptual distinction between brains and persons this
way: brains and their parts, according to Dennett, are syntactic engines, while whole
persons are semantic ones. Sub-personal information-processing systems that make up

37 Andrew Brook and Don Ross, eds., Daniel Dennett (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), p. 18.
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the structure of the brain are physical in nature, and thus they do not know the first thing
about “meanings.” As McDowell puts it:
A sub-personal... informational system is a physical mechanism,
connected to its surroundings by transducers that convert physical
impacts from outside into events of the sort that the system can
work on, and perhaps by transducers that convert the system’s
end products into physical interventions in the exterior. The
system knows nothing even about the character of the immediate
physical impacts on the input transducers, or the immediate
physical interventions in the exterior that result from its
operations by way of the output transducers, let alone about the
nature and layout of the distal environment. The operations of
the system are determined by structures exemplified in the initial
contributions of the transducers, and in intermediate events and
states in the system, which have no meaning for the system. In
short, in Dennett’s own memorable and exactly right phrase, the
system is a syntactic engine, not a semantic engine. (MYR 350351, emphasis added)
Because the operations of the brain are fully determined by its material structure along
with the input it receives from the environment, it cannot be said to “know” or
“understand” or “communicate” anything, even to the mind of the person who possesses
that very brain. That is to say, McDowell goes on, “we have inside us something that is
not intelligent at all (it knows nothing and understands nothing)” (MVR 353). And yet
clearly, “That is not the truth about us” (MVR 354). We, as persons, understand, know,
communicate, reason, perceive, recognize and so on. Our lives are meaningful through
and through. Structure never, in and of itself, produces meaning (and this, of course, is
what is fundamentally wrong about all structuralist theories of language: they account
for the abstract inter-relationships of sign-systems, but are incapable of explaining how7
signs can mean something to language users). When we recognize the familiar face of
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another person standing before us, for example, we certainly can do so only because an
array of sub-personal information-processing systems participate in and enable the
accomplishment of that everyday cognitive task, but for the whole person, facial
recognition is simply the recognition of the presence of a particular person whom we
know. The syntactic workings of the cognitive subsystems enable, but do not
constitute, the meaningful experience of interpersonal recognition. As McDowell
explains:
At the level of internal machinery, it is useful to talk of sensory
systems as information-processing devices; but for the animal its
sensory systems are modes of openness to features of its
environment. Information-processing characterizations of the
internal machinery figure in explanations of how it can be that
animals are in touch with their environments. The “as i f ’ content
that is usefully deployed at the lower level helps make intelligible
the genuine content that appears at the higher level by way of
“enabling” explanations, not as somehow constituting that
content. Since there is no getting around the fact that the internal
machinery is really only a syntactic engine, the attempt to see a
constitutive relation between the lower and the upper levels
undermines our hold on the fact that animals are semantic
engines. (MVR 354-354)
We might put the consequences of McDowell’s point this way: if Dennett (following
Quine) had already acknowledged that there was no fact of the matter which could
ground our attribution of a particular propositional attitude to another person, then
perhaps there is no fact of the matter (in our own brain) which constitutes our ability to
attribute propositional attitudes at all.
Consciousness, in other words, is still unexplained. As McDowell concludes,
“consciousness itself escapes Dennett’s cognitivistic net; he offers what may be an
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enabling explanation of consciousness, but not a constitutive one. And in one sense,
this leaves us without an account of consciousness. We lack an account of what it is,
even if we have an account of what enables it” (MVR 357). For McDowell, this does
not mean, however, that consciousness is now relegated to an immateriaiist ontology:
“as if, in denying that consciousness is a matter of configurations in the satisfyingly
material medium of the nervous system, we were committed to regarding it as a matter
of configurations in an immaterial medium instead” (MVR 357). It seems to me that
McDowell’s conclusion here, while on the one hand providing a salutary check to
certain tendencies in Dennett’s thought that would problematically identify sub-personal
cognitive structures with consciousness, on the other hand supports Dennett’s more
fundamental point that mentality is not factual in nature, and is simply the result of the
intentional stance we take towards human entities, both ourselves and others. To
confirm McDowell’s point in a spirit with which I suspect he would not agree: mind, we
can agree, is not a fact of nature, even if there is nothing more natural in the world.
The outcome of these reflections, however, is that we are left without a
satisfying account of how we perceive meaning and mentality in the faces of other
humans. We have learned a great deal from the scientific literature about the structural
reasons why the face would be a perceptual object of singular importance to the human
organism: but the way we grasp mentality in the face of another is still unclear. After
all, as Karmiloff-Smith and Russell note, “there is nothing specifically mental about
human faces” (CPM 253). This is certainly so because there is nothing specifically
mental about anything at all. It is evident from the development of this argument that
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cognitive science alone—while full of tantalizing clues and immensely enlightening
about the underlying cognitive structures—cannot provide a full account of the rich
semantics of the human face. For this, we will have to turn elsewhere. Luckily, as we
have already noted, Wittgenstein found facial perception (and the related art of
physiognomy) profoundly significant and his later philosophical writings tell us a great
deal about how we perceive meaning and mentality in the faces of other people.
Considering the great and wide-ranging importance he attributed to the ancient art of
face reading, we could even call his whole later philosophy a form of conceptual
physiognomy: as he himself rather cryptically noted at one point in the Investigations,
“Meaning is a physiognomy” (PI §568). Having now reached the present limit of
scientific explanation (though who knows what the future will bring?), we can turn in
the following chapter to Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections on the meaning of the
face.
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2. Wittgenstein’s Face of Meaning

Wittgenstein’s interest in faces and physiognomy can be traced to his early and
enthusiastic reading of Otto Weininger’s Sex and Character, a treatise on the nature of
sexual difference that we know Wittgenstein highly esteemed.58 Weininger regarded
physiognomy as possessing great methodological importance, since he understood it to
study the visible manifestation of the parallelism between the psychic character and the
physical morphology of a given man or woman: “the parallelism between
characterology and morphology in the widest application,” Weininger wrote, “makes us
look forward to the time when physiognomy will take its honourable place amongst the
sciences...” (SaC 36). Wittgenstein was intimately familiar with this text, and so it is
unsurprising that elements of its discussion of faces would find their way into his later
physiognomic remarks. For example, the term aspect, which appears in Weininger’s
comments on the facial expressions of men of genius (“the number of different aspects
that the face of a man has assumed may be taken almost as a physiognomical measure
of his talent” [SaC 65]), would later come to constitute the subject of the longest section
of Part II of the Philosophical Investigations (sec. xi: on seeing aspects, which also
happens to include the discussion of the “physiognomy of a word”). That this
terminological echo is not unintended is suggested by the fact that in earlier versions of
58 Otto Weininger, Sex and Character, trans. of 6th German ed. (London: William Heinemann, 1906).
References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation SaC. On Weininger’s
influence on Wittgenstein, see Ray Monk’s excellent biography, Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty o f Genius
(New York: Penguin, 1990). References to Monk’s biography will be given parenthetically with the
abbreviation WDG. I am indebted to Monk’s text for drawing to my attention the connections between
Weininger’s, Spengler’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas.
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the remarks that would eventually become §§536-537 of the Investigations,
Wittgenstein explicitly cites Weininger in conjunction with the idea of an “aspect of the
face itself’ (PI §536).39 Moreover, this physiognomic association helps to explain why
Wittgenstein’s initial definition of the concept of “noticing an aspect” would make
reference to an experience of facial perception: “I contemplate a face, and then suddenly
notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I
call this experience ‘noticing an aspect’” (PI p. 165). But while Wittgenstein’s interest
in aspects appears to be indebted to his reading of Weininger, the conceptual use he
makes of the term (which we will turn to later) is both stranger and broader than the
relatively ordinary use it has in Sex and Character. On the whole, in fact, it appears
that aside from an occasional and loose terminological borrowing, the most significant
lesson Wittgenstein learned from Weininger’s physiognomy was simply the importance
of physiognomy itself, especially its fundamental belief in the expressive
meaningfulness of the human face. For example, commenting upon a timid face (in the
passage that in earlier versions cites Weininger), he writes: “the timidity does not seem
to be merely associated, outwardly connected, with the face; but fear is there, alive, in
the features. If the features change slightly, we can speak of a corresponding change in
the fear” (PI §537).
In addition to absorbing a physiognomic regard for the face from Weininger’s
Sex and Character, the later Wittgenstein, inspired by Oswald Spengler’s The Decline
59 For example, we find in the manuscript text now available as the Philosophical Remarks: “Wenn ich
sage, dieses Gesicht hat den Ausdruck der Milde, Giite, Feigheit, so scheme ich nicht nur zu meinen daB
wir die und die Gefiihle mit dem Anblick des Gesichts assoziieren, sondem ich bin versucht zu sagen, daB
das Gesicht ein Aspekt der Feigheit, Giite, etc., selbst ist. (Vergleiche z.B. Weininger.)”
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o f the West, would come to perceive in the art of physiognomy conceptual implications
reaching far beyond its original focus on the face.60 The Decline o f the West is a work
of cultural historiography that conceives of cultures as cyclical and organic in nature,
each having its own individual character and destiny: “Each Culture has its own
possibilities of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay, and never return. There is not
one sculpture, one painting, one mathematics, but many. Each is in its deepest essence
different from the others, each limited in duration and self-contained” (DoW 17).
According to Spengler, cultures are not susceptible of scientific interpretation, since the
methods of science grasp nothing but the laws of causality. Destiny, not causality, is
what structures the history of cultural forms (as it does the teleological life-cycles of
organisms) and so the proper method of cultural study will not be scientific, but
morphological, or as Spengler preferred to put it, physiognomic: “The Morphology of
the organic, of history and life and all that bears the sign of direction and destiny, is
called Physiognomic” (DoW 71). In keeping with this characterization of the
historian’s methodology, Spengler called the capacity to perceive the morphological
destiny of a culture a “physiognomic flair,” about which Helmut Wemer, the editor of
the 1959 abridgement of the Decline, offered the following explanation: “The word
‘destiny’ expresses an indescribable inward certainty: causality carries the notion of
law. The physiognomic flair, by which it is possible to read a lifetime, a fate, from a
face, operates without deliberate effort or any system. It is far removed from cause and
effect” (DoW 76). Discussing the study of economics, Spengler wrote: “Economics has
60 Oswald Spengler, The Decline o f the West (1918). References to this text will be given parenthetically
with the abbreviation DoW.
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no system, but a physiognomy. To fathom the secret of its inner form, its soul, demands
the physiognomic flair” (DoW 399). Since cultures are not structured by the
mechanistic laws of causality, attempts at causal explanation are misguided. An
entirely novel methodology is required to see and describe the morphological destiny
that each culture obeys, and Spengler can think of no better way to describe this form of
seeing than the analogy of physiognomy provides: we see the form of a culture’s
destiny in the same way we see the truth revealed by a person’s face. Physiognomy is
the key to morphological analysis.
Wittgenstein found this methodological orientation compelling, and it strongly
influenced the development of his later descriptive, anti-theoretical philosophical views.
For if the later Wittgenstein found theoretical explanations of philosophical problems to
be profitless (“For me”, he said in 1930, “a theory is without value. A theory gives me
nothing”), morphological description seemed a viable methodological alternative:
“What I give,” he said in one lecture, “is the morphology of the use of an expression”
(WDG 304, 303). This later orientation is forcefully expressed in his critical response
to Frazer’s The Golden Bough. Wittgenstein reacted with great hostility to Frazer’s
rationalistic explanations of “primitive” rituals as mistaken, proto-scientific
experiments. Rather than attempt to explain the meaning of the rituals, which
Wittgenstein regarded as foolish, he suggested (invoking Spengler) that they should
simply be described, or shown, in a “perspicuous presentation”
. .. by arranging the factual material so that we can easily pass
from one part to another and have a clear view of it - showing it
in a perspicuous way. For us the conception of a perspicuous
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presentation is fundamental. It indicates the form in which we
write of things, the way in which we see things. (A kind of
Weltanschauung that seems to be typical of our time. Spengler.)
This perspicuous presentation makes possible that understanding
which consists just in the fact that we “see the connections.”
(cited in WDG 311)
Wittgenstein never wavered from this new methodological commitment, and an
essentially unmodified restatement of it appears in the Philosophical Investigations: “A
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing
connexions’.... The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental
significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things”
(PI §122). Wittgenstein’s notion of perspicuity appears to be directly indebted to
Spengler’s “physiognomic flair”: perspicuity characterizes a form of sight (“the way we
look at things”), and a corresponding form of description, which is analogous to
Spengler’s characterization of the way we perceive both faces and cultures (“without
any deliberate effort or system” and “far removed from cause and effect”). Just as
Spengler’s physiognomic or morphological analysis of cultures can reveal connections
that evade the grasp of casual explanation, Wittgenstein’s perspicuity characterizes a
form of sight and description that, as he puts it, “produces just that understanding which
consists in ‘seeing connexions’.” One might say that for both Wittgenstein and
Spengler, understanding and meaning are produced by, and as, a physiognomy.
Or to put it simply: “Meaning is a physiognomy” (PI §568). Seeing the
connections between the physiognomic methods of Spengler and Wittgenstein helps us
now to understand this remark, which appears parenthetically following a discussion of
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whether a certain rule (that “the kings are to be used for drawing lots before a game of
chess”) should be considered essential or inessential to the game. Using the language of
physiognomy, Wittgenstein concludes: “If I understand the character of the game
aright—I might say—then this isn’t an essential part of it. ((Meaning is a
physiognomy.))”' (PI §568, emphasis added). The importance of this discussion lies in
its relevance to the related issues of meaning and rule-following: if the meanings within
a given language-game are determined solely by the following of rules, then there
should be no possible (or at least meaningful) recourse beyond those rules - indeed,
what would constitute such a beyond? There would be no sense, if this were the case,
in making a distinction between the essential or inessential rules of a given game, and
Wittgenstein gives voice to this view when he exclaims in the midst of this discussion:
“But, after all, the game is supposed to be defined by the rules!” (§567). But in propria
persona, he makes it clear that rules do not exhaust the parameters of a game: “The
game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point” (PI §564, emphasis in
original). Wittgenstein’s introduction of the concept of a “point” suggests that meaning
is not completely determined by the totality of the rules of a game. The point of a game
cannot be gathered by reading off a complete list of its rules; it is something graspable
in addition to those rules (“not only rules but also a point”). Yet there is no suggestion
that the point of a game is some kind of mental or spiritual entity added to the rales.
Indeed, to take the point of a game as something simply added to the totality of rales
would leave it indistinguishable from a rule at all, or would force us to call it some kind
of super-rule which controlled the sense of all the other rales of the game, allowing us
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to determine which of them were essential or not. Wittgenstein.5s idea of a “point” is
clearly different in kind, and not simply in degree, from the concept of a rule; yet it is
difficult to know how further to specify what a “point” is. But it is not clear that
Wittgenstein means us to be able to. The point of a game—and the idea of a “point”
here suggestively recalls Spengler’s concept of destiny— seems to be something one can
simply see, as Spengler said one could read a fate from a face. It appears that
Wittgenstein can assert that a rule is inessential to the game of chess simply because he
grasps the game’s “character” - in the form of its physiognomy. Strange as this may
sound, it seems that for Wittgenstein, meaning is a physiognomy, and understanding a
kind of physiognomic flair.
Strange indeed. There is an almost mystical quality to the emphasis on direct
seeing expressed in these physiognomically inflected remarks of Wittgenstein. Yet to
call his flair for physiognomy “mystical” would misleadingly give the impression that
what he regards as meaningful about any given physiognomy (whether of a game, a
word, or an actual face) is somehow hidden, transcendent or otherwise mysterious. This
could not be farther from the truth: for the radical innovation of Wittgenstein’s
physiognomy, as with the whole of his later philosophy (and we can now appreciate, I
think, how significant physiognomy is to the later writings), consists of his view that
meaning and mentality are not occult phenomena which accompany the physiognomy
of a game, a word, or a face, but are rather directly visible to anyone who cares to look.
On our ability to perceive mentality, or consciousness, in the faces of other people, he
writes:
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Consciousness in another’s face. Look into someone else’s face,
and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of
consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest,
excitement, torpor and so on. The light in other people’s faces.
Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his
face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast. (Z 220)
We need not refer, by analogy, to our own mental states (that is, look into ourselves) in
order to perceive the mentality of another (as claimed, for example, by Edmund
Husserl’s phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity in the Cartesian Meditations);
nor, for that matter, is there any need to refer to some private psychological realm
within the other person, lying behind or beneath the expressions of his or her face.
No inner facts at all, whether in ourselves or in the other person, are required in
order to explain our ability to directly see mentality in the appearance of another’s face.
Wittgenstein’s point is simply that such direct seeing is always a possibility (an
everyday occurrence even), not that we can have epistemological certainty with regard
to the mental states exhibited by the expressions of others - that, of course, would be
patently implausible. Without a doubt, the other person could be feigning or
suppressing their facial expressions; just as we may be deceived, or simply mistaken,
about their significance. Indeed, perhaps it is the very real possibility of these kinds of
deceptions and mistakes that gives rise to the common picture of human psychology
that postulates a division between the inner and the outer, the inner constituting a
privileged and essentially private domain accessible solely by subjective introspection.
Consider, for example, the following passage from Augustine’s Confessions which
imagines the mind, even of an infant, in precisely those terms:
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Little by little I began to realize where I was and to want to make
my wishes known to others, who might satisfy them. But this I
could not do, because my wishes were inside me, while other
people were outside, and they had no faculty which could
penetrate my mind. So I would toss my arms and legs about and
make noises, hoping that such few signs as I could make would
show my meaning, though they were quite unlike what they were
61
meant to mime.
In this passage, the contents of Augustine’s mind, including his “wishes,” are quite
explicitly represented as fully formed even prior to the acquisition of language. Later,
words would be learned that could point to, and therefore publicly communicate, these
inner mental states, but the fundamental privacy and inwardness of these states is made
perfectly clear.
As is well known, however, Wittgenstein’s remarks on the idea of a “private
language” in the Investigations show this Augustinian (and, of course, Cartesian and
later, Lockean) picture of mind to be conceptually incoherent (recall that the
Investigations opens with a critique of a passage about language learning from
Augustine’s Confessions). A private language, as Wittgenstein conceives of it, would
be one in which the words “refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to
his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language”
(PI §243). Our ordinary talk of sensations do not fall under this definition of a private
language, for phrases such as “my arms itch,” or “my head throbs,” or “I feel pain in my
lower back” are perfectly understandable public expressions. A problem arises,
however, when these phrases are treated as reports that are distinct from the sensations

61 St. Augustine, Confessions (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 25.
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that they are understood to describe. According to this view, the sensation itself (e.g.,
pain) is inner and absolutely private, and the outer public report describing it merely
associated with it by an introspective act of ostensive definition (i.e. THIS is what the
word “pain” refers to, and only I can know the sensation itself; correlatively, I can only
know the pain of others by analogy to THIS).
Questioning this way of regarding sensations, Wittgenstein asks, “how does a
human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?—of the word ‘pain’ for
example” (PI §244). Countering the descriptivist model of sensation-language required
by Augustinian psychology, Wittgenstein proposes an expressivist one: “words are
connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their
place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him
exclamations, and later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.... [T]he
verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it” (PI §244). Contrary
to the Augustinian model, Wittgenstein makes no recourse to private objects of any
kind. Sensation-words do not designate private objects but rather express feelings in
the form of publicly shareable (and thus meaningful) verbal behavior. Wittgenstein
clearly finds this view acceptable, and the Augustinian one not. But simply presenting
an alternative model of sensation-language would do little to change the minds of those
who find it intuitively incontrovertible that private sensations are, at bottom, what
public sensation-words refer to. So Wittgenstein goes on to present a thoughtexperiment in which he attempts to imagine an actual scenario in which words or terms
would be understood to designate private objects:
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Let us imagine the following ease. I want to keep a diary about
the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it
with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day
on which I have the sensation.—I first want to remark that a
definition of the sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give
myself a kind of ostensive definition.—How? Can I point to the
sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the
sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the
sensation—and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.—But what is
this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition
surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is
done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this
way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the
sensation. (PI §258)
At first, this description of a private language might seem unproblematic, though
Wittgenstein clearly has his doubts, as his jibe about a “ceremony” makes evident. It is
not, however, clear what, if anything, might be objectionable about the kind of
introspective act of ostensive definition that he imagines here (“S” = private sensation).
But, in fact, Wittgenstein finds this whole scenario incoherent:
But “I impress it on m yself’ can only mean: this process brings it
about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in
the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would
like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And
that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’. (PI §258)
The problem is simply that it is conceptually incoherent to speak of the term “S” being
given any kind of definition at all in a private language, since there is no possibility of a
solitary speaker drawing a coherent distinction between correct and incorrect usages of
words that refer to private objects. In “the present case” of private ostensive definition,
anything would go, and thus no particular definition would be meaningful. It follows,
therefore, that such private objects cannot ground our understanding of the meaning of
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sensation-words or, for that matter, the meanings of concepts which apply to mental
states of any kind (such as emotions, intentions, meaning or understanding). The point
is not that such private entities do not exist: any attempt to deny them would already
presuppose the meaningfulness of any talk about them, and would therefore fall prey to
the same critique. The point is simply that when we understand or use a psychological
concept (such as the “fury” Wittgenstein notes we can simply see upon the face of
another), this understanding or use does not require recourse to some private inner fact,
whether in ourselves or in other people.
But if meaning and mentality are not explained by hidden inner facts, this does
not mean that they are reducible to simply outer ones either: Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy is neither a crude behaviorism nor a reductive physicalism. Indeed, as John
Koethe has argued (following Saul Kripke’s pioneering lead), Wittgenstein’s view is
that meaning and mentality are not reducible to facts of any kind at all.

ft,"7

Certain verbal

and non-verbal behaviors (such as trembling, an accelerated pulse, or saying “I’m
afraid”) may serve as definitional elements (or criteria) of what we mean by the concept
fear, yet fear is not reducible to those, or any other, behaviors (and here we must resist
the temptation to say: well, that’s obvious, fear is THIS inside me!). According to
Koethe, criteria are “forms of behavior (among other things) that manifest or exhibit

62 See Koethe’s The Continuity o f Wittgenstein ’$ Thought, which has strongly influenced the
interpretation of Wittgenstein in this essay. It is also due to Koethe’s suggestion, in the final chapter of
his book, that Wittgenstein’s notion of direct seeing might profitably be compared to the philosophical
theories of Dennett and Davidson that first led me to explore the connections that I exploit in the present
chapter. John Koethe, The Continuity o f Wittgenstein’s Thought (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996).
References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation CWT. For Kripke’s reading of
Wittgenstein, see: Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1982).
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mental states,” but criteria are not equivalent to those mental states: fear-behavior is not
fear, though we only see fear manifested in the form of fear-behavior (CWT 110-111).
Mentality, in other words, is reducible to neither inner states nor outer behavior. The
conceptual implications of this two-fold denial are startling, as is made evident by the
following exchange in Zettel:
“But I do have a real feeling of joy!” Yes, when you are glad you
really are glad. And of course joy is not joyful behavior, nor yet
a feeling around the comers of the mouth and the eyes.
“But ‘joy’ surely designates an inward thing.” No. “Joy”
designates nothing at all. Neither any inward nor any outward
thing. (Z 487)
This striking conclusion about the non-factuality of mental states leaves us facing a
perceptual paradox: on the one hand, Wittgenstein argues that our words for mental
states (like joy and fury) designate nothing at all, while on the other hand, he insists that
mentality is immediately and directly visible in the face of another (“Do you look
within yourself, in order to recognize the fury in his face? It is there as clearly as in your
own breast”). How are we to reconcile these apparently conflicting claims?
We can dissolve this conceptual problem if we turn our attention from the
question of what we see (the factuality of mind) to the more fruitful question of how we
see (the recognition of mentality). If, despite the non-factuality of mental states, we can
nonetheless see mentality in another’s face, that is only because of the attitude (like
Dennett’s “intentional stance”) that we take towards the appearances and expressions of
mind in human forms of life. As Koethe puts it: “Thus to call a face, a body, or a form
of behavior a picture of mentality—or to say that we recognize mentality in it—is a way
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of characterizing our direct and natural response or attitude toward it” (CWT 112;
emphasis in original). The attitude which discloses mentality is not ratiocinative in
nature: when we see that someone is joyful or enraged, this is not due to a process of
inference or interpretation. As Wittgenstein puts it in a passage in Zettel that we have
already cited: “We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them... to
joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored” (Z 220).
Or as he puts it in the Investigations, “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a
soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul” (PI p. 152). Consciousness, or
mentality, in other words, is simply and quite directly recognizable — even if the
conceptual account of such recognitional seeing will not necessarily seem so simple or
direct.
This does not mean that we do not occasionally need to consciously interpret or
make explicit inferences about someone’s appearance or behavior to ascertain their
mental state: perhaps a good friend’s disposition has suddenly become strange to us and
we do not understand the significance of her “stony” facial expression (is she
depressed? quietly seething? or on the verge of exhaustion?) - it would behoove us to
think carefully about what might have happened, or even what we may have
unknowingly done, to bring about this change. But lest we generalize such experiences
as this, and conclude that all instances of facial perception can be conceptually reduced
to conscious acts of interpretation, Wittgenstein offers the following wry remarks in
Zettel:

74

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

I interpret words; yes-—but do I also interpret looks? Do I
interpret a facial expression as threatening or kind?—That may
happen.
Suppose I said: “It is not enough to perceive the threatening
face, I have to interpret it.”-—Someone whips out a knife at me
and I say “I conceive that as a threat.” (Z 218)
Wittgenstein acknowledges that we may occasionally need to interpret the “look” of a
face, but as the negative example of the knife-wielding assailant makes clear, it would
be wrong to believe that interpretation is the way we regard faces in general. So while
he does not claim that direct seeing of mental states is the only form facial perception
takes, Wittgenstein holds that direct understanding of a mental state in a person’s face is
absolutely common (and also philosophically significant), and that, in fact, the attitude
that discloses mentality in the appearance of another’s face is more fundamental than
the ratiocinative one we occasionally need to employ. Even in those cases where we are
unsure as to what mental state a certain person’s face might be expressing at a given
moment, it makes little sense to say—unless the person is in an unusual condition, such
as a coma—that we do not at least recognize mentality as such (what would it mean to
sincerely think otherwise?). And when we do need to “think” about what a puzzling
face means, the interpretive reasoning we bring to it does not usually concern the spatial
organization of the facial features (e.g., does the contraction of his forehead
musculature indicate anger?), but naturally tends to focus on psychological questions of
a narrative nature (e.g., he looks like he might be angry... I wonder if so-and-so insulted
him again?).
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Consciousness—-“the light in the face of another”—shines forth even if we are
uncertain as to what particular aspect of mind we are seeing. When looking at a face,
our regard does not choose between, on the one hand, a certain configuration of bone,
cartilage, muscle and skin, and on the other hand, an appearance of joy, for example;
but rather amongst such possible mental states as “joy, indifference, interest,
excitement, torpor and so on” (Z 220). The face is not perceptually constituted in parts
(as in an empiricist view of sense-perception), but rather the face faces us all at once,
instantaneously, as a meaningful expression of mind — even when we cannot see the
whole of it at once (think of the deep significance we can glean from a sideways
glance). Wittgenstein found it conceptually significant that we can often grasp the
expression of a face while at the same time being unable to give any spatial description
of its features: “One may note an alteration in a face and describe it by saying that the
face assumed a harder expression - and yet not be able to describe the alteration in
spatial terms. This is enormously important” (WR 221).63 To Wittgenstein, this
absolutely ordinary fact about facial perception indicated the deep poverty of empiricist
models of visual perception: “One may also say: ‘He made this face’ or ‘His face
altered like this’, imitating it - and again one can’t describe it in any other way. ((There
just are many more language-games than are dreamt of in the philosophy of Camap and
others.))” (WR 221). Those committed to sense-data theories of perception, for
example, cannot account for the obvious visibility of the “glance” in someone else’s
eyes:
63 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader, Ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation WR.
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“If you only shake free from your physiological prejudices, you
will find nothing queer about the fact that the glance of the eye
can be seen too.” For I also say that I see the look that you cast at
someone else. And if someone wanted to correct me and say that
I don’t really see it, I should take that for pure stupidity. (Z 223)
The blindness of empiricism to the human gaze follows from its conception of the eye
as a passive organ of sensation, yet Wittgenstein notes that this theoretical assumption is
not tine to our everyday ways of regarding the powers of the eyes:
We do not see the human eye as a receiver, it appears not to let
anything in, but to send something out. The ear receives; the eye
looks. (It casts glances, it flashes, radiates, gleams.) One can
terrify with one’s eyes, not with one’s ear or nose. When you see
the eye you see something going out from it. You see the look in
the eye. (Z 222)
But our ability to see sight itself cannot be explained by merely broadening the reach of
the senses. The “glance” is not an empirical fact like the color of an iris, or the dilation
of a pupil: “I should contradict anyone who told me I saw the glance ‘just the way’ I see
the shape and colour of the eye” (Z 223). But then what kind of sight is it (if not that of
“Carnap and others”) that can see something like a flashing glance, the “hardness” of a
face, or the fury of a friend?
Wittgenstein found the question of seeing so intriguing and philosophically
significant that he devoted the longest section of Part II of the Investigations to its
consideration: sec. xi, on seeing aspects and aspect-blindness. As we have already
noted, Wittgenstein associated the term “aspect” with Weininger’s physiognomic
writings, and, as this connection suggests, the question of faces was central to
Wittgenstein’s interest in aspects of all kinds (not only those of faces, but also cubes,
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duck-rabbits, and words as well). Indeed, one primary but unstated goal of
Wittgenstein’s treatment of aspect-seeing, I would argue, was to produce a
philosophical description of “seeing” that would account for our physiognomic ability
to recognize different aspects of mind in the faces of others. In Sex and Character,
Weininger claimed that geniuses have particularly fluid and changeable facial
expressions: “Physiognomists, therefore, must not be surprised that men of genius, in
whose faces a new side of their minds is continually being revealed, are difficult to
classify” (SaC 65). Weininger found his theory confirmed when he compared a number
of portraits, executed at different times, of such figures as Goethe, Beethoven, Kant and
Schopenhauer. ‘T he number of different aspects that the face of a man has assumed,”
he concluded, “may be taken almost as a physiognomical measure of his talent” (SaC
65). Wittgenstein took this section of Sex and Character to heart: we know, for
example, that he took Weininger’s distinction between talent and genius very seriously
(in one particularly tormented and disturbing entry in his notebooks, he declared that he
was “no more than talented”).64 We can imagine Wittgenstein carefully studying these
physiognomic remarks in Sex and Character and wondering: what does it mean to say
that one can see a “new side” or “aspect” of mind in the appearance of a face? I believe
that Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspects was essentially an attempt to answer this
pressing and fundamental question about physiognomy.65

64 Culture and Value, p. 19. See Ray Monk biography for Weiningerlan and psychological context of this
remark, p. 316.
65 Even the fact that Weininger compared faces in portraits seems to have caught Wittgenstein’s
attention: sec. xi contains a number of remarks on the way we regard portraits, such as: “I say: ‘We
regard a portrait as a human being,’—but when we do we do so, and for how long? Always, if we see it at
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In the Investigations, he addresses the question of facial aspects directly in
§§536-537 (earlier versions of these sections, as we noted earlier, make explicit
reference to Weininger) by asking what it would mean to see a timid face as
courageous:
I say: “I can think of this face (which gives an impression of
timidity) as courageous too.” We do not mean by this that I can
imagine someone with this face perhaps saving someone’s life
(that, of course, is imaginable in connexion with any face). I am
speaking rather of an aspect of the face itself. Nor do I mean that
I can imagine that this man’s face might change so that, in the
ordinary sense, it looked courageous; though I may very well
mean that there is a quite definite way in which it can change into
a courageous face. (PI §536)
Wittgenstein makes it clear that when he claims to be able to see a timid face as
courageous, he is not making any empirical claims, either about what a person with
such a facial expression might be capable of doing, or about a possible change in the
spatial configuration of the face’s features. He insists that he is speaking of a change in
the way he can regard the face, which he associates with the idea of “an aspect of the
face itself.” Without any actual change occurring in the appearance of the face, he is
simply able to see it in a new light: “a quite definite way in which it can change into a
courageous face.” Aware, perhaps, that his point is rather unclear, he approaches the
same question from a different angle in the following section:
It is possible to say “I read timidity in this face” but at all events
the timidity does not seem to be merely associated, outwardly
connected, with the face; but fear is there, alive, in the features.
If the features change slightly, we can speak of a corresponding
change in the fear. If we were asked “Can you think of this face
all (and do not, say, see it as something else)? I might say yes to this, and that would determine the
concept of regarding-as” (PI p. 175).
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as an expression, of courage too?”—we should, as it were, sot
know how to lodge courage in these features. Then perhaps 1 say
“I don’t know what it would mean for this to be a courageous
face.” But what would an answer to such a question be like?
Perhaps one says: “Yes, now I understand: the face as it were
shews indifference to the outer world.” So we have somehow
read courage into the face. Now once more, one might say,
courage fits this face. But what fits what here? (PI §537)
In this passage, Wittgenstein elaborates on what might be involved in seeing a face
under a new aspect: in this instance, it would involve incorporating the timid face into a
new kind of psychological narrative, which would permit us to see the unchanged facial
expression in a different light. Wittgenstein seems satisfied that this account does
indeed explain one possible way of seeing a new aspect of the face (“Now... courage
fits this face”), yet his closing question suggests that he is a bit troubled by (or even
uncertain about) the potential implications of his explanation. His question—“But what
fits what here?”—seems to warn us from taking the appearance of the face and the
meaning of its expression as distinguishable entities: as a subjective reading or
interpretation fitting into the objective appearance of the face-itself. His fear that we
may misinterpret his account this way seems to be the point behind the opening of the
passage, which prepares us for the aspect-conversion by insisting on the
indistinguishability of the face from its expression of timidity. He admits that it is
meaningful to say “I read timidity into this face,” but insists that we should not regard
the feeling as “merely associated” with the face. The mental state is not “outwardly
connected” to the face’s appearance, but is rather “there, alive, in the features.” Hence
the point of his question: “But what fits what here?” Having claimed that we can
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incorporate the face into a new psychological narrative (timidity becoming visible as
courage), Wittgenstein seems to worry that this suggests that aspects are arbitrary,
subjective associations we cm fit into our visual impression of a face’s appearance.
While it is clear that he thinks it incorrect to think of aspects as subjective
interpretations of visual impressions, he breaks the discussion off at this point and does
not return to the question of aspects until he treats it at length in section xi. Despite the
fact that he also examines such diverse phenomena as schematic cubes, triangles and
duck-rabbit illustrations, the discussion of seeing aspects and aspect-blindness in
section xi clearly extends and elaborates upon the question of facial aspects that
concerned Wittgenstein in §§536-537 (the only other passages in the Investigations that
discuss the subject of aspects at all). In the opening lines of section xi, Wittgenstein
obviously still has the human face in mind as he begins his discussion of aspects by
distinguishing between two different kinds of seeing:
Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?”—“I see this” (and then a
description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness
between these two faces”—let the man I tell this to be seeing the
faces as clearly as I do myself.
The importance of this is the difference of category between
the two ‘objects’ of sight.
The one man might make an accurate drawing of the two
faces, and the other notice in the drawing the likeness which the
former did not see. (PI p. 165)
Wittgenstein finds it significant that one person can notice something about two faces (a
likeness) that another person, who also sees the very same faces, might not. He is
careful to establish that this difference would not be due to any differences in the visual
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facts perceptually available to the two people (e.g., differences in angle, lighting,
disposition of features, etc.): in fact, he goes so far as to say that the likeness can be
perceived by the second person in an “accurate drawing” made by the first. The two
people, in other words, see the very same faces - only they see them in very different
ways. The curious visual experience of the second person captures what Wittgenstein
means by aspect-seeing: “I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to
another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience
‘noticing an aspect”’ (PI p. 165). An aspect, therefore, is evidently not equivalent to an
exhibition of mentality, though, as with the courage in §536, this is clearly one of its
possible, and I would suggest primary, meanings. Rather, it more generally signifies
something visible in an object—certainly in faces, and later, in a variety of other objects
besides—that exceeds (like a glance) what is “empirically” or “factually” available to
sight: something, to recall Wittgenstein’s Shakespearean quip, not dreamt of in the
Horatian philosophies of “Carnap and others.”
Since the two people in Wittgenstein’s example see exactly the same visual
facts, we might think— as he appears to have been worried that we might think of the
courageous expression in §537—that the difference in visual experience is due to an
interpretation introduced by the second person. This explanation would certainly be
consistent with empiricist and phenomenalist models of sense-perception that posit a
private visual impression (or “inner picture,” as Wittgenstein calls it) constituted from
the data of sensation. According to this view, since an aspect is not anything actually
attributable to the object, it must be an interpretation originating in the subject.
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Wittgenstein, however, finds the “inner picture” model of visual perception incoherent.
To illustrate one problem with it, he introduces the following schematic illustration:

Fig. 2

He asks us to imagine that we find this illustration in several places throughout a text
book, each time accompanied by a different textual gloss instructing us how to regard
the figure: “here a glass cube, there an inverted open box, there a wire frame of that
shape, there three boards forming a solid angle. Each time the text supplies the
interpretation of the illustration” (PI p. 165). He notes that as we read each set of
interpretive instructions, we not only can think of the figure that way, but can actually
see the figure differently each time: “we can also see the illustration now as one thing
now as another.—So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.” The similarities to
the discussion in §537 of the timid and courageous face are striking: there he came up
with a new psychological interpretation that allowed him to see the timid face
differently, even though, as with the schematic illustration seen in different ways here,
nothing “factual” about the spatial configuration of the face had changed.
And as with the conclusion of §537, the question arises as to how we should
understand the new visual experiences prompted by the various interpretive glosses on
the schematic illustration: in other words, what fits what here? For instance, if we see
the figure as an “inverted open box,” it might make sense to think of our visual
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experience as one that interprets what we see in that particular way. In other words, we
have a direct visual impression of the schematic diagram which, when provided with the
appropriate instructions, we can interpret as an upside down box. As Wittgenstein puts
it, this would be to characterize the visual experience of the inverted open box as an
indirect one:
Here perhaps we should like to reply: The description of what is
got immediately, i.e. of the visual experience, by means of an
interpretation—is an indirect description. “I see the figure as a
box” means: I have a particular visual experience which I have
found that I always have when I interpret the figure as a box or
when I look at a box. (PI p. 165)
In other words, the interpretation must be something which indirectly modifies our
direct visual impression of the schematic illustration. But Wittgenstein goes on to
question the use of the word “indirect” in this explanation. He notes: “But if it meant
this I ought to know it. I ought to be able to refer to the experience directly, and not
only indirectly. (As I can speak of red without calling it the colour of blood.)” (PI p.
165). In other words, the problem with calling our visual experience of the figure (as an
inverted open box) an indirect one implies that there is some more direct way of
describing that particular visual experience as well. But no more direct alternative is
available, as it would be if we were to say that a red object is “the colour of blood,”
since we could also simply call the object red. The box-ness of the figure that we see (if
we see it as a box) is simply there, not something we have added to a more direct visual
experience of an arrangement of line-segments. Of course, one might suffer from what
Wittgenstein calls “aspect-blindness,” and be unable to see the box-aspect (i.e. not be
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able to see it as a box), in which case one would have to infer that such an arrangement
of lines, according to certain illustrative conventions, can be understood as a box. But
this would be a different relationship to the box altogether, ratiocinative rather than
visual: for the aspect-blind, the words “indirect” and “interpretation” would be
appropriate to describe how they regard the figure as a box. But if we actually see the
figure as an inverted open box, what more direct way is there to describe our visual
experience?66
The implications of this example clearly apply to the discussion of the aspect of
courage in §537. In response to Wittgenstein’s closing question there— “But what fits
what here?”—we can now say with certainty that it is not an interpretation that fits onto
a visual impression: in fact, there are not two “what’s” involved at all. Wittgenstein’s
cautionary question is simply rhetorical in nature. If we can discern courage in a timid
face, it is no more “outwardly associated” with the features than was the original
expression of timidity. Courage simply is an aspect of the face. But this does not mean
that we can willfully see anything anywhere we like: “I can see the schematic cube as a
box;—but can I also see it now as a paper, now as a tin, box?—What ought I to say, if
someone assured me he could?—I can set a limit to the concept here” (PI p. 177). That
Wittgenstein made it clear that it was difficult to see the timid face as courageous in
§537—“we should, as it were, not know how to lodge courage in these features”—was

66 Interestingly, the research of Uta Frith and her colleagues has demonstrated that children with autism—
who in many ways bear a striking resemblance to the aspect-blind in Wittgenstein’s later writings— show
an Impairment in their ability to perceive visual gestalts. Instead of seeing cohesive wholes, they seem
particularly sensitive to fragments and parts: autistics, that is, seem indifferent to contexts and the
meanings of wholes. Cf. AEE, ch. 9: “A Fragmented World.”
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perhaps intended to demonstrate that aspect-seeing, while being “subject to the will” is
not necessarily easily, or even wholly, so (PI p. 182). An aspect of mind is not in the
mind of the beholder, but is, as Wittgenstein put it quite clearly, “<?/the face itself.”
But, of course, we do not usually go around asking ourselves if we can manage
to see this or that person’s face as joyful or angry. Mentality strikes us, faces us
directly. Wittgenstein’s excursus on the schematic box is invaluable in helping to
clarify the concepts involved in our understanding of what it means to see something as
something: the figure as a box or the features as courageous. But because it focuses on
experiences of aspect-seeing that are triggered by volition, it does not fully account for
our everyday recognition of aspects of mind in the faces of others, a kind of recognition
that is often characterized by an absolute absence of volition. “He must be in pain”...
“she looks relaxed”... “he seems anxious”: such common expressions are often
immediate responses to the way people look. To help us understand this type of
everyday form of non-volitional recognition, Wittgenstein discusses a variety of
phenomena that are related to what he calls aspect-dawning. To explain what he means
by this, he introduces Joseph Jastrow’s famous illustration of a duck-rabbit:

Fig. 3

He notes that “The picture might have been shewn me, and I never have seen anything
but a rabbit in it” (PI p. 166). Such a person would have continuously seen the rabbitaspect, and would be completely unaware that there was also a duck-aspect in the
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figure. If presented with the illustration, and asked what he saw, he would naturally
respond with something like, “I see a picture of a rabbit.” It would make no sense for
him to say, “I see this picture as a rabbit,” since what other possibility would exist?
But if this illustration were put amongst a number of unambiguous Images of
ducks, this person would likely recognize (that is, experience the “dawning” of) the
duck-aspect of the figure, and it is easy to Imagine some type of exclamation
accompanying this experience: “I saw it quite differently, I should never have
recognized it!” (PI p. 167). From this moment on, it would make sense for the person to
say: “I see this picture as a duck” or “as a rabbit.” Seen one way, and then another, the
duck-rabbit figure appears completely different, though it is just as clear that the figure
has not changed at all: “The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new
perception and at the same time of the perception’s being unchanged” (PI p. 167).
Wittgenstein asks: “But what is different: my impression? my point of view?” He
cautions against regarding the changed perception as the result of an alteration in the
“organization” of some inner visual impression: in other words, against theorizing that
the lines are subjectively re-organized now as a rabbit-picture, now as a duck-picture.
This would entail thinking of “organization” as a property of the visual impression, on
the same level as colour and shape. But “If you put ‘organization’ of a visual
impression on a level with colours and shapes, you are proceeding from the idea of the
visual impression as an inner object. Of course this makes this object into a chimera; a
queerly shifting construction. For the similarity to a picture is now impaired” (PI p.
168). If one thinks of the inner picture as being organized differently when the figure is

87

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

seen as a rabbit or as a duck, then while this might explain the change in how we regard
what the figure represents, it would conflict with the presupposition that the inner
picture is a reflection of the outer picture in the first place, rendering the entire “inner
picture” theory of perception conceptually incoherent. According to the explanation by
re-organization, the inner picture would become a “queerly shifting construction” - no
longer an inner picture at all. Moreover, if one asked two people who saw the figure
differently (one as a duck, one as a rabbit) to make copies of what they saw, the two
copies would be identical. One cannot point to anything factual in the figure that
accounts for it now appearing as a duck or as a rabbit: “If I saw the duck-rabbit as a
rabbit, then I saw: these shapes and colours (I give them in detail)—and I saw besides
something like this: and here I point to a number of different pictures of rabbits” (PI p.
168). The rabbit-aspect is not reducible to a factual property of the figure on a par with
shape and colour: “what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the
object, but an internal relation between it and other objects” (PI p. 180). That is why
Wittgenstein claims that ‘“ Seeing as....’ is not a part of perception. And for that reason
it is like seeing and again not like” (PI p. 168).
Because visual experiences of aspects are not wholly perceptual in nature— as
sense-perception has been understood by empiricism and phenomenalism, at least—
verbal descriptions of aspects should not be understood as mere perceptual reports.
Wittgenstein claims that they should rather be regarded as expressions of visual
experience (like cries of recognition):
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I look at an animal and am asked: “What do yon see?” I
answer: “A rabbit”.
—I see a landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I exclaim “A
rabbit!”
Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are
expressions of perception and of visual experience. But the
exclamation is so in a different sense from the report: it is forced
from us.—It is related to the experience as a cry is to pain. (PI p.
168)
It is not that the exclamation (and one can imagine a silent one to oneself) is without
conceptual content: after all, it too is a perceptual description of what is seen. What
differentiates an exclamation from a report, rather, is that the conceptual content of an
exclamation is not the result of a process of ratiocination, though one can still call it a
kind of “thinking”: “If you are looking at the object, you need not think of it; but if you
are having the visual experience expressed by the exclamation, you are also thinking of
what you see” (PI p. 168). One directly sees “a rabbit/” and the exclamation expresses
the thought infolded into this visual experience, which Wittgenstein therefore
characterizes as a strange amalgam of sight and reason: “Hence the flashing of an aspect
on us seems half visual experience, half thought” (PI p. 168). Or as he puts it
elsewhere: “‘The echo of a thought in sight’— one would like to say” (PI p. 181).
Of course, this is a very strange idea: half sight, half thought? One can imagine
someone dismissing this idea as logically absurd. And indeed, one cannot be led to
accept or even see Wittgenstein’s point simply by means of logical argumentation.
Wittgenstein is not claiming that the concept of “seeing” that he is discussing is
theoretically deducible a priori. Rather, he is simply describing an everyday kind of

89

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

visual experience with which we are all perfectly familiar, but before which empiricist
theories of perception are conceptually blind. For example:
Someone suddenly sees an appearance which he does not
recognize (it may be a familiar object, but in an unusual position
or lighting); the lack of recognition perhaps lasts only a few7
seconds. Is it correct to say he has a different visual experience
from someone who knew the object at once? (PI p. 163)
One might answer yes and no: no, for each person in this thought-experiment sees
precisely the same visual data (that is, they both can be understood to have identical
sensory impressions); but yes as well, for one person at first sees only the visual data
while the other person immediately recognizes (like the running rabbit above) what the
object is. According to sense-data perceptual theories, however, the visual experience
of each person would be identical, one of them merely taking a bit longer to locate the
appropriate concept under which to place the visual impression. And perhaps the sensedata theory is correct, for it does manage to account for the basic facts of the situation.
After all, “might not someone be able to describe an unfamiliar shape that appeared
before him just as accurately as I, to whom it is familiar?” (PI p. 168). For if both
persons experienced the same visual impression, as presupposed by the sense-data view,
then there should be no difference in the way each could describe the familiar or
unfamiliar object, for each would have seen the same thing, only understanding it
differently. But, as Wittgenstein retorts, “Of course it will not generally be so. And his
description will run quite differently. (I say, for example, “The animal had long ears”—
he: “There were two long appendages”, and then he draws them.)” (PI p. 168).
Recognized, the shape is seen as an animal, and everything comes into view differently
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(those are not “appendages” but ears). But seen without recognition, it is merely a
shape. The visual experience itself is completely different depending on whether
recognition is involved or not: whether or not, in other words, one experiences “the
echo of a thought in sight,” however strange this may sound.
One implication of Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect-seeing is that, though the
experiencing of aspects is not entirely conceptual in nature, a mastery of certain
concepts is necessary to have certain aspect-related experiences. Without a mastery of
the concepts of “duck” and “rabbit” (which would include familiarity with their shapes),
one could not experience the dawning of their aspects in the duck-rabbit figure: “You
only ‘see the duck and rabbit aspects’ if you are already conversant with the shapes of
those two animals” (PI p. 177). Wittgenstein pursues this line of thought by discussing
a kind of aspect-experience that he calls “aspects of organization,” in which “when the
aspect changes parts of the picture go together which before did not” (PI p. 177):
In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base—now this
as apex, that as base.—Clearly the words “Now I am seeing this
as the apex” cannot so far mean anything to a learner who has
only just met the concepts of apex, base, and so on.—But I do not
mean this as an empirical proposition.
“Now he’s seeing it like this”, “now like that” would only be
said of someone capable of making certain applications of the
figure quite freely.
The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a
technique. (PI p. 178)
Wittgenstein acknowledges that there is something quite odd about this claim, for he is
insisting that various forms of purely visual experience are unavailable to those who
have not adequately mastered certain conceptual “techniques”: “how queer for this to be
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the logical condition of someone’s having such-and-such an experience! After all, you
don’t say that one only ‘has toothache’ if one is capable of doing such-and-such” (PI p.
178). The point is not that one would simply be unable to describe the duck-rabbit
figure as a duck if one did not know the concept (including the shape) of a “duck,” but
rather that one would not even be able to see it as a duck. A person who was clumsy
with, or ignorant of, the concept of a “duck” would have access to one fewer visual
experiences, not merely one fewer descriptive terms.
In other words, aspect-seeing reveals seeing to have its own kind of intelligence,
which therefore requires, as all forms of intelligence do, enculturation and education:
“For how could I see that this posture was hesitant before I knew that it was a posture
and not the anatomy of the animal?” (PI p. 178). Unless we have somehow become
intimately familiar with the concept of animal postures, we would be unable to directly
see a particular disposition of an animal’s body as this or that psychological state. If, on
the other hand, we happen to have been raised by and among humans who consistently
related to a particular kind of animal—dogs, for example—as relatively complex
psychological beings, we might very well be able to see hesitation manifested in the
mere curve of a dog’s spine. But for those who have not experienced such enculturation
into the psychic lives of dogs, an array of psychological concepts having to do with
canine postures (such as hesitation, aggression, submission and so on) would literally
not be visible: they would be blind to those aspects of a dog’s mental life - or perhaps it
would be more accurate to say that for them those psychological states would simply
not exist in a dog. Hence, the way humans perceive dogs varies widely from culture to
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culture: some societies treating them with the kind of care usually reserved for humans
(that is, “humanely”); others treating them as little more than a nuisance, sometimes
even as food.
The conceptual analogy with the psychological states visible in the human face
is obvious, and Wittgenstein does not neglect to consider it (again returning to the
example of §§536-537): “Might I n o t... have a purely visual concept... of a timid
face?” (PI p. 178).
We react to the visual impression differently from someone who
does not recognize it as timid (in the full sense of the word).—
But I do not want to say here that we feel this reaction in our
muscles and joints and that this is the ‘sensing’.—No, what we
have here is a modified concept of sensation.
One might say of someone that he was blind to the expression
of a face. Would his eyesight on that account be defective? (PI
p. 179)
Recognizing the aspect of timidity in a face is something that one who has mastered the
concept of timidity can do without a thought, so to speak. We can have a “purely visual
concept... of a timid face” : wholly visual, yet conceptually rich. But for one who has
not mastered the concept of timidity, a timid aspect would not be directly recognizable
upon the face of another, and this blindness would be made evident by the fact that he
would “react to the visual impression differently”: perhaps, for example, showing
indifference where another might have shown concern. The way a person responds, or
does not, to an aspect of mind in the face of another shows whether that person can
experience (that is, fully knows the concept for) that aspect of mind at all. Following
this line of thought, it is clear that an important ethical function of cultural practices
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such as art and literature is the conceptual training (that is, sensitization) of humans to
recognize more and finer shades of mental experience, both in ourselves and others,
though it is, of course, always a possibility that such “sensitization” could be perverted
into a self-regarding and decadent end-in-itself. Seen as a kind of conceptual training,
art would not be understood as a form of “expression” (bringing out what is latent and
within) but rather as a kind of “cultivation” that plants the seeds of new intersubjective
cognitive possibilities. We should also say that those who are blind to a particular
expression on a face are not suffering from some type of physiological defect in their
eyesight, but rather from a kind of partial or selective mmd-blindness, which we can
always hope might be corrected by conceptual familiarization with the “unseen” state of
mind. However, we also now know that such sight is tragically beyond the reach of
those who suffer from severe autism, a biological form of full-blown mind-blindness.
As we have seen, research into the condition of autism confirms the intersubjective
implications of Wittgenstein’s theory of aspect seeing: seeing states of mind in other
h u m a n s,

like the ability to see a particular side of a triangle as the base, is the result of

the “mastery of a technique” which one can sadly lack.
The “modified concept of sensation” Wittgenstein uses to describe aspect-seeing
bears a striking similarity to the kind of direct seeing—or Spenglerian “physiognomic
flair”—that we saw implied by the phrase, “Meaning is a physiognomy” (PI §568). In
fact, Wittgenstein confirms the association we have already suggested between aspects
and physiognomy when he remarks that the experience of seeing a face might be
“explanation enough” for the concept of an aspect: “The aspect presents a physiognomy
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[Physiognomic] which then passes away. It is almost as if there were a face there which
at first I imitate, and then accept without imitating it.—And isn’t this really explanation
enough?—But isn’t it too much?” (PI p. 179). Perhaps we see revealed in these
ambivalent remarks the underlying physiognomic motivation for the whole
investigation of aspects in the first place. The suggestion about “imitation” here recalls
the remark he made about facial perception in the context of his jibe about the
perceptual theories of “Carnap and others”: “One may also say: ‘He made this face’ or
‘His face altered like th is\ imitating it - and again one can’t describe it any other way”
(WR 221). Aspects, like the facial expressions in this remark, are clearly visible yet
impossible to describe in factual terms: an aspect is there to be seen, but what is there?
Nothing, and yet everything that makes us “human.” Faces, and the aspects that play
across their features, inspired Wittgenstein to radically reorient our understanding of
seeing in general, turning us away from the question of what we see (factuality) to that
of how we see (recognition). We could say that his entire investigation of aspects
emerged from his sense that no available theory of perception could help him answer
one basic question about the foundations of physiognomy: what does it mean to say that
one can simply recognize mind in the appearance of a person’s face?
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing, however, has conceptual
implications that go far beyond its initial focus on the human face and the sense of
sight. For example, in his discussion of the timid and courageous face in §536,
Wittgenstein compares the experience of aspect-conversion with that of tonal
modulation: “The reinterpretation of a facial expression can be compared to the
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reinterpretation of a chord in music, when we hear it as a modulation first into this, then
into that key.” Tonal modulation is not something factually inhering in the notes of a
given chord, but neither is it something merely subjectively apprehended in the mind of
the listener, as when, to take a simple example, we can hear the notes C, E and G played
together as the tonic of C Major, and then as the sub-dominant of the key of G. Just as
courage was called “an aspect of the face itself,” tonality can be thought of as an
auditory aspect of the musical notes (PI §536). Later, in the context of his discussion of
the “purely visual concept... of a timid face” in section xi, Wittgenstein again
associates aspects with various experiences of musical perception:
Think of this too: I can only see, not hear, red and green,—
but sadness I can hear as much as I can see it.
Think of the expression “I heard a plaintive melody”. And
now the question is: “Does he hear the plaint?”
And if I reply: “No, he doesn’t hear it, he merely has a sense
of it”—where does that get us? One cannot mention a senseorgan for this ‘sense’. (PI p. 178)
Wittgenstein’s remarks here make clear that though aspects are first discussed in the
context of visual perception, aspect-like experiences are not limited to the sense of
sight. Wittgenstein even suggests that “Aspect-blindness will be akin to the lack of a
‘musical ear’” (PI p. 182). There is, after ail, no specific “sense-organ” associated with
aspect-experiences, and, in any case, aspects are not attributable to the factual contents
of any sensory manifold or impression. So it follows that they can be experienced in
any field of human life, not simply the visual, but the auditory too, and even the purely
conceptual as well, as suggested by the example of the direct seeing of the
“physiognomy” of the game of chess in §568.
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According to Wittgenstein, however, the most important implications of his
discussion of aspect-seeing are related to the concept of “experiencing the meaning of a
word,” for Wittgenstein thinks of words as he thinks of faces: “The familiar
physiognomy [Gesicht] of a word, the feeling that it has taken up its meaning into itself,
that it is an actual likeness of its meaning” (PI pp. 182, 186). A word, that is, exhibits
meaning as a face exhibits mind: while we may occasionally need to interpret a word,
just as we may sometimes need to think about the “look” of a face, the ordinary way of
experiencing the meaning of a word is recognitional, characterized by immediacy and
an absence of ratiocination. Wittgenstein acknowledges that “there could be human
beings to whom all this was alien” (PI p. 186). For them, a word’s meaning would
seem arbitrarily connected to its appearance, and—as with those who cannot see
timidity in a face—this meaning-blindness would be shown by the way they behaved
towards words: “They would not have an attachment to their words” (PI p. 186).
Language, for such humans, would be like a code “in whose use the ‘soul’ of the words
played no part. In which, for example, we had no objection to replacing one word by
another arbitrary one of our own invention” (PI §530).
But, of course, such a picture of language does not capture our familiar
relationship to words. To illustrate his point, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a
hypothetical case of word-substitution: “Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone;
‘tower’ means bank. I tell him ‘Now go to the tower’—he understands me and acts
accordingly, but he feels the word ‘tower’ to be strange in this use, it has not yet ‘taken
on’ the meaning” (PI p. 182). Wittgenstein is certainly not claiming that words have a
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necessary or a priori connection to their meanings. That is, he is not talking about some
kind of Adamic tongue (though Ms idea that we see words in the way we see faces does
happen to explain why humans would believe in the existence of a divine language in
which words and objects are necessarily connected, as a face is to a mind). On the
contrary, the meanings of words are still to be understood as conventionally determined
by their use, and he even implies that the word “tower” in this example could eventually
(if “not yet”) take on its new meaning. Nor is he saying that the arbitrarily chosen word
in this scenario would be incomprehensible: the person in this example “understands ...
and acts accordingly.” The point, rather, is that linguistic theories that conceive of
words as arbitrary signs (like that of Saussure) are unable to adequately account for the
familiar ways in which we ordinarily use and understand (that is, relate to) words. The
meaning of a word is not merely associated or “outwardly connected” with its
appearance but is an aspect of the face (or appearance) of the word itself.
And just as we can see a variety of psychological states in a face, a word can be
understood in a number of different ways, or under different aspects. For example,
“You can say the word ‘March’ to yourself and mean it at one time as an imperative, at
another as the name of a month” (PI p. 184). A person who was blind to the “faciality”
of the appearance of a word would not understand what it feels like to take a word now
one way, now another: “What would you be missing, for instance, if you did not
understand the request to pronounce the world ‘till’ and to mean it as a verb” (PI p.
182). But because we are able to say “till” and mean it as a verb, and also as a noun,
and even as a preposition, we know that we are not blind to the meaning-aspects of
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words. We are already physiognomists of language: we naturally see words as we see
faces, along with the affective implications face-to-face relations often imply (the
aspect-blind, on the other hand, would “not have an attachment to their words” [PI p.
186]). Put plainly, we care about words. Wittgenstein, therefore, finds it revealing that
we often obsess about finding the “right” word for a particular occasion:
How do I find the ‘right’ word? How do I choose among words?
Without doubt it is sometimes as if I were comparing them by
fine differences of smell: That is too..., that is too. ..,— this is the
right one.—But I do not always have to make judgments, give
explanations; often I might only say: “It simply isn’t right yet”. I
am dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: “That’s
it!” Sometimes I can say why. (PI p. 186)
It is not unusual for us to care deeply about finding the right word for a particular use.
We might struggle to find it, but this does not mean that we necessarily cogitate in some
rational manner (i.e. “make judgments”), as though consciously processing the options
available in an internal dictionary or lexical memory-bank. We may not be able to infer
what the right word will be; but we can often recognize that we have found it. We may
not even be able to say how we found the right word, or even precisely why it is right.
We just see or hear that it fits.
Who has not had linguistic experiences like these? Yet this discloses a
dimension of our ordinary relationship to words that cannot be accounted for by
traditional philosophies of language. On the other hand, such experiences of looking
for and finding words are quite understandable if, along with Wittgenstein, we think of
words as having faces - and conceive of linguistic understanding as a form of
physiognomy. This, of course, does not mean that words literally have faces: that is,
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have appearances which are somehow perceptually analogous to the features of human
faces. What would a claim like that mean? And where would it get us anyway? After
all, Wittgenstein has already established that if we see mentality exhibited by a face,
that experience is not attributable to anything factual about the face. If we see mind in a
face, it is not because mind is somehow literally there, but because we take a
recognitional attitude or stance towards the appearance of the face’s features. So to say
that a word has a face is not to say that it somehow looks like a face, which would
establish nothing, but rather to say that we approach words in the recognitional way we
approach faces.
And, of course, Wittgenstein can understand words by analogy to faces only
because he already regards faces physiognomically. For him, the human face is the
paradigmatic form in which mind and meaning are directly recognizable: meaning is a
physiognomy. If references to physiognomy in the later writings are often meant in a
figurative or analogical sense (we see words or games as we see human faces), this
figurative usage is clearly and quite explicitly tied to the primary senses of
“physiognomy” as the human face itself and the art involved in its interpretation.
Wittgenstein’s later philosophical outlook, in other words, is profoundly
anthropomorphic: not, however, because he projects the human form beyond the class
of human beings, but rather because he implies that humanity itself is the outcome of a
kind of anthropomorphic projection. The recognition of mentality in the face of another
person is not grounded upon some deep fact of the matter about that person’s mind, but
is simply the result of the intentional stance we naturally adopt towards him or her: “My
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attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul,” as he put it (PI p. 152). Though
their respective idioms are quite different, Wittgenstein’s explanation of the way we see
aspects of mind In the human face is not fundamentally unlike Quine’s notion of the
“essentially dramatic idiom” that we use to attribute propositional attitudes to
intentional entities. In each case, it is explicitly denied that attributions of mentality are
grounded upon the existence of private mental entities. If we see mentality all around
us, that is not because there are such things as minds: as Davidson rather dryly states the
point, “There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties” (CPM
231).
We might say that Wittgenstein encourages us to take others at face value: that
is another way of saying that he teaches us to properly value the face. Physiognomy is
possible and necessary not because the outward face reliably mirrors the inward soul (as
the physiognomic tradition, including Weininger, mistakenly believed), but rather
because there is nothing behind the face to which we can turn. After all, appearances
and behavior (including, of course, linguistic testimony) are all we have to go on, and
there are no deeper facts that will settle residual uncertainties about competing
mentalistic attributions. Thus, it might be possible to see a given face as “timid” or
“courageous”: if so, how is one to decide the matter? Simply by deciding the matter, as
we naturally do in any case. As Dennett puts it in a passage that we have already noted,
it is always possible (though unlikely) that “rival intentional interpretations” might arise
“that did equally well at rationalizing the history of behavior of an entity. Quine’s
thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation carries all the way in, as the thesis of
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the indeterminacy of radical interpretation of mental states and processes” (CPM 239).
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the timid and courageous face in the Investigations
suggests that he would not have found Dennett’s point difficult to understand. But if,
following Wittgenstein, we detach the face from the inner mind that appears to animate
it, are we not left with a mere mask? What then becomes of ail our notions about the
person?

• Dramatic Idioms: Personae and the History of Personhood

Considering Quine’s talk of “dramatic idioms,” it is curious, but probably not
accidental, that the modem word person derives from the Latin word persona, which at
first had an exclusively theatrical meaning: it referred to a mask used by an actor, but
could also designate the one who performed or the part acted (as in dramatis personae,
as we still say).

fn

In turn, the Latin word persona, by way of the Etruscan term phersu

(for mask), comes from the Greek word prosopon, which could also mean a mask, a
dramatic part, or a face. The metaphoric connections to faces, masks and theater that
are implicit in the history of the word person “can still haunt us,” Raymond Williams
observes in his etymological discussion of the English word “personality” (in
Keywords) 68 But the attenuation implied by Williams’ use of the word “haunt” is

67 Etymology is given in A. David Napier, Masks, Transformation, ana Paradox (Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1986), p. 8 and p. 20. References to this text will be given parenthetically with the
abbreviation MTP.
68 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o f Culture and Society, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 232-235.
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telling: while the theatrical associations implicit in its etymological history still have
some bearing on our understanding of the word “person,” such associations constitute a
rather pale and ghostly semantic aura. Moreover, the theatrical associations, while
certainly adding some color to a rather abstract legal and philosophical category, are
usually invoked only in a pejorative sense: to suggest that a person is playing a part,
wearing a mask, or fulfilling a role are not generally considered forms of high praise.
This has a great deal to do with the ambivalence about theatricality that lies deep in the
culture of the West, an attitude that can be traced to the rise of early Christianity. It is
the early Church that decisively purged the Latin word persona of its primarily dramatic
meanings and replaced them with the qualities of depth, interiority and subjectivity that
we associate with the modem self.
From the earliest days of the Church, the persona was a fundamental category in
Christian theology, referring not only to individual believers but also to the divine
persons of the Trinity. At the same time, however, the persistent theatrical associations
of the Latin word persona were a source of great tension in early Christian thought.
Anti-theatricality in general was vigorous and widespread among early Christian
writers, who believed that the classical theater was radically incompatible with a
Christian worldview. As Charles Garten puts it:
the continuing intent to glorify the god, the fundamentally
religious character of theatrical events—that is, in Christian eyes,
their fundamentally pagan character—is emphasized and
reemphasized in patristic writings down to the end of antiquity....

103

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

A man cannot be a Christian and remain an actor, because he is
serving pagan gods, and the audience are his abettors.69
In his anthropological study of masks, David Napier persuasively argues that profound
metaphysical differences motivated early Christian anti-theatrical polemics (rather than
mere disdain for the immorality of the theater, for example): “only a direct
epistemological incompatibility can account for the Church’s persistent criticism of the
stage” (MTP 11). Napier suggests that the crux of the incompatibility between Church
and theater lay in the radical differences between polytheistic and monotheistic attitudes
towards appearances, an epistemological issue with obvious implications for the
meaning of masking practices. Polytheistic traditions, Napier notes, exhibit a “tolerant
disposition toward the possible significance of appearances”: in “the cases where one
finds a genuine pantheon, there is, in the advent of unusual phenomena or events, a
natural tendency toward uncertainty and divination that at least in part results from not
knowing which member is to be held responsible” (MTP 14, 5). In a monotheistic
tradition, however, appearances are regarded as merely superficial in nature, ultimately
to be explained away:
A primary consequence of a world generated by a single
omniscient force is that all change can be made accountable to
that one ideation.... [A]ny unaccountable transition or
inexplicable manifestation may be attributed in the end either to
God or to Satan; traffic between supernatural forces and multiple
conflicts among them become highly improbable.... For the
mortal’s part, the understanding arose that beneath the guise of
appearance, beneath prima facie evidence, was an innate reality
that was not diverse, but devoid of unaccountable diversities.
(MTP 5)

69 Charles Gallon, Personal Aspects o f the Roman Theatre (Toronto, 1972), p. 37. Cited in MTP, p. 6.
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The use of the mask in the classical theater was consistent with a polytheistic tolerance
for the ambiguity and mutability of the realm of appearances, indeed, John Jones notes
that for the Greeks, the dramatic mask was “known to have no inside”:
Its being is exhausted in its features. To think of the mask as an
appendage to the human actor is to destroy the basis of the
ancient masking convention by inviting the audience to peer
behind the mask and demand of the actor that he shall cease
merely to support the action, and shall begin instead to exploit the
action in the service of inwardness.70
Rather than express the inward essence of the actor, masks were used to make manifest
transitions or transformations at the level of appearances: that is, to dramatically address
the question of mutability. In this, Napier points out, the use of the mask in the classical
theater is wholly consistent with the use of masks in other cultures and social contexts:
The presence of masks in situations relating to transition is so
commonly the rule that exceptions to it are hard to find. Whether
the change is from one social status to another or in the conscious
states of the mask wearers or their audiences, again and again
mask users or their observers or both attest to some change in
conjunction with a mask’s presence. These transitions from one
state to the next may occur in any number of easily recognizable
categories, the most common being rites of passage, curative
ceremonies and exorcisms, and religious and secular dramas.
(MTP 16)
In light of the transformational significance of the mask across cultures, it is worth
noting that the Greek word for mask (pmsopon) properly signified a manifestation or a
figure, and not simply a material thing; as Napier notes, “such a primary meaning

70 John Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London, 1971), pp. 44-45. Cited in MTP, p. 9.
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Implies that masks were conceived of as belonging to a much broader class of
phenomena than the mere object (mask) prosopon is usually taken to mean” (MTP 8).
Christianity’s Insistence on the mere superficiality of diverse appearances
militated against their acceptance of the classical notion of personae. Only for the devil
were apparent changes real. Anti-theatricality was therefore not an accidental, but an
essential, aspect of early Christian theological self-definition. This accounts for the
radical constriction and simplification of the meaning of the mask in Medieval drama:
Though the mask survived in several forms into the Middle Ages,
interestingly what did not survive beyond the classical period was
a sophisticated theater of personae, an extensive pantheon of
mask types. Theatrical masking of the postclassical and early
medieval eras was in fact far less organized and complex than in
earlier times, so that when personae did appear, they did so in the
standard plots common to the mystery plays and folk
performances that may be witnessed in some European villages
to the present day. In the absence of complex personae... masks
naturally lost some of the easy familiarity given to them on stage
and came more frequently to be associated with the sinister and
the evil. (MTP 7)
Here we see the emergence of the limited and pejorative meaning that is so often
attributed to masks in modernity. Eventually, writes Napier, “the association between a
diabolical nature and a mask that disfigures and conceals came to exclude nearly all
other interpretations” (MTP 12).
At the same time, Christian writers were redefining the very meaning of the
Latin word persona itself. Boethius formulated the theological definition that would
eventually be adopted by the Scholastics: “naturae rationabilis individua substantia” an individual substance of a rational nature. The conceptual distance traveled between
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mask and individual, appearance and substance measures the radical transformation
undergone by the classical notion of the persona in the early centuries of the Church.
Napier suggests that we see this radical shift in the meaning of persona as part of a
general drive towards objectification that characterized the Church’s attitude towards a
number of different phenomena, including the Trinity and the Sacraments. In this light,
it is telling that the fundamentally dramatic explanation proposed by Sabellius to the
paradox of the Trinity would be rejected as heresy, for he argued that “the three forms
of divine presentation were mere forms and nothing more, that behind each mask there
stood individually the same actor, portraying in succession the roles of creation,
redemption, and sanctification.”71 Marcel Mauss also suggests that the historical
development of Christian beliefs about the unity of the human person were closely
linked to early debates about the unity of the persons of the Trinity, a theological issue
that was resolved by the Council of Nicaea (325 C.E.) only when (in response to the
perceived threat of Arianism) it decisively asserted the distinctness and
consubstantiality (homoousios) of the three divine persons. As Mauss puts it, “unitas in
tres personas, una persona in duas naturas” (that is, unity of the three persons of the
Trinity, unity of the two natures of Christ).72 Modem personhood and Christian
monotheism, Mauss explains, are closely connected: “It is from the notion of the ‘one’
that the notion of the ‘person’ (personne) was created - 1 believe that it will long remain

71 G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London, 1936), p, i 13. Cited in MTP 7.
72 Marcel Mauss, “A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self,” trans. W.D.
Halls, in The Category o f the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, eds. Michael Carrithers, Steven
Collins, Steven Lukes (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 1-25. Subsequent references to
Mauss’ essay will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation CP.
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so - for the divine persons, but at the same time for the human person, substance and
mode, body and soul, consciousness and act” (CP 20).
The theological conception of the person as an enduring substance underlying
all apparent changes of state completed the Christian objectification of the persona: it is
this transformation that enabled Augustine to attribute an entirely novel—and
historically momentous—importance to inferiority as the privileged space of mental and
spiritual life. For as we have already seen, he regarded the human mind as a private,
interior space fully formed even prior to the acquisition of language. According to
Augustine, this interior space was to be understood as the proper field of spiritual
cultivation. “Do not go outward,” as he put it in De vera Religions, “return within
yourself. In the inward man dwells truth” (“Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore
homine habitat veritas”).73 Considering the crucial role he accorded to inwardness for
the spiritual welfare of the person, it is no wonder that Augustine “viewed theater and
its personae as antithetical to true identity” (MTP 8; for examples of Augustine’s anti
theatricality, see Book 3 of the Confessions).
Augustine’s writings about the Christian person laid the ground for all
subsequent philosophical reflections on personhood, interiority and consciousness:
indeed, it is due to Augustine’s influence that these three terms can so easily appear to
refer to the same conceptual terrain in the first place. For the Augustinian turn inward
entailed a fundamental re-orientation of the direction of spiritual and philosophical

73 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1989), p. 129. References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation
SoS. Augustine cited on same page.
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reflection: introspection and the first-person standpoint would from then on constitute
privileged ways to access truth, whether about oneself, the world, or God. Charles
Taylor, sees Augustine’s contribution as historically decisive:
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who
introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it
to the Western tradition of thought. The step was a fateful one,
because we have certainly made a big thing of the first-person
standpoint. The modem epistemological tradition from Descartes,
and all that has flowed from it in modem culture, has made this
standpoint fundamental—to the point of aberration, one might
think. It has gone as far as generating the view that there is a
special domain of “inner” objects available only from this
standpoint. (SoS 131)
Seen against the background of this Augustinian legacy, of which Wittgenstein was
clearly both conscious and critical, his later philosophy’s aspect-seeing model of
physiognomy shows us how “person” and “persona” might be conceptually re-united.
Like the mask of the classical stage, the face of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has no
inside: his physiognomy takes us beyond the conceptual distinction between appearance
and essence (significantly, the Investigations replaces the notion of essences with that of
family resemblances, a concept that clearly trades heavily on the special role that faces
play in human forms of life74). The mentality that we can quite simply see when we

74 Here is Wittgenstein’s introduction of the concept of family resemblances: “Consider for example the
proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so
on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say ‘There must be something common, or they would not be
called “games’”—but look and see whether there is anything common so all.—For if you look at them
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of
them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!.... I can think of no better expression to characterize these
similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a family:
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—
And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family” (PI §66-67). The direct seeing he exhorts us to engage in (“don’t
think, but look!”) is clearly the same kind developed throughout his yarious physiognomic reflections,
and the common presence of faces is, of course, no accident. Dennett, in his essay “Real Patterns,”
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adopt the right stance towards the faces of other people reflects a “dramatic idiom” that
we have quite naturally mastered. Read this way, we can discern the logic underlying
Wittgenstein’s choice of Augustine as a philosophical foil in the Investigations, for we
might say that Wittgenstein’s version of physiognomy constitutes a modem philosophy
of the persona, overturning at once both Augustinian anti-theatricality and inferiority.
But I am not implying that we should (or could) alter the way we regard actual persons:
the point is to offer a truer account of our intuitive grasp of “folk psychology,” not to
change folk psychology as such (an impossible task, in any case). Rather, I believe that
philosophical “dramatists” of the mind, such as Quine and Wittgenstein, simply reveal
how persons always have been like personae to begin with, a truth the ancients may
have grasped but that we have since lost touch with. The modem personae of the
intentional stance, therefore, call for a fundamental rethinking of the concept of
theatricality: for, as we have seen, the historical development of the Christian soul was
predicated upon the denigration of the earlier personae of the classical stage, and the
effects of that corrosive anti-theatricality are still alive and well. Masks are still
commonly associated with mere superficiality and appearances; the truth, on the other
hand, is to be found in depths and essences. As a result, our vocabulary to describe
surfaces can seem profoundly impoverished.

exhorts us to the same kind of direct seeing during a discussion of whether a particular (partially garbled)
visual image (labeled “A”) can be said to contain a particular visual pattern that he calls “bar-code”:
a
real pattern in frame A is bar-code with 25% noise. And sometimes, we can simply tolerate or ignore the
noise. From this perspective, a real pattern in frame A is simply: bar-code. But is bar-code really there
in frame A? I am tempted to respond: Look! You can see it with your own eyes” (p. 103). Dennett’s
point is that intentional!ty, like any pattern, is not a concrete fact, but nonetheless real: at another point in
the essay he calls folk psychology one of the “pattern-making perspectives we have on the buzzing
blooming confusion that bombards us with data” (p. 104).
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John Ashbery touches upon this very constellation of issues in his major poem,
“Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror.” As Ashbery says to the face of Parmigianino in his
“Self-Portrait”:

But your eyes proclaim / That everything is surface. The surface is

what’s there / And nothing can exist except what’s there” (190).75 Ashbery sees the
primary meaning of Parmigianino’s Self-Portrait, especially its exquisite rendering of
the artist’s face, as having primarily to do with the question of personal identity, or
what—invoking theological categories—he calls the soul. “The soul has to stay where
it is,” Ashbery gathers from the depiction of the face in the painting: “It must move / As
little as possible. This is what the portrait says.” The soul must remain so still,
according to Ashbery, because it exists only in the mirroring (that is, speculative)
moment of one’s regard and attention. Put quite literally, Parmigianino could see his
face only while he looked straight into his reflection in the convex mirror. Any
movement of the face or eyes (or even attention) would have broken the specular
relationship between self and self. Understood metaphorically, Ashbery’s point is that
introspective reflection is at once master and slave of its own existence. So he reads the
painting as the record of a kind of incarceration that characterizes the existence (we
might say, is the condition of the possibility) of the soul in the first place: “the soul is a
captive, treated humanely, kept I In suspension, unable to advance much farther / Than
your look as it intercepts the picture.” Parmigianino’s painting shows that one’s
attention, and nothing else, is what lends being to the soul. Indeed, the painful “secret”
that the painting reveals is that, in fact, “the soul is not a soul” at all (at least as

75 John Ashbery, Selected Poems (New York: Penguin, 1986).
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Christianity has conceived of it) since it has no substance or identity of its own: “The
secret is too plain. The pity of it smarts, / Makes hot tears spurt: the soul is not a soul, /
Has no secret, is small, and it fits / Its hollow perfectly: its room, our moment of
attention” (189). From a theological perspective, this knowledge is bitter indeed. But
seen differently, this “secret” (that the soul “has no secret,” since it is not some kind of
occult entity) is not painful at all, but rather liberating. This change in perspective is
registered by an alteration in poetic tone, the aqueous (and melodramatic) image of
spurting tears giving way to a jet of water playfully holding aloft the soul now pictured
as a bobbing ping-pong ball: “The whole is stable within / Instability, a globe like ours,
resting / On a pedestal of vacuum, a ping-pong ball / Secure on its jet of water” (190).
A ping-pong ball, of course, is hollow, nothing but surface all around. But Ashbery
does not rest content with this new, quite literally superficial, knowledge; perhaps
uneasy with the ease with which it was possible to assert that “everything is surface,” he
immediately puts into question our very ability to describe surfaces accurately: “there
are no words for the surface,” he concludes, “that is, / No words to say what it really is,
that it is not I Superficial but a visible core...” (190).
Ashbery apparently disdains a mere transvaluation of the psychological
distinction between inner and outer. That is, he cautions us against simply inverting our
traditional privileging of interiority in order to revel in a meaningless postmodern play
of surfaces. Our inherited conceptual schemes are not so easily overthrown, he
suggests. Indeed, he heaps scom upon those who would take this all too easy route,
calling them “beside the point”: “those assholes / Who would confuse everything with
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their mirror games” ... “that would corrode the architecture / Of the whole in a haze of
suppressed mockery” (200). “They are out of the game,” he concludes, as if wiping his
hands clean, “Which doesn’t exist until they are out of it” (200). That life may be a
“game,” Ashbery implies, does not mean that it has no point, just as by denying the
interiority (or “secrecy”) of the soul he does not intend to deny its reality. The soul is
not an illusion, but a “visible core,” as he puts it. One can see why, after briefly toying
with a superficial conception of the self, he reconsiders and declares that “there are no
words for the surface.” For to speak of the soul as superficial would be to partake still
of a logic that opposes it to an essence. The two concepts go together and neither,
Ashbery suggests, captures the truth about the soul. As Nietzsche put a parallel point in
The Gay Science, tellingly invoking the figure of a mask: “What is ‘appearance’ for me
now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could I say about any essence
except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a mask that one could
place on an unknown X or remove from it!”76 How, with the conceptual pictures we
have inherited, can we speak of the nature of the soul or the person without betraying
the truth one way or another? Ashbery’s feeling that “there are no words for the
surface” is understandable and apposite to our broader discussion of the historical fate
of the persona in the West: it is perhaps too easy for us to understand such families of
concepts as surface, theater and masks as opposed to depth, sincerity and faces. But I
hope this dissertation demonstrates that developments in the philosophy and science of

76 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1974), p.
54.
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mind throughout the twentieth-century have been busy formulating the very words we
might use to characterize the “visible cores” that Ashbery rightly suggests we truly are.
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3. Seeing As: Pictures, Perception and Persons

Like the sight of the human face itself, visual representations of the human
countenance have always exerted a special power upon those who behold them, whether
one prefers to characterize this power as religions or aesthetic (or some other way).
When it comes to understanding the presence or aura often associated with pictures of
the human face, one of the single most powerful and illuminating points was made by
E.H. Gombrich in his popular art history survey, The Story o f Art. At the beginning of
the first chapter (“Strange Beginnings”), devoted to the art of “prehistoric and primitive
peoples,” Gombrich takes a moment to discuss the magical beliefs “so-called primitive
peoples” have about images of all kinds, but especially those representing persons: “the
absurd feeling that what one does to [a] picture is done to the person it represents” (SA
40). Gombrich suspects that his readers may find such ideas radically alien, even
unintelligible. But he argues that, in fact, such “irrational” feelings are very much alive
and well within us, even if we may not be consciously aware of them. He insists that
we need to sympathetically understand such feelings if we hope to attain a proper
understanding of the function of images in prehistoric cultures: “these strange ideas are
important because they may help us to understand the oldest paintings which have come
down to us.”77 So he goes on to suggest a hypothetical exercise designed to elicit a
conscious first-person recognition of the “absurd” feelings he believes we still

77 E.H. Gombrich, The Story o f Art (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), p. 40.
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(unconsciously) have about images. Tellingly, the exercise he recommends focuses
particularly on a picture of a person’s face:
We cannot hope to understand these strange beginnings of art
unless we try to enter into the mind of the primitive peoples and
find out what kind of experience it is which makes them think of
pictures, not as something nice to look at, but as something
powerful to use. I do not think it is really so difficult to recapture
this feeling. All that is needed is the will to be absolutely honest
with ourselves and see whether we, too, do not retain something
of the ‘primitive’ in us. Instead of beginning with the Ice Age,
let us begin with ourselves. Suppose we take a picture of our
favorite champion from today’s paper - would we enjoy taking a
needle and poking out the eyes? Would we feel as indifferent
about it as if we poked a hole anywhere else in the paper? I do
not think so. However well I know with my waking thoughts that
what I do to his picture makes no difference to my friend or hero,
I still feel a vague reluctance to harm it. Somewhere there
remains the absurd feeling that what one does to the picture is
done to the person it represents. Now, if I am right there, if this
queer and unreasonable idea really survives, even among us, into
the age of atomic power, it is perhaps less surprising that such
ideas existed almost everywhere among the so-called primitive
peoples. In all parts of the world medicine men or witches have
tried to work magic in some such way - they have made little
images of an enemy and have then pierced the heart of the
wretched doll, or burnt it, and hoped that their enemy would
suffer. (SA 41)
Whatever one thinks of the surrounding discussion - and a certain amount of cultural
condescension admittedly colors Gombrich’s remarks - the moment where he asks us
how it would feel to poke out the eyes of a person’s photograph is pedagogically
brilliant: indeed, I recommend that my own reader take a moment to follow Gombrich’s
directions before reading on (I believe, however, that the impact of the exercise is more
powerful if one selects a photograph of a personal acquaintance rather than simply of a
public figure). Gombrich is, of course, right that most of us will not “feel as indifferent
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about” poking out the eyes of the person in the photograph “as if we poked a hole
anywhere else in the paper.” This is a phenomenological fact of the utmost importance
for a clear understanding of the perceptual and cognitive dynamics that underlie the
making and beholding of visual representations of the human face. The strange and
unpleasant feeling (and the “vague reluctance”78) one naturally experiences while
poking out the person’s eyes in a photograph immediately makes clear what page after
page of abstract discussions about the face could never get across.
In this context, it’s worth considering the sense of “violence,” even “brutality,”
that is so frequently associated with the distorted physiognomies painted by Francis
Bacon. Keeping Gombrich’s point in mind, imagine, just for a moment, what the
visceral feeling associated with the disfiguration of the “mere” image of a face suggests
about how Bacon might have felt while painting a distorted portrait of an intimate
friend, such as his lover George Dyer or friend Isabel Rawsthome. Imagine, as well,
how the friends he portrayed in such a distorted way might have felt about it too. A
brief and fascinating exchange between Sylvester and Bacon speaks directly to this
issue. Explaining to Sylvester why he preferred painting portraits of people from
photographs and memory rather than in the presence of the person, Bacon said: “They
inhibit me. They inhibit me because, if I like them, I don’t want to practice before them
78 Gombrich’s expectations about our response to this exercise were empirically confirmed by a class of
mine in which I assigned it. I asked the students in the class, which was on the subject of modernist
portraiture, to each bring in a photocopy of a photograph o f a person they cared about (friend, spouse,
family member). In class, I then asked them to poke two holes in some insignificant area of the
photograph. All the students quickly complied, surely wondering all the while what I was up to. I then
asked them to poke out both eyes of the person in the photograph. Much consternation and hesitation
ensued, with some students taking widely varying amounts of time to comply with my instructions, and
with a number of other students ultimately refusing to finish the exercise (interestingly, many of those
who refused were parents who had brought in a photograph of a child).
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the injury that I do to them in my work. I would rather practice the injury in private by
which I think I can record the fact of them more clearly” (IFB 41). In response to a
follow-up question from Sylvester (“In what sense do you conceive it as an injury?”)
Bacon reverses his position and implies that in fact the injury is real only from the
(mistaken) perspective of the person being portrayed: “Because people believe - simple
people at least - that the distortions of them are an injury to them - no matter how much
they feel for or how much they like you” (IFB 41). Luckily, Sylvester presses the issue,
and after asking Bacon whether he does not think this feeling on the part of his friends
is “probably right,” he receives a thoughtful and tentative acknowledgement from
Bacon: “Possibly, possibly. I absolutely understand this. But tell me, who today has
been able to record anything that comes across to us as a fact without causing deep
injury to the image?” (IFB 41).
A number of important insights into Bacon’s art can be gleaned from this
searching exchange. The multiple reversals in Bacon’s position during the course of the
conversation, however, need to be approached with great care. Rather than take his
reversals and self-contradictions as signs of inconsistency or equivocation, or worse yet,
choose one of his statements over the others as indicative of his true belief, I think we
need to take all of his remarks together at once - they are probing and uncertain
acknowledgements of many sides of a single, very complicated truth about the power of
figuration and disfiguration. One thing that the exchange makes clear is that both
Bacon and those he painted did indeed recognize an element of violence (that is,
“injury”) in his use of distortion. What he does when he distorts the images of people
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is, in a way, injurious. And then again, of course, it is not: only a “simple” person
would think that. And yet again, “possibly” injury is in fact involved, though it is
necessary and done to the image, not the person: after all, “who today has been able to
record anything that comes across to us as a fact without causing deep injury to the
image?” But consider, for a moment, how readily Bacon speaks here of “causing deep
injury” to an image, as if that made any more sense than the possibility of injuring
persons by distorting pictures of them (would one speak of “injuring” a stone, for
instance?). The perceptual and affective boundary between image and person is
profoundly ambiguous here. In fact, he ends up voicing a quasi-magical sentiment not
all that far from where he began in this particular exchange: “I don’t want to practice
before them the injury that I do to them in my work.”
Gombrich’s general psychological point about the contemporary existence of
“magical” image-related feelings is certainly confirmed: Bacon and his friends were
apparently quite familiar with (if also ambivalent about) the “queer and unreasonable”
idea that “what one does to the picture is done to the person it represents.” Indeed, I
suspect that the “feeling” to which Gombrich draws our attention has a profound
affinity to the “sensation and the feeling of life” that Bacon often refers to in so many
different ways as he tries to explain his art to Sylvester (IFB 43). As Bacon was fond of
saying, he wanted his images to directly strike the “nervous system” of those who
viewed them: explaining his use of distortion, he once said “it’s an attempt to bring the
figurative thing up onto the nervous system more violently and more poignantly” (IFB
12). I propose that whatever other significance Bacon’s references to violent “feelings”
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might have, one of them - and perhaps the most important - is the unpleasant “feeling”
that Gombrich calls “absurd,” which all of us have when we disfigure (or even
contemplate disfiguring) a representation of a person’s face. But this point, as
important as it may be as a beginning, only gets us so far, for we still need to understand
why we have this feeling when we disfigure images of persons. After all, no actual shall we say physical - injury is done to the person portrayed when Bacon distorts his or
her mouth or nose or eyes (“I don’t think it is damage,” as Bacon puts it later in the
same conversation). Yet is the “feeling” we are trying to put our finger on, as
Gombrich says it is, really “absurd”? How, in any case, can a feeling be absurd? That
an idea (which is formulated as a proposition) can be absurd is understandable, but one
wonders whether this adjective can appropriately be used to modify the kinds of mental
states referred to by the word “feeling.” Indeed, it appears that Gombrich has been
eliding the distinction between ideas (which must be expressible in propositional form)
and feelings (which, at least, do not need to take propositional form). The “queer and
unreasonable idea” Gombrich discusses (“that what one does to the picture is done to
the person it represents”) surely is absurd, but the vague, unpleasant feeling that
underlies this idea is not the same thing as the idea itself, and I would say is not absurd
at all. Indeed, one can have this feeling without it ever taking the propositional form of
the idea Gombrich refers to. Though the feeling can provoke the formulation of the
idea, the two are conceptually distinct, and each can exist in the absence of the other. It
is perfectly plausible that a person could hold the belief expressed in Gombrich’s
magical “idea” without that person ever experiencing the feeling beforehand, in the very
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way that many people express articles of religious faith without ever experiencing any
corresponding first-person religious “feelings” of grace, absolution, enlightenment or
what have you. Just so, ideas about magic can be transmitted and absorbed simply by
means of linguistic communication rather than first-hand experience. While it is very
likely that there is an intimate - though historically and culturally contingent association between the feeling Gombrich speaks of and the magical idea he calls
“queer and unreasonable,” the two have no necessary logical connection to each other.
We do not need history in order to explain the contemporary presence of this feeling; in
fact, I would go further and say that it is our ability to experience this feeling in the
present that enables us, in the first place, to grasp its cultural function in the past.
It is because Gombrich fails adequately to distinguish between idea and feeling
that he ever mistakenly labels this feeling “primitive” in the first place and then
proceeds to wonder at its “survival” into the “age of atomic power.” If the idea
Gombrich discusses may very well be primitive, the feeling is most definitely not. If
we found modem people who expressed absolute certainty in the belief that one can
harm others simply by disfiguring pictures of them, that would be something to marvel
at. On the other hand, I would argue that the odd feeling we all experience when we
consider poking out the eyes of a person’s photograph (publicly observable in the
hesitation we manifest while contemplating the unpleasant task) is simply part of our
natural biological and cognitive makeup: I suspect Bacon was quite close to the literal
truth when he insisted on the importance of our “nervous systems” to the effect of his
art. But it’s still not clear why we have this feeling. After all, as we have already
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noted, we are not gouging out the eyes of a living person who can experience pain and
suffering: physical revulsion at the thought of that bloody act would require little
explanation. And clearly we do not perceptually mistake a picture for a person, for then
the quality and intensity of our feeling would be the same in both instances. So the
reason why we might experience a feeling of “vague reluctance” when contemplating
“injury” to the eyes of a person in a pictorial representation is not self-evident.
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing can help us here. Consider, for example, his
comments about our ability to see mentality in the eyes of other people, which we
discussed in chapter two:
We do not see the human eye as a receiver, it appears not to let
anything in, but to send something out. The ear receives; the eye
looks. (It casts glances, it flashes, radiates, gleams.) One can
terrify with one’s eyes, not with one’s ear or nose. When you see
the eye you see something going out from it. You see the look in
the eye. (Z 222)
As we noted when we first cited this passage, Wittgenstein is simply acknowledging the
everyday fact that we do not see eyes - as we would if we conformed to empiricist
theories of sense perception - as purely passive organs of sensory reception. Rather, we
clearly recognize in them the active life of the mind: eyes, that is to say, flash, radiate,
and gleam (and Wittgenstein’s point is that these are not mere figures of speech but
rather perceptual descriptions). But this is not because such aspects of mind are really
there, just like any other factual trait of the eyes. As Wittgenstein insists, the “glance”
is not an empirical fact like the color of an iris, or the dilation of a pupil: “I should
contradict anyone who told me I saw the glance ‘just the way’ I see the shape and
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colour of the eye” (Z 223). If we can see mentality in the appearance of a person’s
eyes, that is simply because of the recognitional attitude we naturally take towards
them. The “look in the eye,” in other words, is an aspect of their appearance, not a
physiological fact.
But because there is no fact of the matter in the physical eyes themselves that
determines our recognition of mentality in their appearance, it follows then that there is
no reason why we should not be able to recognize such aspects of mind in pictorial
representations of eyes as well. All of this, of course, applies equally to the face as a
whole. Recognition of mentality in the picture of a face, however, is additionally
colored by a simultaneous recognition that we are beholding a representation, and not
an actual face. But as Gombrich’s point about newspaper photographs and Bacon’s
remarks about “injury” make clear, the awareness of the difference between seeing an
actual person and a mere representation of a person can, at times, become experientially
blurred or problematic. Ideas are one thing, our feelings another. In other words,
though we consciously know that we are seeing a person in a picture, we may at the
same time experience a vague sense of seeing the picture as a person too. Consider for
instance, Velazquez’s portrait of Innocent X, a masterful painting that somehow
provokes this kind of perceptual blurring (unfortunately, I suspect that if one does not
immediately see the truth of this claim when looking at Velazquez’s painting, then no
amount of argument will help). By stressing the phenomenological difference (and
occasional confusion) between seeing “in” and seeing “as,” I am of course invoking but also marking a disagreement with - Richard Wollheim’s well-known philosophical

123

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

account of the distinction between these two Muds of visual perception in the second
edition of his Art and its Objects (“seeing-in” then goes on to serve as the theory of
representational seeing in his magisterial Painting as an Art).79 In the first edition of
Art and its Objects, Wollheim had employed Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as from
section xi of the Investigations as a general theory for the visual perception of pictorial
representations. In the second, and expanded, edition of Art and its Objects, however,
Wollheim came to view his earlier use of seeing-as as incorrect, and argued instead for
another closely related phenomenon that he called “seeing-in” as a better way to
characterize the type of perception we appropriately bring to pictorial representations.
As he explains, in a chapter entirely devoted to marking the conceptual distinction
between seeing-in and seeing-as: “Where previously I would have said that
representational seeing is a matter of seeing x (= the medium or representation) as y (=
the object, or what is represented), I would now say that it is, for the same values of the
variables, a matter of seeing y in x ” (AO 209). According to Wollheim, in other words,
it is a conceptual mistake to claim, as I - along with Gombrich and Bacon - ventured a
moment ago, that one ever sees a picture as a person.
Wollheim’s discussion of the differences between these two forms of seeing
raises a number of distinct issues, yet I think what is at stake in the discussion as a
whole is neatly captured by what he calls the “twofold thesis”: “The thesis says that my
visual attention must be distributed between two things though of course it need not be
equally distributed between them” (AO 213). The two “things” Wollheim is referring

79 See Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects, ch. 5.
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to here are, on the one hand, the “medium or representation” and, on the other, “the
object, or what is represented.” According to Wollheim, seeing-in respects the
phenomenological difference between these two components of representational seeing,
whereas seeing-as does not, the latter, he claims, dissolving an awareness of the
medium Into an all-consuming perception of the thing represented. In other words,
according to Wollheim, when I see x as y, I am only conscious of y, and no longer of x,
though I can consciously bring my attention back to x if I wish (then losing sight of y).
But Wollheim points out that when I see a face in an oil painting, I am simultaneously
aware of the face represented and the various markings that make up the medium of the
representation (though, depending on one’s state of mind and the kind of handling
exhibited by the medium, the distribution of attention between these two aspects of a
representation may vary: looking at Ingres’ portrait of Louis-Francois Berlin I may
attend more to the face represented, while seeing Matisse’s portrait of his wife with a
green stripe, I may very well attend more to the medium of representation).
The major target of Wollheim’s argument is Gombrich’s account of perception
in Art and Illusion (“I have argued for [the twofold thesis] in arguing against
Gombrich,” as he acknowledges):
For it is a central thesis of Art and Illusion that, in looking at
representational pictures, I am incapable of this kind of twofold
perception. Gombrich attempts to clinch the point by
assimilating what he calls the ‘seeing canvas’/ ’seeing nature’
disjunction, or what I have expressed as seeing the medium
versus seeing the object, which holds for picture perception
generally, to the seeing the duck/seeing the rabbit disjunction,
which holds for the special case of looking at the ambiguous
duck-rabbit picture. Everyone would recognize that the second
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disjunction is exclusive, or that we cannot simultaneously see the
duck and the rabbit in the picture, and through assimilating the
two disjunctions Gombrich is able to claim that the first
disjunction is exclusive too. I cannot be simultaneously aware of
the medium and of the object of the representation and to
perceive both I have to switch perception. (AO 213-4)
Of course, Wollheim is right to oppose any theory of picture perception that would deny
the possibility of a simultaneous awareness of medium and object, to use his own
terminology. And he is surely correct to dispute Gombrich’s assimilation of the duckrabbit disjunction to visual perception in general: only particular types of perceptual
objects exhibit the ambiguity shown by Jastrow’s duck-rabbit. Indeed, Wollheim need
only have noted that even the duck-rabbit picture exhibits twofoldness: while one
cannot simultaneously see the duck and the rabbit, one can see the duck aspect while
remaining aware that one is seeing that aspect in a drawing, and likewise with the rabbit
aspect. But my primary concern is whether in having achieved such conceptual clarity
- firmly marking off seeing-in from seeing-as so as to preserve the twofoldness of
pictorial representations - Wollheim does not blind himself to the kind of
phenomenological datum about our relationship to images that Gombrich’s exercise in
The Story o f Art so vividly brought to our attention. How would Wollheim account for
the “feeling” Gombrich and Bacon each refer to, except by denying its possibility
altogether?
On this score, it is interesting to see that Wollheim chooses to discuss a portrait
in order to demonstrate what is wrong with Gombrich’s account of perception. Arguing
that the twofold thesis, unlike Gombrich’s view, can respect “what is distinctive
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phenomenologically... about seeing something or someone in a representation,”
Wollheim offers the following illustration, which implicitly rales out the possibility that
we might see a picture as a person:
[The twofold thesis] tells us what is experientially different, for
example, seeing Henry VIII in Holbein’s portrait, as opposed to
seeing him face to face. The suggestion favoured by Gombrich,
which is that, while looking at Holbein’s portrait, I can always
stop seeing Henry VIII, switch my perception, and then be
visually aware of the canvas, clearly does not fill this need. For
instead of citing some actual characteristic of a present
experience, it merely invokes the possibility of an alternative
experience, and this is not phenomenology. Indeed, it is
Gombrich’s failure to assign to the seeing appropriate to
representations a distinctive phenomenology that impels him
towards the view that there is nothing distinctive about the seeing
of representations, or that seeing someone’s representation is
quite continuous with seeing that person face to face - with all
that such a view implies or suggests. (AO 214-5)
Now, it is clear that Wollheim is again right when he notes that any failure to
distinguish between actual face-to-face perception and the perception of a face in a
painting is conceptually faulty. As I stated earlier, recognition of mentality in the
picture of a face is necessarily colored by the awareness that the recognition is in
response to a picture. Otherwise, one would feel no differently whether cutting into an
actual person or a photograph of that person. In other words, art is not illusion, as
Wollheim rightly insists (but as does Gombrich as well). However, Wollheim’s account
is unable to account for the phenomenological “fact” that poking out the eyes in a
photograph of a person will not feel the same as poking two holes in the middle of a
blank sheet of paper. Much of Wollheim’s discussion is absolutely convincing and
helps advance our understanding of representational seeing, especially since it explicitly
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accounts for the awareness of artifice that is involved when we look at pictures, but
seeing-in and seeing-as are not as phenomenologicaily distinct as Wollheim’s
conclusions suggest. In this respect, I would say that while Gombrich’s explanations
may not be as philosophically acute as those of Wollheim, the former nonetheless show
an intuitive feel for an important aspect of our experience of images that Wollheim’s
arguments seem inadequately sensitive to (perhaps the difference in their sensibilities
accounts for the fact that it is Gombrich who has produced some of the most important
studies yet of physiognomic expressions in the literature on the psychology of art80).
Gombrich, that is, rightfully acknowledges that the distinction between persons
and pictures can, at times, become phenomenologicaily confused, however difficult and
problematic this acknowledgement makes our understanding of pictorial representation
in general. The problem such perceptual confusions introduce into our theories of art, I
would suggest, are not simply the result of misformulated theories (on the part of
Gombrich) but rather evidence of something essential to the nature of pictorial
representation and perception. That Gombrich’s explanation is partly mistaken does not
show that the problem he draws our attention to is not real: on the contrary, he has put
his finger on a fact that must be adequately accounted for in any comprehensive
psychology of art. In fact, I would call it a serious fault of Wollheim’s otherwise
powerful theory of art that the best “solution” he can suggest is to deny the reality of the
problem in the first place. Therefore, I would reproduce one of Wollheim’s criticism of

80 See Art and Illusion, ch. 10 (“The Experiment of Caricature”) and “The Mask and the Face: the
Perception of Physiognomic Likeness in Life and in Art” in Art, Perception, and Reality, Ed. Maurice
Mandelbaum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 1-46.
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Gombrich’s theory, though this time taking it as a summation of one of Gombrich’s
most valuable insights: that “seeing someone’s representation is quite continuous with
seeing that person face to face - with all that such a view implies or suggests.”
Continuous, however, not identical. It is only because there is such a continuity
(“absurd” as it may sound) that a pictorial representation of another human being can
face us with a quasi-moral injunction not to do harm (evident in our “vague reluctance”
to poke out his or her eyes). This does not mean that such continuity between image
and person is incompatible with the “twofold” awareness upon which Wollheim insists:
on his sense of the importance of “twofoldness” to a proper understanding of
representational seeing, I completely agree. As Wollheim argues, Gombrich is surely
mistaken to categorically deny its possibility. But I would suggest that there is
something wrong with Wollheim’s account as well, for it appears that the
phenomenological qualities he associates with seeing-in and seeing-as can actually co
exist in a single experience of representational seeing - at least, we may need to add,
when the representation we are seeing is of a human face. Faces, it appears, are in a
representational category all their own. It follows, then, that we may need a theory of
visual perception specific to seeing representations of faces. There is, after all, no
reason to think that an absolutely general and homogeneous theory of representational
seeing is even possible, let alone desirable. It may be the case that certain types of
representational objects call upon different kinds of seeing than do others (real faces
certainly do, as cognitive neuroscience has shown us). We may naturally have different
kinds of perceptual relationships to different kinds of represented objects. Wittgenstein
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seems to have suggested as much when he said, “You need to think of the role which
pictures such as paintings (as opposed to working drawings) have in our lives. This role
is by no means a uniform one” (PI 175). Pictures of faces, at least, appear to elicit a
.kind of perception that is special, and it seems also especially difficult to understand.
Indeed, perhaps Wollheim’s mistake was simply to attempt to specify a single form of
seeing that would encompass all instances of representational seeing in general.
But I believe another problem with Wollheim’s account is linked to the way he
reads section xi of the Philosophical Investigations, the text from which he derived his
original account of seeing-as. Indeed, one senses that something may be wrong with
Wollheim’s interpretation of section xi as soon as he claims that “seeing-as” is
fundamentally related to what he calls the “straightforward perception” of objects
present to the senses. Because so much depends on the cogency of Wollheim’s reading
of Wittgenstein here, I will quote his interpretation at length;
... seeing-as draws upon no special perceptual capacity over and
above straightforward perception. Rather it partially is, partially
is a development out of, an aspect of straightforward perception.
The aspect is this: Whenever I straightforwardly perceive
something, which ex hypothesi is present to the senses, my
perception of it is mediated by a concept, or in perceiving it I
subsume it under a concept. For any x, whenever I perceive x,
there is always som e/such that I perceive x as/. But it is crucial
to an understanding of seeing-as to recognize that my seeing x as
/ i s not just the conjunction of my seeing x and my judging it to
be/. Such a view, which has gained currency among perceptual
psychologists who talk of perception as hypothesis, errs in that it
leaves the judgment external to the perception. It was just this
view that Wittgenstein tried to combat when he asked us to
consider cases where we switch from seeing something or other
as this to seeing it as that. For the relevance of such cases is that
they allow us to observe how experience and concept change not
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merely simultaneously but as one. It is a misfortune of
Wittgenstein’s exposition of his argument that he chose as
examples of alternating perception cases of alternating perception
of representations: notably, the duck-rabbit drawing. For such
cases introduce additional complexities, which can be the source
of confusion. But the fundamental point in Wittgenstein’s
argument, which remains, is that, when I see x as/,/perm eates or
mixes into the perception: the concept does not stand outside the
perception, expressing an opinion or conjecture on my part about
x, and which the perception may be said to support to this or that
degree. (AO 219-220)
I will begin by saying - in order to immediately establish the nature of my interpretive
disagreement with Wollheim - that “the fundamental point” or, better yet, motivating
concern of Wittgenstein’s discussion in section xi is to understand how we can see
mentality in the appearance of a face (as well as other phenomena) and not, as
Wollheim claims, simply to argue that “when I see x as/,/perm eates or mixes into the
perception.” Certainly, the point that Wollheim emphasizes is a crucial part of the
larger project of section xi (as confirmed by our discussion in chapter two), but it is only
a part: that is, Wollheim does not misread Wittgenstein (or at least the part he reads),
but he ultimately fails to see the underlying motivation or point of the whole discussion.
Wittgenstein’s “fundamental point” is not to explain how we see what is there, but to
understand how we see what can not be there, as a fact of the matter, that is (such as the
mental states of timidity, sadness, or courage): after all, as philosophers of mind
working in the field of developmental psychology have pointed out, “there is nothing
specifically menial about human faces” (CPM 253).
I should note, however, that Wollheim’s “straightforward” way of approaching
section xi is not uncommon. In fact, few of Wittgenstein’s readers (even very careful
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ones) have grasped the motivating importance of physiognomy and the face to the
discussion of aspect-seeing in the Investigations, perhaps because this understanding
requires a grasp of the genesis of Wittgenstein’s concern with faces in his reading of
Weininger’s physiognomic treatise, Sex and Character, and his subsequent study of
Spengler’s “physiognomic flair” in The Decline o f the West.®1 Close reading of the
Investigations alone, in other words, may not be enough. As noted in chapter two, it is
from Weininger’s physiognomic remarks about the portraits of men of genius that he
borrowed the term “aspect” in the first place, and it is by reading Spengler’s Decline
that he realized the methodological superiority of morphological description over
systematic theorization. Indeed, an incident recollected by Wittgenstein’s friend Miles
Drury shows how much a part of his everyday thoughts the ideas of Spengler eventually
became. One day in the autumn of 1930, Drury reports, Wittgenstein came to visit him
after strolling through Cambridge and declared, with great distress, that he had just seen
a pictorial representation - tellingly in the form of a series of portraits - of Spengler’s
theory of cultural decline:
I was walking about in Cambridge and passed a bookshop, and in
the window were portraits of Russell, Freud and Einstein. A little
further on, in a music shop, I saw portraits of Beethoven,
Schubert and Chopin. Comparing these portraits I felt intensely
the terrible degeneration that had come over the human spirit in
the course of only a hundred years.82
811 again refer the reader to Ray Monk’s magisterial biography of Wittgenstein, The Duty o f Genius, for a
meticulous account of the importance of both Weinioger and Spengler to Wittgenstein’s whole approach
to philosophy, and indeed life. For instance, Monk notes that in 1931, “references to Weininger and
Weiningerian reflections abound in Wittgenstein’s notebooks and conversations. He recommended Sex
and Character to his undergraduate friends, Lee and Drury, and to [G.E.] Moore” (312). He likewise
recommended Decline o f the West to his friends, even after Spengler’s association with the National
Socialists rendered it a politically suspect work to many (cf. p. 315).
82 Rush Rfaees, ed., Recollections o f Wittgenstein (Oxford: OUP 1984), p. 112. Cited in WDG 299.
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Portraiture is considered the most important and culturally characteristic kind of
Western (or Faustian) art in The Decline o f the West: “Faustian man... found the most
genuine, the only exhaustive, expression of his life-feeling in the Portrait'' (DoW 136,
italics in original). And, Wittgenstein could not have thought of Spengler and
portraiture without recalling Weininger’s remarks on portraits and genius. In Sex and
Character, Weininger observes that “men of genius” will exhibit “incredibly great
changes” in “personal appearance... from time to time,” a physiognomic indication of
great mental power that can be verified simply by looking at their portraits:
“Comparisons of the portraits at different times of Goethe, Beethoven, Kant, or
Schopenhauer are enough to establish this” (SaC 65). It is this that leads Weininger to
conclude that the “number of different aspects that the face of man has assumed may be
taken almost as a physiognomical measure of his talent” (SaC 65). It is likely this very
passage that Wittgenstein has in mind when, in early drafts of §§536-537 of the
Investigations where he first considers the timid or courageous face, he explicitly cites
Weininger in connection with the idea of an “aspect of the face itself’ (cf. the draft
version published in the Philosophical Remarks, for example, which preserves the
parenthetical citation of Weininger). Aspects are, therefore - and from the moment of
their genesis in Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections - a physiognomic concept.
And seeing-as is, first and foremost, a seeing of aspects: seeing a face as fearful, for
example. One can now see how misplaced is Wollheim’s complaint that it is a
“misfortune of Wittgenstein’s exposition of his argument that he chose as examples of
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alternating perception cases of alternating perception of representations: notably, the
duck-rabbit drawing.” Far from being a “misfortune,” Wittgenstein’s choice of such
visual objects as duck-rabbit drawings for his exposition reflects the pictorial origins of
his interest in aspects in the first place: aspects of mind exhibited in portraits. The
representational nature of such examples is not somehow extrinsic to Wittgenstein’s
concern with aspects - a factor that would merely “introduce additional complexities,”
as Wollheim puts it - but rather present from the very beginning in Wittgenstein’s
reading of the discussion of portraits and physiognomy in Sex and Character.
Of course, Wittgenstein radically alters Weininger’s notion of physiognomy,
reversing Weininger’s insistence on a parallelism between inner and outer in favor of
the radical visibility of mental states. But even if he did not follow him on every point
(and in fact, reversed him on most) Wittgenstein knew clearly, and candidly
acknowledged, how much he owed to Weininger’s inspiration. When he received a
cool response after warmly recommending Sex and Character in 1931 to his colleague
G.E. Moore, Wittgenstein wrote to Moore in terms that show not only the intensity of
his feeling for Weininger but also the complicated nature of his relationship to his ideas:
It is true that he is fantastic but he is great and fantastic. It isn’t
necessary or rather not possible to agree with him but the
greatness lies in that with which we disagree. It is his enormous
mistake which is great. I.e. roughly speaking if you add a ~ to
the whole book it says an important truth, (cited in WDG 313)
It was by “negating” the inner-outer picture that underlay Weininger’s physiognomy
that Wittgenstein was able to grasp the “important truth” his physiognomic ideas
expressed. Many elements in Wittgenstein’s later writings, such as Part II of the
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Investigations, the Remarks on the Philosophy o f Psychology, and much of Zettel, can
profitably be read as late flowerings of the conceptual seeds first planted in
Wittgenstein’s mind by his study of Weininger, and then Spengler. But only by
adopting a genetic and developmental approach to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can
we see how important physiognomy actually was for him.
Another reason that it is difficult to see the importance of the face to the later
writings is that physiognomy was not primarily an object of investigation, but rather the
source of Wittgenstein’s methodological orientation. He suggests as much in citing
Spengler during his essay on Frazer’s Golden Bough:
For us the conception of a perspicuous presentation is
fundamental. It indicates the form in which we write of things,
the way in which we see things. (A kind of Weltanschauung that
seems to be typical of our time. Spengler.) This perspicuous
presentation makes possible that understanding which consists
just in the fact that we “see the connections.” (WDG 311)
In other words, physiognomy (that is, Spengler’s “physiognomic flair”) shaped how he
came to think, but was far from the only thing he was interested in thinking about:
understanding how we recognize the “familiar physiognomy [Gesicht] of a word,” as he
tellingly put it, was certainly as important as understanding how we recognize the
expression of a timid face (PI 186). Yet, as we stated earlier, Wittgenstein could
express his understanding of how we experience the meaning of a word by likening a
word to a face (Gesicht) only because he already regarded faces physiognomically.
Without a sense of the continuity of Wittgenstein’s interest in physiognomy, the
scattered mentions of faces in section xi can easily seem but one kind of example
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among many (no more important than duck/rabbit drawings, for instance). But the
other phenomena discussed in section xi (words, duck/rabbits, triangles, melodies,
portraits, etc.) are linked to, and emerge out of, a more fundamental interest on
Wittgenstein’s part in the recognition of mental states in the perception of faces (i.e.
physiognomy). Physiognomy can explain the meaning of these nonface phenomena
because, as he put it earlier in the Investigations, meaning is a physiognomy (“Die
Bedeutung eine Physiognomic,” PI 568). As I suggested earlier, however, I think it
would be quite difficult to see this simply by closely reading section xi on its own:
perhaps one must situate the discussion of seeing-as and aspect-seeing within the wider
context of Wittgenstein’s intellectual development in order to “see the connections” I
am gesturing towards.83 This, I suspect, is why Wollheim does not clearly grasp the
“fundamental point” of section xi himself.
In any case, only a failure to see the ultimate importance of mentality in general
to the whole of section xi could lead Wollheim, a little later in his discussion, to choose
a perception of an oak tree in order to illustrate how seeing-as works: “The concept/
enters the mind along with the perception of x, blends with this perception, and stays in
the mind to form the belief that x is/. So I look out of the window of a train and see a
tree which I straightaway see as an oak, which I thereupon believe it to be” (AO 220).
Wollheim’s point is not incorrect, but by using a “straightforward” and trivial object

83 Indeed, as I noted in chapter two, it is John Koethe’s study, The Continuity o f Wittgenstein’s Thought,
that led me to search out these connections in the first place. In that text, Koethe even tentatively noted
“a faint parallel with seeing Jastrow’s figure as either a duck or a rabbit in the discussion in
Investigations, 537 of the possibility of seeing a face as timid or as courageous” (CWT 113). I hope it is
now clear why Koethe is absolutely correct to see these moments as connected.
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such as an oak tree in order to illustrate the nature of seeing-as, he minimizes the
conceptual novelty and importance of section xi, the point of which is to understand
precisely those instances of perception that are not at all straightforward, such as the
fearful expression of a face, the sadness of a musical melody, the meaning of a word, or
the striking likeness between two different faces. If Wollheim’s account of seeing-as
was all it really amounted to, one would not wonder at his decision to abandon it as
hopelessly inadequate to the understanding of art.
He comes closer to suggesting the conceptual reach of Wittgenstein’s theory of
seeing-as, however, when he discusses instances of seeing in which we attempt to see
some x as an /w e think or know the jc actually is not: for example, a line of trees as a
row of pirates; a church as an overturned footstool; or a mountain range as a naked
woman’s body (all Wollheim’s examples; AO 222). Here, however, Wollheim actually
misinterprets Wittgenstein, rather than simply failing to see his underlying point.
According to Wollheim’s explanation of the mental processes related to such “pretend”
forms of seeing-as, the mind actively imagines what would have to change about x in
order for it to be seen or experienced as/: “we must be able to imagine how x would
have, or would have had, to change or adapt itself in order to take on the property of
being/. We would have to be able to imagine just how much of x would have to go,
and just how much could stay, under this transformation” (AO 222). Anyone who has
witnessed children playing pretend will know that this is a mischaracterization of the
kind of seeing that occurs under conditions of pretence. To see a banana as a telephone
does not require that the child engage in any kind of imaginary process of visual
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alteration or adaptation: would a child really have to grasp how much of a banana
would have to go, how much stay, before the child could see a banana as a telephone?
Putting it this way immediately shows how overly intellectualized Wollheim’s account
is. The transformation of a banana into a telephone is not visual but conceptual, ft is
appropriate for us to say that the child sees the banana as a telephone, but not because
he imagines the banana as looking like a telephone. Indeed, developmental
psychologists, as we noted earlier, have found that pretence operates by decoupling
(rather than altering or adapting) primary and secondary representations: as KarmiloffSmith and Russell explain, “pretending that a simple block of wood has a steering
wheel, a horn and four wheels in no way detracts from toddlers’ understanding of the
real properties of the block of wood and of real cars, nor does it change their
representations of such properties” (CPM 254). According to Wollheim’s account, on
the other hand, during the time a toddler pretended to see a block of wood as a car, he
would not be able to see the wood underlying the pretence: he would only be able to see
it as a car. Seeing-as, after all, is supposedly incompatible with twofoldness. And in
the following discussion, Wollheim follows his methodical reasoning all the way to the
unpersuasive conclusion that seeing-as necessarily precludes twofoldness:
We have already noted that, in those cases [such as the oak tree]
where x is indeed believed to b e/, seeing x as/goes beyond
merely seeing x and simultaneously judging x to be/: seeing x as
/ i s a particular visual experience of x. So in the same way, in the
case where x is not believed to be /, or is even believed not to be
/, seeing x as/[su ch as a line of trees as a row of pirates] goes
beyond seeing x and simultaneously imagining it to be/: it also is
a particular, though a very different, experience of x. Now, just
because it is, there is no room when seeing x as counterfactual/
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also to be visually aware of those properties of x which would
have to change if x were actually to be or become/. In other
words, the properties that sustain my perception of x as/w ould
have themselves to be perceptually masked if I am - as I have put
it - to try out the appearance of/upon x. So twofoldness in the
case of seeing-as is ruled out. (AO 222-223)
Key phrases such as “were actually to be or become” and “to try out the appearance o f f
upon x” betray what is wrong with Wollheim’s interpretation. He seems to believe that
seeing x as “counterfactual / ’ (the way he characterizes th e/w e know x actually is not)
would entail some form of alteration in an inner, or phenomenal, picture of x (which
then perceptually “masks” the “properties that sustain my perception of x a s / ’). But,
oddly enough, one of the most important elements of section xi is Wittgenstein’s
argument against the inner picture theory of visual perception: ‘T he concept of the
‘inner picture’ is misleading, for this concept uses the 'outer picture’ as a model; and
yet the uses of the words for these concepts are no more like one another than the uses
of ‘numeral’ and ‘number’. (And if one chose to call numbers ‘ideal numerals’, one
might produce a similar confusion.)” (PI p. 167). Wittgenstein especially cautions
against placing the “organization” of the visual impression on a level with color and
shape, which Wollheim surprisingly appears to do when he states that we must “be
visually aware of those properties of x which would have to change if x were actually to
be or become/.” Wittgenstein’s response to this kind of theory, which we have already
cited in chapter two, is clear about the conceptual problems it entails: “If you put the
‘organization’ of a visual impression on a level with colours and shapes, you are
proceeding from the idea of the visual impression as an inner object. Of course this
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makes this object into a chimera; a queer!y shifting construction. For the similarity to a
picture is now impaired” (PI p. 168). Wollheim’s “x seen as counterfactual/’ can
certainly be called a “queerly shifting chimera,” as it entails the transformation of the
appearance of x along with a perceptual masking of those properties of x which sustain
the transformation into the appearance off. Indeed, the implausibiiity of Wollheim’s
conclusion provides strong confirmation of Wittgenstein’s argument that the inner
picture theory leads inevitably to mistaken, even incoherent, conceptual conclusions.
I suspect that Wollheim’s discussion of pretence seeing may have been
prompted by the following discussion of Wittgenstein’s in section xi about children’s
pretend play, which, if not carefully read, could easily be taken to support Wollheim’s
incorrect point about “perceptual masking”:
Here is a game played by children: they say that a chest, for
example, is a house; and thereupon it is interpreted as a house in
every detail. A piece of fancy is worked into it.
And does the child now see the chest as a house?
“He quite forgets that it is a chest; for him it actually is a
house.” (There are definite tokens of this.) Then would it not
also be correct to say he sees it as a house? (PI 176)
The answer to both questions is clearly yes: the child sees the chest as a house.
However, Wittgenstein’s point here must be carefully specified and delimited.
Wollheim’s argument above about x seen as counterfactual / would find support in this
passage if one read the interlocutor’s declaration that the child “quite forgets that it is a
chest” as evidence that Wittgenstein too believes the child is no longer aware of the
properties of the chest that sustain his “perception of x [=chest] as/[=house].” It is,
however, always dangerous to attribute remarks of the interlocutor unambiguously to
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Wittgenstein himself. For here, Wittgenstein is only agreeing that one could and should
say of the child that “for him it actually is a house”: but there is absolutely no reason to
go further and take Wittgenstein’s use of “see” here as a claim about the actual visual
perception experienced by the child. Indeed, one cannot imagine Wittgenstein
venturing that type of claim in the first place (recall the “Inner picture” argument): what
matters is not whether the child quasi-hallucinates the chest into a house, but that, for all
intents and purposes, one can see the child’s behavior as criterial of the fact that he is
regarding the chest as a house, period. A “piece of fancy” (that the chest is a house) has
been worked into the chest, but there is no reason to think the imagined “house” has
eclipsed or masked the appearance of the “chest” altogether. The transformation is
conceptual, not visual, though the only way to accurately capture this transformation in
language is to say that the child sees the chest as a house. After all, that’s how he treats
it: “there are definite tokens of this.” (I would encourage my readers to take a moment
and try pretend seeing-as on their own, in order to see for themselves which account
better describes its phenomenology.)
That Wollheim’s interpretation of seeing-as is inaccurate, however, does not in
any way vitiate his account of representational seeing in a text such as Painting as an
Art, for Wollheim assimilates to seeing-in much of what properly belongs to seeing-as
in the first place. This conceptual assimilation explains why the phenomenological
boundary he attempted to establish between the two seemed problematic and at times
confused, for the attributes he associates with each are in actuality but aspects of one
(very internally diverse) form of seeing: that is, seeing-as or, better yet, aspect-seeing
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(but the quasi-technical terms themselves are not important). It appears Wollheim
mistakenly felt compelled to discard the theory of seeing-as in section xi of the
Investigations simply because he held an overly narrow, and therefore skewed,
conception of what seeing-as was like in the first place.
In other words, twofoldness is not necessarily ruled out by seeing-as. Seeing a
picture of a face as expressive of mind (as one can easily do when seeing the face in
Velazquez’s Innocent X, for example) is perfectly compatible with a simultaneous
awareness of the representational medium that supports our ability to recognize the
Pope in the image in the first place. A consciousness of pretence and artifice, that is,
naturally and inevitably accompanies our experience of the recognition of mentality in
representations of faces. It might be better, however, to say that pretence is what
enables us to see a picture as a person to begin with. Touching on this issue in section
xi, Wittgenstein introduces what he calls a “picture-face”:

Fig. 4

He then explains that, “In some respects I stand towards it as I do towards a human
face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face.
A child can talk to picture-men or picture-animals, can treat them as it treats dolls” (PI
166). Wittgenstein’s point is clearly that pretence, just like the imaginary play of
children, is what enables us to “stand towards” a picture-face as we do towards a real
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human face. He acknowledges that there is a difference in the quality of the “stand”
one takes in each case (the phrase “in some respects” implies as much), yet he also
makes it clear that it is a matter of taking a “stand” in each instance. After all, even the
recognition of mind in flesh and blood humans requires that one adopt a certain
(Dennett would say “intentional”) stance towards them: “My attitude towards him is an
attitude towards a soul” (PI 152). It is a question of attitude whether the face one
“studies” or “reacts to” is in a picture or not, though of course the difference matters a
great deal. Wittgenstein’s talk of “stands” however does not mean that one can opt not
to play the game: volition is not required in order to recognize the picture as a face. As
if he is concerned that his point might be misunderstood just this way, a few paragraphs
later he muses: “If you say ‘Now it’s a face for me’, we can ask: ‘What change are you
alluding to?”’ (PI 166). Wittgenstein’s querying response to the interlocutor’s remark
here suggests that he does not see how one could see the picture-face as anything other
than a face. This exchange immediately follows a comment that confirms this
interpretation: “One doesn’t ‘take’ what one knows as the cutlery at a meal fo r cutlery;
any more than one ordinarily tries to move one’s mouth as one eats, or aims at moving
it” (PI 166). Just as one does not consciously take a knife for a knife, one does not need
to consciously take a picture-face for a face. A particular “stand” is necessary, but this
is a stand one cannot help but assume, just like Dennett’s intentional stance, which
enables us to see others as mental entities, yet is not the result of any conscious
interpretive decision.
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Since aspect-seeing and the intentional stance partake of a certain form, of
“dramatic” pretence, the difference between the perception of a real face and a picture
of a face - though obviously immense - will ultimately be one of degree, and not of
kind: to again recall Wollheim’s characterization of Gombrich’s position, “seeing
someone’s representation is quite continuous with seeing that person face to face - with
all that such a view implies or suggests.” Quandaries, to recall Quine’s discussion of
the projective nature of “dramatic idioms,” will therefore inevitably arise (even ethical
ones: “with all that such a view implies or suggests,” as Wollheim pointed out): do I
injure my friend if I poke out the eyes in a photograph of his face? Whatever I may
rationally believe, I may not be able to help feeling so. That is, even if I am aware that
a picture of a face is, ontologically speaking, merely a representation, mentality will be
recognized in it nonetheless; and thus, though I will not blind my friend and cause him
great pain, I may very well feel that I “injure” the aspects of mind that are “alive” in my
perception of his eyes in the photograph. As with facial perception in general, volition
need play no role here.84 The intentional stance appears not only to be a natural power
of the mind, but an almost irrepressible one as well: whenever given the opportunity,
the mind will adopt an intentional stance towards entities and patterns in our
environment. Indeed, even very simple geometric shapes (such as circles and triangles),
when moving in patterns that can be intentionally interpreted, will spontaneously be

84 It is possible to imagine a person “supressing” a mentalizing response to a representation of a face, but
this would be a founded or derivative attitude, non-primary in just the way that Heidegger imagines it as
possible for a person to assume a purely theoretical or present-to-hand attitude towards a tool despite the
fact that the more fundamental (primordial) relationship of humans (or rather Daseins) to tools is
characterized by what he calls readiness-to-hand.
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understood as intentional agents: a classic study done in 1944 by Fritz Heider and
Mary-Ann Simmel “found that when subjects were asked to watch a silent film in which
geometric shapes moved around, and were then asked to describe what they had just
seen, they tended to anthropomorphize (or ascribe agency to) the geometric shapes.
These subjects used a rich vocabulary of volitional mental-state terms in their accounts,
all of which they attributed to the shapes” (MB 35-6).85 Since people will naturally
adopt an intentional stance even towards images of mere circles and triangles, it is not
so surprising that we spontaneously do the same to pictorial representations that are in
any way recognizable as human faces.
And we are innately sensitized to see faces wherever we can. Indeed, we will
unavoidably recognize as faces even configurations of objects that clearly are not “real”
faces at all: consider, for example, the composite fruit and vegetable physiognomies of
Giuseppe Arcimboldo (such as Vertumnus). Our perception of a face in Vertumnus is
fully compatible with a consciousness of radical artifice. Indeed, one might say that
Arcimboldo’s paintings are intended to exploit and heighten our sense of “twofoldness.”
However, it would be a mistake to think that the configuration of nonface objects in
Arcimboldo’s painting is somehow interpreted as a face. Rather, the perception of the
nonface objects and the perception of a face-pattem happen at the same time and in
different regions of the brain: face and object recognition, as cognitive neuroscientific
studies of vision have established, are anatomically distinct and autonomous. Martha
Far ah, in fact, tells us of a patient who, suffering from a profound impairment in his
85 F. Heider and M. Simmel. "An experimental study of apparent behaviour." American Journal o f
Psychology, 13, 1944.

145

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

ability to perceive nonface objects (a condition called “object agnosia”), saw in
Arcimboldo’s Vertumnus only a “face, pure and simple” and did not even realize that
any nonface objects were present (CNV 133-4). There is a part of our brain, in other
words, that is innately sensitized to face-like patterns. Our face perception system will
be automatically activated whenever an appropriate pattern of stimuli is present in our
field of visual perception. As Wittgenstein suggested, we cannot help but see a pictureface as a face: we do not need to “take” Arcimboldo’s painting as that of a face.
And when we see a face, whether in a picture or in real life, we naturally see it
as expressing mentality as well. Indeed, Gombrich has even formulated this point as a
law of physiognomic representation, which, after the nineteenth-century inventor of the
comic strip (Rodolphe Topffer’s), he has named Topffer’s law: “the proposition that
any configuration which we can interpret as a face, however, badly drawn, will ipso
facto have... an expression and individuality.”86 Again, as with Gombrich’s exercise in
The Story o f Art, this “law” is worth trying out for oneself: experiment with a number of
different shapes and configurations. One remarkable psychological fact this exercise
makes clear is how widely one can distort the features, and indeed the whole outline of
the head, before the images pass beyond physiognomic recognizabiiity: after trying this
exercise, one realizes why the various cubist transformations, biomorphic mutations and
figurative distortions of Picasso and Bacon yield images that can still appropriately be
called, and perceptually seen as, faces. That perceptual immediacy pertains even under
conditions of minimal or radically altered visual input suggests a problem with those

86 Gombrich, ‘T he Mask and the Face,” p. 24.
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popular semiotic accounts of Picasso’s art that would “read” his cubist faces as
conglomerations of purely conventional ideograms or signs for faces (but we will return
to this matter later). The sideways faces - composed of configurations of punctuation
marks - that have become such a regular feature of email correspondence in the last
decade, also attest to the truth of Gombrich’s point, at least about physiognomic
expression if not individuality. Here is a representative sampling of such email faces,
along with the mental-state attributions that are commonly associated with each:
:-)

happy

:-(

sad

:-<

upset

:-j|

angry

:-(0)

yelling

:-d

laughing

;-)

winking

:-}

grinning

:-|

apathetic

:-o

shocked

It is interesting that these “emoticons,” as they are called, are often used to compensate
for what some users of email perceive as the lack of affect (and thus tonal ambiguity) of
the written word, as though only the immediacy of a face might breath life into
electronic script (which, on the one hand, lacks the personal “touch” of handwritten
notes and, on the other, the “tone” of voice messages). The felt need for such quasi
pictorial markers of affect, however, is probably but a sad reflection of the extent to
which a wholly instrumental (information-carrying) conception of language has come to
permeate our relationship to words as such. In any case, whatever pallid kind of “life”
these “emoticons” first managed to convey - after all, such typographical innovations
may have struck those who first stumbled upon them as quite affecting - has now
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almost entirely died into convention: but not completely so, for so naturally sensitized
are we to faces that their expressions can still sometimes stand out as faces.
Consistent with Topffer’s law, Wittgenstein said of his rudimentary picture-face:
“I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face.” The
cognitive systems that underlie and enable the recognition of aspects of mind in a face
do not seem to respect the ontological difference between “real” faces and “pictures” of
faces, though the difference is consciously registered (probably because different and
distinct systems perceive the “faciality” and “representational materiality” of a given
picture-face). If we can recognize mind in a real face, we can recognize mind in a
picture-face as well. Remarkably, as Wittgenstein’s schematic picture-face makes clear,
it takes very little visual detail to activate what one might call our “physiognomic
stance.” Like Wittgenstein’s modest drawing, the psychological studies that
demonstrated an innate preference on the part of newborn infants for faces used highly
rudimentary and schematic face-pattem images. The activation of our innate cognitive
preference for faces does not require illusionistically rendered faces: a circular outline,
two dots for eyes, perhaps a line or a dot for a nose, and a line for a mouth seem good
enough to do the trick. Perhaps the perceptual requirements for neurological activation
are not even this stringent or strict: the suggestion of orality in the “gaping” mouth of a
painted cave, or the blank “stare” of an apple with its top pointed right at us in a
Courbet still life, are often minimally sufficient to trigger our natural and highly
sensitive anthropomorphizing tendencies, though responses will differ widely from
viewer to viewer as debates about what elements are, and are not, anthropomorphic
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within certain paintings is often hotly disputed. Gombrich, intuitively sensitive to just
these aspects of the psychology of perception, expressed understandable wonder at this
fact: “The most astonishing fact about... clues of expression is surely that they may
transform almost any shape into the semblance of a living being. Discover expression
in the staring eye or gaping jaw of a lifeless form, and what might be called ‘Topffer’s
law’ will come into operation - it will not be classed just as a face but will acquire a
definite character and expression, will be endowed with life, with a presence” (A I342).
Indeed, the Hebrew account of creation in Genesis powerfully suggests just how hungry
the human mind naturally is for the appearance of a face, any kind of face:
In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the
earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the
face of the deep. And the spirit of God moved upon the face of
the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.
(Genesis 1:1-3, KJV)
Bereshit bara Elohim et hashamayim ve'et ha'arets. Veha'arets
hayetah tohu vavohu vechoshech al-peney tehom veruach Elohim
merachefet al-peney hamayim. Vayomer Elohim yehi-or vayehior. (Genesis 1:1-3)
Prior to the invocation of light, there is already the metaphoric “figure” of a face, even
if that face is of a void, absolutely without form: the “face” of the deep, the “face” of
the waters. At the far reaches of the human imagination, imagining a time even before
the creation of imagination as such, even then and there the mind naturally strains to
o 7

see, and therefore makes out, a face.

But are we still surprised that the form such

87 Cf. the beautiful and powerful account of the human hunger for the “outline, the figure, of the person”
in the opening pages of chapter one of Susan Stewart’s Poetry and the Fate o f the Senses. This
dissertation is, in many ways, simply a further exploration of some of the issues broached by Stewart in
that inspiring study.
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imaginings would take would be described by the word “face” (“al-peney,” from
“'panim” for face)? A religious text that can project a face even into the time before
creation is one that understands the face’s fundamental importance: no wonder, then,
that one of the defining traits of its God is that one cannot see his face and live: “You
cannot see My face; for no man shall see Me, and live” (Exodus 33:20; the Torah has
“panim” for “face,” the Septuagint “prosopon”). The Judaic prohibition on graven
images is the ultimate acknowledgement of the face’s value and power.
As minimal as the number of visual clues triggering the recognition of a face
may be, once we recognize an image or object as a face, we will be highly sensitive to
the expressive significance of the spatial relations between its various physiognomic
features. We will inevitably perceive (even if we cannot describe, as Wittgenstein
noticed) the minutest alterations in the configurational relations. The psychologist Egon
Brunswik performed studies that “confirm the extreme sensitivity of our physiognomic
perception to small changes; a shift in the distance of the eye which would perhaps be
unnoticeable in a neutral configuration may radically affect the expression of [a]
mannikin, though how it will affect it is not always easy to predict.”88 As Brunswik
summed up his findings: “Human appearance and especially the face, constitute as tight
a package of innumerable contributing variables as might be found anywhere in
cognitive research.”89 Apropos of this point, Gombrich relates an interesting anecdote
first told by Max Friedlander, “of the bank official who insisted that German bank notes

88 Gombrich, “The Mask and the Face,” p. 25.
89 Egon Brunswik, Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments, 2nd ed.
(Berkeley, 1956), p. 115. Cited in Gombrich, “The Mask and the Face,” p. 25.
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should retain a portrait head in their design. Nothing, he said, was harder for the forger
to imitate than precisely the right expression of these artistically quite insignificant
heads, nor was there a quicker way of discovering a suspect note than simply observing
the way these faces look at you.”

on

But it is the configuration of the features and not the

quantity of visual details that matters most; caricaturists and cartoonists, as Gombrich
has pointed oat, have long recognized and exploited this fact of visual perception.
Facial perception, after all, is simply a form of pattern recognition, and a pattern is a
pattern as long as it has the minimal number of elements arrayed in the correct
configuration. If not, life would have been much more difficult for cartoonists like
Charles Schulz and James Thurber! It is because so very little is required to activate our
facial recognition and perception systems that the minimally rendered faces of the
characters in Schulz’s Peanuts strips or Thurber’s comics are so readily recognizable as
expressive of mental states (even if, as with all facial expressions, our mentalistic
attributions may end up being ambiguous or uncertain).
Anytime we see an appropriate “physiognomic” pattern, we see, to some degree
or other, mentality as well. Thus, to recall Gombrich’s point about anthropomorphosis,
we see in such shapes (inanimate as they may really be) “life” and “presence” too:
“discover expression in the staring eye or gaping jaw of a lifeless form... [and] it will be
endowed with life, with a presence.” The perception of aspects of mentality in the
representation of faces is precisely what Wollheim’s misreading of section xi of the
Investigations blinded him to: his account of seeing-in explains how we may see a face

90 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, p. 334.
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in a picture, but not how we inevitably see that face (in the picture) as afraid,
thoughtful, pensive, joyful, enraged. Seeing-in, on its own, does not adequately explain
the recognition of mind which is such a crucial part of representational seeing. Of
course, Wollheim does not dispute that we readily see thoughts and feelings in the
people portrayed in paintings (his powerful interpretations of various works make
liberal use of mental-state attributions): the point is simply that his misreading of
Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as precludes a satisfactory theoretical account of this
obvious phenomenological fact. Wollheim’s position unfortunately militated against
any acknowledgement at all of the fact that pictures can sometimes be seen as persons
(recall his critique of Gombrich on just this score). On the other hand, Gombrich, more
intuitively sensitive as he was to this aspect of sight, never wavered from his sense that
the perception of life and presence was a common part of our experience of
physiognomic representations, even if he was not able, in the end, to produce a cogent,
plausible account of how this was possible. As his use of the powerful term “presence”
indicates, he was not embarrassed to admit that we can see images as mental beings. As
I suggested earlier, I think that is why he was able to produce such powerful and
insightful work on the history and workings of physiognomic expressiveness in visual
art.
If neither Gombrich nor Wollheim managed to account for the perception of
mentality in pictorial representations, however, it is important to remember that they
both consistently asserted that the cognitive and perceptual capabilities underlying our
ability to understand pictorial representations were likely biological in nature. As
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Gombrich put it: “our reaction to faces and physiognomic expression may not be wholly
due to learning, and that the mental set which makes us read faces into blots, rocks, or
wallpapers may be biologically conditioned” (AI 341-2). Wollheim, in Painting as an
An, likewise said that “seeing-in appears to be biologically grounded. It is an innate
capacity, though, as with all innate capacities, it requires an environment sufficiently
congenial and sufficiently stimulating, in which to mature. A baby a few days old will
respond to the drawing of a face: fleetingly, of course, but the same goes for all its
responses to the external world” (PA 54). As Wollheim’s remark about the
responsiveness of a baby to the picture of a face at the age of a few days suggests, he
did not have access to the kind of empirical information we are lucky to have in such
abundance today (recall that babies with a median age of but nine minutes show
preferential attentiveness to visual face-pattems; and that a baby less than two days old
will show an ability not only to discriminate between different facial expressions but
also to imitate them; cf. chapter two). This is just to note that Gombrich and Wollheim
both ultimately grounded their theories on an empirical and scientific foundation, and
thus implicitly acknowledged that their claims were fallible in the face of new findings.
Similarly to the way Quine regarded philosophy in general, Gombrich especially, but
even Wollheim too, seem to have held the philosophy of art as fundamentally
continuous (though not, of course, identical) with the natural sciences. Philosophy of
mind, in other words, is not absolutely distinguishable from empirical psychology, nor
is the philosophy of art. There is, in other words, no wholly a priori aesthetics: how
could there be since judgments about art, as the term “aesthetics” itself implies, are
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ultimately rooted in sense perception? Once we no longer accept the force of
transcendental arguments, the perception of representations will naturally be understood
as a conceptual field to be illuminated as much by experiments in the laboratory as by
the introspections of the lover of art. If we are now able to understand better the
workings of certain parts of the brain and mind that allow us to improve on the
monumental and seminal accomplishments of thinkers such as Gombrich and
Wollheim, that is surely only due to the fact that we simply enjoy an abundance of
empirical information that simply was unavailable to them less than two decades ago.
Of course, this does not mean that everything about perception will be reducible to
scientific explanations: even Quine held that the “humanly indispensable” intentional
idioms cannot be reformulated in the universal language of the natural sciences. Just so,
aspects, which are such an important contribution of Wittgenstein’s to the fields of
psychology and perception together, are not reducible to the outcome of physical
processes (the dynamics of mental processes, as Davidson pointed out, have “no echo”
in physical theory). Nonetheless, a kind of fallibility that the transcendentally minded
Kant and Hegel would have found incomprehensible is now intrinsic to aesthetics.
Considering how relatively new the synthesis of cognitive neuroscience is, along with
developmental and evolutionary psychology, all theories of art that attempt to
accommodate their scientific findings will be quite unstable for the foreseeable future.
It may very well turn out that much of the scientific findings about cognition and
perception that are made to bear such great explanatory weight in projects such as this
will turn out to be falsified by new scientific findings, though the sheer amount and
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theoretical convergence of recent years (especially concerning facial perception)
suggest that the instability will lie more in the details rather than with the larger
explanatory structures. But who knows? All we can do is formulate the best
explanations we can with the best information we currently have.
In any case, Gombrich’s important point about “life” and “presence” brings us
back to the powerful role of the face in the art of Bacon and Picasso. Noting the
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Fig. 5 from Rodolphe Topffer, Essai du physiognom ie

“astonishing fact” that our mind endows the appearance of a face (even in a formation
of cracks in a wall) with the feeling of life and presence, Gombrich speculates on what
this might tell us about the playful experimentation with facial expressions practiced by
someone like Topffer (fig. 5). In 1845, Topffer published a treatise (Essai du
physiognomie) intended to teach others how to create expressive “cartoon” characters
without drawing from life or bothering even to examine the faces of real people
(activities which Topffer regarded as a waste of time). As Gombrich summarizes his
advice:
... anybody who wants to try should be able to find out the traits
in which [a particular facial] expression resides. All he must do
is to vary his scrawl systematically. If his first mannikin looks
stupid and smug, another with the eyes a little closer to the nose
may look less so. By a simple reshuffle of these primitive traits,
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our lonely hermit will find out how these elements and their
combinations affect him and us. Thus a little experimentation
with noses or mouths will teach us the elementary symptoms, and
from here we can proceed, simply by doodling, to create
characters. Topffer maintains that the heroes of his [own comic
strip] stories thus arose out of his penplays. (A I340)
Because our recognition of facial expressions is innate, no study from life is necessary.
One need only systematically vary one’s drawings and then gauge one’s psychological
responses to the variations. Gombrich notes that masters at rendering facial expressions
throughout the history of art (Rembrandt and Daumier premier among them) all doubted
the value of life study when it came to the rendering of facial expressions: for facial
expressions change too quickly to be captured by even the quickest draughtsman.
Gombrich writes: “Daumier made fun of Courbet and despised Monet. To him who
never drew from life, the study of ‘plein-air’ effects must have seemed nugatory
compared with the study of human reactions” (AI 355). Those who wish to convey the
appropriate expressions, therefore, are thrown back upon their own innate responses to
the images they have put on paper or canvas.
All of this is fascinating for a number of reasons, but Gombrich is particularly
struck by the fact that the method of playful variation advocated by Topffer’s manual is
unprecedented in the history of art. He asks: “why does this method not develop much
earlier?” Acknowledging that questions of “why” are “dangerous in history,” he
nonetheless proposes an intriguing speculative explanation. Considering the ease with
which Topffer was able to create a sense of mental life simply by means of
systematically varied doodling, Gombrich wonders whether it may not have been the
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“very power” to create a sense of mentality, exploited by Topffer, that also “held it in
check” in the past:
It needs the detachment of an enlightened nineteenth-century
humorist to play with the magic of creation, to make up these
playful doodles, and to question them for their character and soul
as if they were real creatures. To the humble craftsman of earlier
periods, the experience may not have been free from half
conscious or unconscious fears.... The very laws of proportion
and style that held the schemata of beauty together in past
centuries may have served this additional aim of preventing too
much life from entering the artist’s creations. (AI 342)
Gombrich’s remarks are explicitly presented as speculations of the most adventurous
sort, but our own lengthy exploration of the nature of the mind’s natural responses to
visual images of the human face lends rational plausibility to his ideas. We cannot, of
course, know how people regarded images of the face in the past, but we do know that
an uncanny, almost magical, liveliness often strikes viewers of picture-faces even in our
own modernity (recall Bacon’s remarks about “injury”), and there is nothing irrational
about this. Who knows how such uncanny feelings of presence and life would have
struck humans living under very different historical conditions, such as those prior to
the development of technologies of mechanical reproduction, which led to the cultural
ubiquity of images of all kinds. Whether or not people ever entirely confused images
with persons (little depends on the unknowable answer to this question), we do know
that it is still very common to experience, along with a full consciousness of the
representational nature of a painting, a feeling that the painting has the presence o f a
person as well. “Her picture smiles down on me from the wall,” one can imagine
someone feeling and saying of a portrait, as does Wittgenstein in the Investigations (PI
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175). The experience of presence or life in a picture of a person, however, need not be
continuous or uniform. As Wittgenstein notes: “I might say: a picture does not always
live for me while I am seeing it. ‘Her picture smiles down on me from the wall.’ It
need not always do so, whenever my glance lights on it” (PI 175, emphasis in original).
Of course, this passage also makes clear that while the feeling of life need not be
continuous, it definitely is an ordinary part of the way we relate to photographs and
paintings. It depends on the stance one assumes, though the stance will not necessarily
be a matter of volition. To recall our earlier formulation, we not only see persons in
paintings, but also, at times, paintings as persons. Indeed, it may be that those paintings
which conjure up this feeling of personal presence or life within us also naturally call
forth feelings of aesthetic value as well: an intimation of aura, one might say.
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4. Bacon’s Sensational Portraiture

Picasso’s art evinces a profound, life-long fascination with the human figure as a
whole, but the sheer frequency and variety of his representations of the human head and
face - sometimes reduced to a skull, sometimes transformed into a mask - suggest that
they in particular held a special artistic and personal significance for him. Few other
artists have so relentlessly experimented with different ways of representing and
transforming the human physiognomy. In her 1938 monograph on Picasso, Gertrude
Stein went so far as to claim that nothing else mattered for his art but “the head the face
the human body”:

these are all that exist for Picasso,” she flatly declared (PGS 13).

Stein immediately followed this remark with a revealing anecdote meant to indicate the
power of the face’s hold upon Picasso’s imagination: “I remember once we were
walking and we saw a learned man sitting on a bench, before the war a learned man
could be sitting on a bench, and Picasso said, look at that face, it is as old as the world,
all faces are as old as the world” (PGS 13). “And so,” Stein went on to explain,
“Picasso commenced his long struggle to express heads faces and bodies of men and of
women in the composition which is his composition” (PGS 13).
The same might readily be said of Francis Bacon, whose art has been even more
single-minded in its devotion to - or rather obsession with - the human figure,
especially the human face. Bacon’s art, too, was one long struggle to express heads
faces and bodies of men and of women in the composition which was his composition.
It is surely no accident, then, that he regularly expressed an affinity to Picasso in his
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many recorded statements about art. But he did not inherit his interest in the figure
from any other artist; on the contrary, he saw it as absolutely and quite literally natural.
In one of his interviews with David Sylvester, he explained it this way: “I think art is an
obsession with life and after all, as we are human beings, our greatest obsession is with
ourselves. Then possibly with animals, and then with landscapes” (BFB 63). And
tellingly - and from our perspective, unsurprisingly - this obsession “with ourselves”
more often than not took the form of the painted portrait: the appearance of the face,
pushed by means of distortion to the limits of resemblance and recognition, appears to
have held the key to the sensation of “life” that Bacon’s art so relentlessly strove to
“trap” in the image, as he often liked to say in his various interviews. A tension
between the appearance of the figure and the practice of disfiguration lies at the heart of
Bacon’s method: “I’m always hoping to deform people in to appearance,” as he said
about his portraits. This same tension also, of course, lies at the heart of Bacon’s
meaning, though one might more safely say meaningfulness: as anyone who has been
struck by the power of his portraits knows, their “meaning” is difficult to articulate with
words and often is simply experienced at the level of intense feeling. This is, however,
perfectly consistent with Bacon’s intent: to “unlock the valves of feeling and therefore
return the onlooker to life more violently” (IFB 17). Why and how his art of
disfiguration strikes us as it does, therefore, along with the significance of the feelings it
evokes, has posed an enigmatic problem for his critics, and it turns out, even himself:
“What has never yet been analyzed is why this particular way of painting is more
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poignant than illustration” (“illustration” is Bacon’s term for realistic representation).91
In order to understand why, we will need a better grasp of the role of the face in the
psychology of visual perception. The face is the key to much of Bacon’s art, as it is for
much of Picasso’s as well. Continuing our study of the face, we will leam much about
their art; likewise, by studying their art, we will leam a great deal more about the face.
% %

On June 30,1972, less than one year before his
death and many years after his enigmatic remarks
about faces to Stein, Picasso would draw a selfportrait that would betray no slackening in the
psychological intensity of his relationship to the image
of the face (fig. 6). Having finished it, he seems to
have sensed that he had accomplished something
radically new (one notices that faces often play
Fig. 6 Pablo Picasso, SelfPortrait, 1972

important roles in “breakthrough” works by Picasso:

recall, for example, the Portrait o f Gertrude Stein, Les Demoiselles d ’Avignon, or the
Weeping Woman canvases). The next day, he would tell Pierre Daix: “I did a drawing
yesterday, and I think maybe I touched on something. It’s not like anything I’ve done
before.”92 In the bold, child-like crayon lines that forcefully demarcate the outlines of

91IFB 17.
92 Pierre Daix, Picasso createur (Paris: Seuil, 1987), p. 378. Cited in Kirk Varnedoe, “Picasso’s SelfPortraits” in Picasso and Portraiture, Ed. William Rubin (London: Thames and Hudson, 1996), pp. 110179, p. 170.
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most of the face’s features we see a clear stylistic echo of the linear structure of the
1907 Self-Portrait (fig. 7). The three-quarter pose of the earlier work, however, has
given way to a fully frontal posture, obliquely suggesting the striking compositional
convention once reserved for funeral effigies, though Picasso’s unkempt appearance
and lack of clothing in the 1972 drawing works against any hint of formality such a
traditional generic association might import: indeed, we might say that this is a work
that invokes the idea of death without summoning the socially-mediated protections of
rituals or conventions.
There is also a significant difference in the
extent of the outlines of the 1907 and 1972 images.
In the 1907 Self-Portrait, the black outlines firmly
and clearly demarcate the boundary between
Picasso’s head and the surrounding space. As Kirk
Vamedoe has said about the 1907 work, the
organization of the lines conveys a strong sense of
Fig. 7 Pablo Picasso, SelfPortrait, 1907

structural coherence: “Picasso conjures his likeness

here from a scaffolding of essentially flat, unmodulated, and evenly weighted angular
slashes and rhythmical arcs, potently locked together by insistent parallelisms,
repetitions, and alignments.”9j While the space implied by this canvas is far from being
illusionistically straightforward (as Vamedoe notes, “the rear of the head is collapsed
into the front... [and] what seems the back of the skull is pulled around to profile
93

Varnedoe, “Picasso’s Self-Portraits,” p. 136.
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flatness”), what is remarkable is how the “locked” geometry of its linear patterning
nonetheless projects a decisive sense of structural coherence. There is no confusion
between figure and space within this image. One of the most obvious and striking
formal differences then between the 1972 Self-Portrait and that of 1907 is the absence,
in the left side of the later image, of any clearly demarcated outline separating Picasso’s
head from the surrounding space. Absolute absence of outline would be striking
enough, but Picasso leaves clear visual evidence that the shape of the head as a whole
had originally been rendered in a relatively symmetrical (inverted pear-like) fashion,
only to be severely re-worked and partially scrubbed out in the left side of the image.
One can easily discern traces of various once-darker outlines now softened and half
effaced by an apparently unsystematic process of rubbing-out and over-drawing. So
whereas the far right side of the image contains a large, relatively crisply bounded, area
of untouched negative space, the left side harbors a wild jumble of faint marks of
various kinds (thick outlines, thin scribbles, scrubbed-out passages) all ultimately
unified by broad patches of mauve or green drawn in with roughly parallel strokes
evincing great, almost frenzied, manual energy. Contrasted with the 1907 Self-Portrait,
one feels that form as such has been put in question in the later work: bold geometry
(arrows, diamonds, and circles) is juxtaposed with an antithetical dissolution of
structure (Vamedoe aptly characterizes the right side of the head as “massively
illogical”).94 That the color field dominating the area of this formal dissolution is done
in a blood-like hue, and that the whole right side of the head appears as if it is suffering

94 Vamedoe, p. 172.
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from a kind of structural leak, strongly suggests that the frenzied area on that side is
meant to represent a kind of symbolic hemorrhage. The presence of a passage of mauve
in the grossly dilated right pupil shows that the subject’s vision is entirely colored by
this terrifying, “late” knowledge.
To be sure, one cannot be certain what Picasso meant when, in his remarks to
Daix on the day after he executed this drawing, he spoke of having “touched
something” in it, that it represented a vision “not like anything” he had “done before.”
Nonetheless, the “massively illogical” dissolution of form in the left side of the image is
surely an important aspect of whatever it is that Picasso felt he had “touched.” Of
course, one might object that a kind of formal dissolution had already been achieved by
Picasso long before in the cubist works he executed during the summer of 1910, in
which the “closed form” and continuous faceting of works such as the Seated Woman of
1909 gave way to the radically open forms of works such as Woman with Mandolin. As
Pepe Karmel observes about the major transformations in Picasso’s style during this
period: “the shift from continuous to discontinuous faceting led Picasso to rethink the
status of the space in the immediate vicinity of the figure. The opening of the closed
form made the border between figure and space into a contested zone” (PIC 72).
Whereas in the Seated Woman of 1909 the facets “lock together to make a continuous
skin,” no such structural closure is evident in Woman with Mandolin (PIC 69). Indeed,
Karmel even notes that the “term ‘faceting’ no longer seems adequate to describe
Picasso’s approach here” (PIC 74). Sculptural solidity has given way to a space of
“free-floating” marks: “Rather than translating the naturalistic contours of the figure
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into a vocabulary of geometric facets, he completely re-imagined them as a series of
free-floating lines and planes - a combination of curves, angles, and rectangular strips”
(PIC 74). This development in Picasso’s style, moreover, led to figures that were
“awkward and incoherent,” an obvious fact critically noted at the time even by
Picasso’s friends and supporters (PIC 75). Such criticisms hit home with Picasso, for,
as Karmel notes, the perceptual coherence of his figures mattered very much to him:
“Picasso’s goal was to produce something recognizable as a figure” (PIC 77). A remark
by Kahnweiler demonstrates at once the kind of uncomprehending response Picasso’s
work of this period received, as well as the fact that that response appears to have
bothered the artist: “Picasso himself often repeated the ludicrous remark made by his
friend, the sculptor Manolo, before one of his figure paintings: ‘What would you say if
your parents were to call for you at the Barcelona station with such faces?”’ (RoC 11,
cited in PIC 76). Kahnweiler himself later wrote of Picasso’s move to the open form
during this period as a “decisive advance,” yet at the time, as Karmel notes, he
“regarded them as ‘unfinished,’ and declined to purchase any of them” (PIC 77). The
dealer Ambroise Vollard, speaking to Picasso’s close friend Max Jacob, even declared:
“He’s gone mad, your friend” (PIC 77).
But if many contemporaries of Picasso, such as Manolo and Vollard, appear to
have found the works of 1910 “massively illogical” in their own way, the openness of
form (even figurative incoherence) these works exhibit needs to be carefully
distinguished from the kind of dissolution of form we see in the 1972 Self-Portrait. If
Vollard found Picasso’s work of 1910 incomprehensible - even “mad” - those works
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were nonetheless the inevitable consequence of an almost systematic process of
abstraction and experimentation (Karmel’s recent study of this crucial period has done a
great service by meticulously unpacking the logic of its development).95 While the
“irrationality” of these earlier works is accidental, that of the 1972 Self-Portrait is
absolutely not. In fact, the reassertion of the closed form in the so-called “neoclassical”
and “biomorphic” works that followed the cubist period indicates that the dissolution of
form as such was never Picasso’s fundamental goal or intent during those earlier years.
Even in the most adventurous biomorphic mutations of the late 1920’s and early 30’s
{Bather with a Ball, for instance), there is rarely any confusion about the spatial limits
and boundaries of the radically altered and unfamiliar organic forms. Indeed, one
suspects that the persistence of formal closure throughout so many different stylistic
transformations belies an ultimately Apollonian bias for structural coherence on
Picasso’s part beneath all of his Dionysian experiments with distortion and
metamorphosis. It is when seen against this life-long background that the “massively
illogical” passage on the left side of the 1972 Self-Portrait stands out as novel (“not like
anything I’ve done before”). The large passage of mauve exhibits a wild tactile energy
fundamentally alien to even the most difficult and incoherent of the analytic cubist
works: the latter exude a kind of crystalline, almost mathematical, order when compared
to this late drawing. In fact, Picasso would permit himself, or rather feel himself able,
to exhibit such child-like looseness of technique only in his later years: “it took me a

95 P e p e Karmel, Picasso and the Invention o f Cubism (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2003).
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lifetime to learn to draw like them,” as he once said of children’s drawings,96 Of
course, I do not intend to suggest that the novelty of this late work is entirely technical
or formal: it is only against the obvious representational meaning of the image that this
irrational passage signifies as powerfully as it does. In other words, it is crucial that the
figure that faces us is in fact recognizable as a face: that is what lends the mauve
passage on the left side its affective force. Indeed, there are other works of Picasso’s
last decade that hint at the looseness of technique we see in this final Self-Portrait, yet it
is perhaps the fusing of disorder with a clearly recognizable physiognomy that provoked
Picasso to see in it something fundamentally new. That Picasso, even in the last year of
his life, would come to this new knowledge by means of the representation of a face, is
consistent with the artistic trajectory of his whole career. As Daix, the friend to whom
Picasso first showed this late drawing, put it: “For Picasso, unlike Braque, the face was
the ultimate test of the validity of pictorial experimentation, and the portrait would
become the ultimate stake” (perhaps this explains why Picasso went around repeating
Manolo’s jibe about the way his cubist faces looked).97
As suggested earlier, only Bacon, among twentieth-century artists, has shown a
concern with the visual representation of the face that matched the obsessive intensity
of Picasso’s own. It is telling, then, to hear Bacon, in connection to his own art, speak
approvingly of the biomorphic works Picasso executed in the late 1920’s: “I think
there’s a whole area there suggested by Picasso, which in a way has been unexplored, of
organic form that relates to the human image but is a complete distortion of it” (BFB
96 Roland Penrose, Picasso: His Life and Work (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 275.
97 Pierre Daix, “Portraiture in Primitivism and Cubism,” in Picasso and Portraiture, pp. 254-295, p. 257.
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8).98 Reading this statement, made during one of Bacon.’s interviews with David
Sylvester, Milan Kundera incisively notes: “With this very precise remark, [Bacon]
defines the realm whose exploration is actually his alone” (BPSP 10).

QQ

But if,

following the “suggestion” offered by Picasso’s biomorphic images, Bacon came to
explore a “realm” of figurative distortion all his own, the dimensions of this realm were
never quite as expansive as that first mapped out by Picasso himself. If Bacon’s
relentless deformations of the human face reach a ferocious intensity never attained by
Picasso’s ultimately more controlled and controlling imagination (only the 1972 SelfPortrait comes at all close), that violent power is achieved (perhaps is even enabled) by
a single-mindedness of vision that precluded the range of formal experimentation
evident in Picasso’s own widely varying treatments of the face. Ultimately, this
difference of style bespeaks a fundamental difference of vision: both Picasso and Bacon
found the ultimate test of their artistic skills in the figuration of the face, yet for very
different (though not ultimately incompatible) reasons. Picasso appears to have been
fascinated by the extent to which the “form” of the face could lend coherence and
structure to a world ever threatened by chaos (hinted at by the mauve that swirls in the
dilated right eye of the 1972 drawing), whereas Bacon appears to have marveled at the
way in which a world that ultimately was nothing but chaos could ever - solely by
“chance,” as he liked to say - give rise to the absolutely contingent form of the
individual human face. Rather than the biomorphic works of the late 1920’s that Bacon
98 Interviews with Francis Bacon: 1962-1979, new and enlarged ed., David Sylvester (London: Thames
and Hudson, 1980), p. 8. References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation IFB.
99 Bacon: Portraits and Self-Portraits, Ed. France Borel, intro. Milan Kundera (London: Thames and
Hudson, 1996). References to this text will be given parenthetically with the abbreviation BPSP.

168

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

approvingly points out to Sylvester, it seems to me that Picasso’s June 30, 1972 SelfPortrait, with its “massively illogical” dissolution of structural coherence, marks the
closest point of proximity between the two artists. Of course Bacon was already far
along on his own path by then (the Three Studies fo r Figures at the Base o f a
Crucifixion were painted in 1944; fig. 8).

Fig. 8 Francis Bacon, Three Studies fo r Figures at the Base o f a Crucifixion, 1944

What is remarkable, though I think far from accidental, is that both artists found in the
image of the face a crucial and fixed reference point for their far-reaching artistic
explorations. Though each would transform the face almost beyond recognition - and
indeed, sometimes they did inadvertently step across that cognitive and perceptual
threshold - each appears to have held dearly to, and put great stock in, the importance
of visual recognition, resemblance and even identity. Significantly, it seems to have
mattered yery much to them that a face of theirs be recognizable as a face, and often
even as the face of a particular person: no other artists, since the invention of the
photograph, have done more to expand the possibilities of the painted portrait. As
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Bacon put it quite clearly while speaking to David Sylvester about two portraits he
painted of his friend Michel Leiris, “I really wanted these portraits of Michel to look
like him: there’s no point in doing a portrait of somebody if you’re not going to make it
look like him” (IFB 146). The point of their distortions was never to go beyond the
human face, but rather to more fully explore the strange, even auratic, aspects of its
appearance.
*

v

*

Michel Leiris, a good friend of Bacon’s, emphasized the powerful experience of
“presence” he consistently felt when looking at his paintings, in one of the best essays
written on Bacon’s art. Here is how Leiris put it:
As if the picture had its own life, and constituted a new reality
instead of being a mere simulacrum... that feature in a Bacon
canvas which is immediately apprehended and asserts itself
unequivocally and independently of any sense of agreement or
disagreement... is the kind of real presence to which his figures
attain, even though this presence has no connection at all with
any kind of theology. Through the agency of the figures, the
spectator who approaches them with no preconceived ideas, gains
direct access to an order of flesh-and-blood reality not unlike the
paroxysmal experience provided in everyday life by the physical
act of love. And this presence is graced with a wild ambiguity,
an alluring iridescence, which makes it a sensuous delight, but
one so intense that, despite the attractiveness of its painterly
vehicle, to some people, repelled perhaps by its searing impact, it
can appear wholly abhorrent.100
Bacon frequently spoke of trying to trap what he liked to call the fact of life in his
paintings (“fact” and “life,” both terms of approbation in Bacon’s theoretical lexicon,
appear to be synonyms, though little else is self-evident about their meanings): “as an
100 Michel Leiris, “Francis Bacon, full face and in profile,” trans. John Weightman, in Francis Bacon
(New York: Rizzoli International Publications, 1987), p. 6.
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artist you have to, in a sense, set a trap by which you hope to trap this living fact alive”
(IFB 57); “It’s really a question in my case of being able to set a trap with which one
would be able to catch the fact at its most living point” (IFB 54); and, to circle round to
where we began, “I would rather practise the injury in private by which I think I can
record the fact of them more clearly” (IFB 41).
The “real presence” that Leiris notes, and which Bacon himself calls by various
different names (such as fact, life, sensation), is profoundly (and I hope now clearly)
related to the simple fact that Bacon is fundamentally a painter of faces and figures.
That, I would propose, is one reason that “appearance” is also such an important
theoretical idea and practical goal for Bacon: “What I want to do is distort the thing far
beyond the appearance, but in the distortion to bring it back to a recording of the
appearance” (IFB 40). While by realistic, or what he calls “illustrational,” standards, he
may be seen to radically distort the images he paints, from his own point of view, he
nevertheless brings things back to a recognizable appearance. It’s worth noting that
while the extent to which Bacon’s canvases actually manage to remain recognizable
likenesses of their models cannot be determined by “objective” criteria, their
achievement of resemblance is attested to by a number of different critics. As Kundera
remarks, not without much wonder at the achievement of identity under conditions of
radical disfiguration:
Looking at Bacon’s portraits, I am amazed that, despite their
‘distortion,’ they all look like their subject. But how can an
image look like a subject of which it is consciously,
programmatically, a distortion? And yet it does look like the
subject; photos of the persons portrayed bear that out; and even if
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I did not know those photos, it is clear that in all the series, in all
the triptychs, the various deformations of the face resemble one
another, so that one recognizes in them some one and the same
person. However ‘distorted’, these portraits are faithful. That is
what I find miraculous. (BPSP 11-12; emphasis in original)
As Bacon himself said of his portraits of Leiris: “there’s no point in doing a portrait of
somebody if you’re not going to make it look like him” (IFB 146). This last remark
indicates not only the importance of personal identity to Bacon’s conception of
portraiture, but the more general importance of the perceptual category of the face to its
violent force: faces are (and must be) perceivable as faces, if the images are to have the
effect and power he intends. For we do not need to be able to recognize Leiris in order
to feel the force of the portraits Bacon comments upon (we may not even know who he
is, nor what he looked like); but if we did not recognize Leiris’ face as a face, our
experience of the portrait would be a radically different one. Anyone who claims that
paint as such can exhibit violent force is already speaking metaphorically: one does not
injure stretched canvas anymore than one hurts stones. When Bacon, on the other hand,
speaks of causing “deep injury” to an image, he is being as literal as he can be, since the
image he refers to, having the appearance of a face, possesses the life and presence of a
person.
Bacon never intentionally distorts a face beyond the point where that image is
recognizable as a face. Of course, in the unpredictable course of actual practice, the
image often would move beyond the point of resemblance nevertheless. Bacon’s
reaction to such moments is significant. Sylvester, at one point, asks about this: “Do
you sometimes find in working on a portrait that, when it’s developing in such a way-

172

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

that the paint is very alive and strong, at the same time you’re tending to lose the
likeness of the specific person?” Bacon admits that, “More often than not that does
happen.” But when Sylvester goes on to ask: “Do you feel you want to pull it back by
strengthening some illustrational component?” Bacon replies, tellingly: “No, I think you
just lose it.” Bacon, in other words, is not interested in following his paintings beyond
recognition, into some realm of non-figurative abstraction (however, he does admit, in a
comment we will turn to in just a moment, that he does sometimes “pull back” the
image, but this only confirms the central importance of perceptual recognizability to his
art). I think we have to understand his resistance to the abstraction that was dominant in
the art world of his day as indicative of an intuitive sense of the affective power that
was only available to him as long as he remained within the zone of figurative, and
especially physiognomic, resemblance. Not because of what the figure meant, but
because of how the figure could be seen. Seen as, if you will: as a presence, as alive, as
a mind, as a person. At one point in his conversations with Sylvester, after he had been
speaking quite a bit about how much he wanted his paintings to emerge as if by chance
and wholly irrationally, he admits candidly that this is perhaps a theoretical fantasy on
his part. In fact, he acknowledges that he works quite consciously to maintain the
minimal visual (that is, illustrational) clues to foster the recognizability of the face in his
images:
I think that in our previous discussions, when we’ve talked about
the possibility of making appearance out of something which was
not illustration, I ’ve over-talked about it. Because, in spite of
theoretically longing for the image to be made up of irrational
marks, inevitably illustration has to come into it to make certain
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parts of the head and face which, if one left them out, one would
then only be making an abstract design. I think what I very often
have talked about has been perhaps a particular theory of mine
which is impossible to achieve. Of course one does put in such
things as ears and eyes. But then one would like to put them in as
irrationally as possible. And the only reason for this irrationality
is that, if it does come about, it brings the force of the image over
very much more strongly than if one just sat down and illustrated
the appearance, which of course millions of art students all over
the world can do. But I’m quite prepared to believe that mine is a
really far-out and impossible theory. (IFB 126)
Illustration and irrationality, figuration and disfiguration: both sides of these oppositions
are equally necessary to Bacon’s art. His is not an art that moves from reality outwards,
away from illustration, but one that circles and goes back and forth constantly, looking
for a perfect tension between them. This passage also makes clear that he is constantly
checking his responses to the image that unfolds, however haphazardly, however
consciously, on his canvas, remarkably confirming the relevance of Gombrich’s general
argument about the role of schema and correction in art even in the extreme case of
someone like Bacon. Bacon may not be sure what his “schemata” are, but he senses
clearly when there is a need for correction. As with Topffer and Daumier, Bacon’s art
relies on a circuit of perceptual interaction between hand and eyes. It is, after all, in the
response to the image that the power of Bacon’s art lies. Bacon is, as Wollheim would
put it, the painting’s first spectator.
By tenaciously holding to appearance, recognition and identity, Bacon
maintained a tight grip on a fundamental source of power for his art in general. In the
following remarks to Sylvester, he searchingly discusses this very constellation of
Issues:
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When I was trying in despair the other day to paint that head of a
specific person, I used a very big brush and a great deal of paint
and I put it on very, very freely, and I simply didn’t know in the
end what I was doing, and suddenly this thing clicked, and
became exactly like this image I was trying to record. But not
out of any conscious will, nor was it anything to do with
illustrational painting. What has never been analyzed is why this
particular way of painting is more poignant than illustration. I
suppose because it has a life completely of its own. It lives on its
own, like the image one’s trying to trap; it lives on its own, and
therefore transfers the essence of the image more poignantly. So
that the artist may be able to open up or rather, should I say,
unlock the valves of feeling and therefore return the onlooker to
life more violently. (IFB 17)
I think we can now say that the reason “why this particular way of painting is more
poignant than illustration,” is that Bacon is able to exploit our natural sensitivity to face
patterns while forcing us to register violent distortions to an image we intuitively
recognize as a face. The “violence” of the “sensation” entailed by the simultaneous
registration of both of these “facts” upon our “nervous systems” creates a key element
of the sheer power one experiences when beholding a Bacon canvas. The
“physiognomic logic” that I am arguing underlies Bacon’s art also explains why so little
distortion is ever evident in his rather spare and flat spaces and backgrounds: distortion
of non-human objects would add nothing to the overall effect of his images. Leiris
remarks on this difference of treatment between figure and space as a crucial
characteristic of his canvases: “In the case of Bacon’s pictures - at least those I consider
to be most curiously alive, irrespective of any question of quality - their extreme
intensity seems to me to result from the paradoxical conjunction of two procedures: a
more or less marked distortion of the figures, combined with a fairly naturalistic
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treatment of their surroundings” (FFP 11). Indeed, I suspect that the presence of figural
distortion beyond the “skin” of the human figure and face would permit the viewer to
read the surface of the entire canvas as “painterly” rather than be forced perceptually
and cognitively to confront a violent distortion specifically directed at the flesh of a
recognizably human body. We can now see how Ms varied and contradictory
statements to Sylvester about “injury” and distortion are all true at the same time: he
does injure the people he paints (“the injury I do to them in my work”), in so far as their
images can be seen as the persons they represent; at the same time, he does not injure
his friends, since injury is done to mere images; and finally, he does and in fact needs to
injure the image (“who today has been able to record anything that comes across to us
as a fact without causing deep injury to the image?”), for this is the source of much of
the psychological power of his paintings, but his talk of injuring images is meaningful
only because he is familiar with the way they can be seen as persons.
It will be obvious, I hope, why the argument about Bacon that I have been
developing must be opposed to Gilles Deleuze’s influential interpretation, which
perversely refuses to acknowledge the primacy of the face for Bacon’s art. Importing
the ideas about “faciality” that he and Felix Guattari developed in A Thousand Plateaus
(discussed above, in chapter one; Deleuze’s text on Bacon is the first he wrote after his
collaboration with Guattari), he reads Bacon’s portraits as a painterly manifestation of a
process they called in that text the “dismantling of the face”:
As a portraitist, Bacon is a painter of heads, not faces, and there
is a great difference between the two. For the face is a structured,
spatial organization that conceals the head, whereas the head is
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dependent on the body, even if it is the point of the body, its
culmination. It is not that the head lacks spirit; but it is a spirit in
bodily form, a corporeal and vital breath, an animal spirit. It is
the animal spirit of man: a pig-spirit, a buffalo spirit, a dog-spirit,
a bat-spirit... Bacon thus pursues a very peculiar project as a
portrait painter: to dismantle the face, to rediscover the head or
make it emerge from beneath the face. (FBLS 19; ellipsis and
emphasis in original)
As is the case here, the original discussion of “faciality” in A Thousand Plateaus made
little sense of the idea that a face might (indeed should) be dismantled, let alone what
the quasi-technical term “head” was supposed to refer to (this much is clear: the “head”
is what remains once the social construct of the “face” is dismantled, but as I noted in
chapter one, their theory of “faciality” is premised on the mistaken notion that the
central role of the face in human forms of life is socially determined). So it is difficult
to evaluate the claims that Deleuze puts forward here. But it is obvious that any reading
of Bacon that does not preserve a fundamental role for the human face cannot begin to
account for the peculiar presence and force his paintings have been recognized to have:
Leiris and Kundera, as we have already noted, do not make this mistake and are quite
clear that the “resemblance” (Leiris) and “faithfulness” (Kundera) of his faces are
essential to the power of Bacon’s portraits.
Moreover, Deleuze’s failure to acknowledge the role of the face leaves him
unable to provide a compelling explanation of Bacon’s use of the term “sensation,”
which, as the subtitle of Deleuze’s text makes clear (“The Logic of Sensation”), is the
conceptual key to his entire reading of Bacon’s works. As I have argued, one of the
primary sources of the violent sensation of life Bacon hopes to provoke in the “nervous

177

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

system” of his viewers is the tension between figuration and disfiguration precariously
balanced in the way he renders his physiognomies. But because Deleuze does not grasp
the critical significance of the perceptual recognizability of Bacon’s faces (against
which any “irrationality” could be perceived), he is forced to look elsewhere for the
source of “sensation.” That is, in his eagerness to regard Bacon as an artist who is
concerned primarily to “rediscover the head or make it emerge from beneath the face,”
he fails to respect how important the face (as a face) is to whatever power Bacon’s art
possesses. He argues instead, in a cosmological vein, that “sensation” refers to a prereflective life of the senses that is linked to a universal, cosmic “Rhythm” that runs
through all existence. (The source of the Rhythm itself he traces to a primordial chaos:
“We can seek the unity of rhythm only at the point where rhythm itself plunges into
chaos, into the night, at the point where the differences of level are perpetually and
violently mixed”; FBLS 39). According to Deleuze, the sensory experience of any
particular sense modality (such as “visual sensation” in particular)
is in direct contact with a vital power that exceeds every domain
and traverses them all. This power is Rhythm, which is more
profound than vision, hearing, etc. Rhythm appears as music
when it invests the auditory level, and as painting when it invests
the visual level. This is a “logic of the senses,” as Cezanne said,
which is neither rational nor cerebral. What is ultimate is thus
the relation between sensation and rhythm, which places in each
sensation the levels and domains through which it passes. This
rhythm runs through a painting just as it runs through a piece of
music. (FBLS 37)
I admit that I find these ideas quite beautiful, but I am not sure what they have to do
with Bacon’s art. It follows from Deleuze’s account here that “sensation” is not to be
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understood (as I have been claiming) as the result of how we perceive Bacon’s distorted
human figures, but rather the distortions themselves are to be regarded as visual traces
of the rhythmic force of sensations that runs through the bodies on the canvas: “In short,
it is not movement that explains the levels of sensation, it is the levels of sensation that
explain what remains of movement..,. [IJn the end, It is a movement ‘in-place,’ a spasm,
which reveals a completely different characteristic of Bacon: the action o f invisible
forces on the body (hence the bodily deformations which are due to this more profound
cause)” (FBLS 36). But this leaves unexplained why we - the beholders of Bacon’s
paintings - would so intensely experience the sensations that, according to Deleuze’s
basically formalist account, simply inform or deform the visual dispositions of the
bodies on his canvases. If one accepted Deleuze’s cosmology, one might argue that
because the rhythmic patterns and forces underlying sensations run through the whole
of the universe, the viewer of the sensations represented in a Bacon canvas (visible in
his deformed bodies) would quite naturally be sympathetically affected (I am not
certain, but I believe Deleuze implies as much though he nowhere makes it explicit).
One would have to accept his cosmology, however, for this to seem a compelling
answer.101 But however it measures up as cosmology, I would argue that it falls short as

101 It appears that Deleuze’s cosmology ultimately derives from his reading of Nietzsche’s cosmological
doctrine of the “will to power.” For an incisive evaluation of the role of this doctrine within Nietzsche’s
philosophy as a whole, see Maudemarie Clark’s Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991). Clark argues quite compellingly that Nietzsche did not regard the
cosmological theory of the will-to-power as true (she also argues, forcefully, that Nietzsche never
abandoned the concept of truth itself, against the prevailing tendency, by both his critics and supporters,
to read him this very way).
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an account of Bacon’s art, for the simple reason that it is blind to Bacon’s quite obvious
obsession with the face, as a face.
Finally, Deleuze’s account disregards the fact, noted earlier, that Bacon
constantly gauges his own perceptual and psychological responses to the images he
paints as they emerge on his canvases: perceptual interaction between image and
beholder is not something that can be left extrinsic to any account of the genesis or
meaning of his works. This means, as Bacon candidly admitted, that “illustrational”
elements may be introduced so as to maintain the recognizability of the face: “Of course
one does put in such things as ears and eyes.” It is, however, his ongoing perceptual
response that will determine when and what kinds of alterations will be introduced (and,
of course, this does not entail conscious control, though it does not preclude volition
either: appearance is not inconsistent with chance, an important point which we will
discuss later at greater length). Such perceptual interaction, and the resulting beholder’s
“sensation” that is the measure of the perception’s intensity, are internal to Bacon’s
creative process. In the following remarks, Bacon characterizes this process as a
continuous and relentless form of self-criticism:
You see, one has an intention, but what really happens comes
about in working - that’s the reason it’s so hard to talk about it it actually does come about in the working. And the way it works
is really by the things that happen. In working you are really
following this kind of cloud of sensation in yourself, but you
don’t know what it really is. And it’s called instinct. And one’s
instinct, whether right or wrong, fixes on certain things that have
happened in that activity of applying the paint to the canvas. I
think an awful lot of creation is made out of, also, the selfcriticism of an artist, and very often I think probably what makes
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one artist seem better than another Is that his critical sense is
more acute. (IFB 149)
Notice that he locates the “cloud of sensation” referred to in these remarks in himself (It
is a kind of critical “instinct”), reacting to and guiding the development of the image.
Whenever Bacon successfully traps sensations in his images, whatever Is captured is the
result of a complex and continuous perceptual interaction between the viewer (first of
all, Bacon himself) and the organically emerging Image seen, at each moment, as a
distorted though recognizable part of a particular person’s body, often his or her face.
We might say, then, that sensation is not what deforms Bacon’s bodies (like an
“invisible force” pressing down upon them, as Deleuze imagines) but something we
naturally experience (in our own “cloud of sensation”) when we perceive bodies so
deformed. The truth is that Bacon’s “sensations” are probably neither really in the
canvas nor in the viewer, but always a measure (in the “nervous system”) of how the
canvas is perceived by the viewer (whether that is Bacon or us). So understood, it
would not be wrong to then see sensations as either in the image or in the viewer (as
Bacon sometimes does), but neither of these two localizations would make sense
without their emergence in the perceptual contact between the two (“sensation” has no
metaphysical existence, one might say, which is why I think Bacon uses the fuzzy
image of a “cloud”: it only comes to life when something is seen or experienced a
certain way).
One consequence of Deleuze’s disparagement of the concept of the face is that
he necessarily neglects the importance of identity and personality for Bacon’s art:
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indeed, if Deleuze were right, Bacon should probably be regarded as a Mud of anti
portraitist. Yet Bacon’s paintings themselves, along with many of his published
remarks, make dear that he was deeply concerned with what we might variously call
the individuality, personality or identity of the people he chose to paint. Like Picasso,
Bacon only felt like painting people he knew quite well. “I couldn’t do people I didn’t
know very well,” he said: “I wouldn’t want to. It wouldn’t interest me to try and do
them unless I had seen a lot of them, watched their contours, watched the way they
behaved” (IFB 73-4). During the same conversation in which Bacon made these
remarks, Sylvester also called the “most crucial step in the development o f ’ Bacon’s
“subject-matter” that time in the early 1950’s when Bacon “started to do paintings of
particular people [he] knew” (IFB 72). And when asked why he did not turn to this
subject matter sooner, Bacon explained that he simply felt technically inadequate to the
task, implying that the change in subject did not mark a change in interest: he was
always fascinated by his friends and their personalities and would have painted them
sooner if he had felt himself capable enough. And in a different interview, Bacon again
links portraiture to personality. When asked by Sylvester about the “distinct presence
or threat of violence” that “most people” feel when looking at his works, Bacon’s
response confirms not only that he agrees that his works exhibit a kind of interpersonal
“violence,” but also that this violence is intimately tied to the way he sees personality as
such:
When talking about the violence of paint, it’s nothing to do with
the violence of war. It’s to do with an attempt to remake the
violence of reality itself. And the violence of reality is not only
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the simple violence meant when you say that a rose or something
is violent, but it’s the violence also of the suggestions within the
image itself which can only be conveyed through paint. When I
look at you across the table, I don’t only see you but 1 see a
whole emanation which has to do with personality and everything
else. And to put that over in a painting, as 1 would like to be able
to do in a portrait, means that it would appear violent in paint.
We nearly always live through screens - a screened existence.
And 1 sometimes think, when people say my work looks violent,
that perhaps I have from time to time been able to clear away one
or two of the veils or screens. (IFB 81-2)
One thing these remarks show is how profoundly traditional Bacon’s conception of
portraiture actually was. Far from turning his back on verisimilitude and likeness as
criteria of aesthetic success, he seems to have seen himself as pushing the medium of
paint towards a greater faithfulness to the personality being represented. Bacon did not
move portraiture beyond personhood, but rather re-imagined the “appearance” of
personality as such.
There is, however, a significant and consequential ambivalence about the idea of
personality that runs through these remarks by Bacon. On the one hand, personality is
an “emanation” that, to speak etymologically, flows out from and floats around the
person’s face (here, that of his interlocutor, Sylvester): “When I look at you across the
table, I don’t only see you but I see a whole emanation.” On this view, personality is
out there, as it were, part of the realm of appearances, rather than something hidden
away and private, like one’s innermost soul (“in interiore homine,” to recall Augustine’s
formulation). On the other hand, however, Bacon also implies that personality is, in
fact, hidden or concealed (we live a “screened existence”) and that the violence people
sense in his paintings may have to do with the fact that he somehow sees through or
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clears away those “'veils or screens.” The “distinct presence or threat of violence” that
Sylvester referred to, according to this view, would be an index of the kind of
psychological violation Bacon practices. As is obvious, these two very different, one
could say opposed, ways of picturing personality, have quite different consequences for
our understanding of Bacon’s art, as they may have had for his own understanding of
his practice as well: one view sees his art as a faithful record of the visible, the other as
an invasive disclosure of the hidden. I will return to the latter possibility after first
taking a moment to consider the surprising complexities of the former.
For the visibility of personality does not entail simplicity of transcription. Art,
for Bacon, is not illustration. We can begin by noting that it is of the very essence of
the visibility of such emanations - ever shifting and transforming - that they be
absolutely mysterious and profoundly difficult to capture. As he says about
“appearance” elsewhere:
The longer you work, the more the mystery deepens of what
appearance is, or how can what is called appearance be made in
another medium. And it needs a sort of moment of magic to
coagulate colour and form so that it gets the equivalent of
appearance, the appearance that you see at any moment, because
so-called appearance is only riveted for one moment as that
appearance. In a second you may blink your eyes or turn your
head slightly, and you look again and the appearance has
changed. I mean, appearance is like a continuously floating
thing. (IFB 118)
The essential transience of the appearance of the human body that Bacon refers to here
is what convinced some masters of physiognomic expressions, such as Daumier, to
dismiss the value of drawing from life. However, appearance is not so difficult to
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capture because it is somehow hidden, but only because it is so fleeting. On the other
hand, the fleetingness of appearance is not simply due to the speed with which the
muscles of the human body or face physically alter. This would make the difficulty
purely contingent, something a faster hand or perhaps a camera might remedy. Indeed,
Bacon regularly used photographs as visual references when he painted, and since his
paintings look little like anything a camera could capture, we can be certain that
physical transience has nothing to do with the “mystery” he invokes. On the contrary,
the difficulty appears to be essential to the nature of appearance as such, for appearance
does not seem to be reducible to “physical” or “literal” appearance at all. “I don’t only
see you but I see a whole emanation which has to do with personality,” he said to
Sylvester, as if there were some kind of disjunction internal to the way Sylvester
appeared to Bacon. Note how, in order to explain why physiognomic expression is so
difficult to capture, we were forced into embarrassing linguistic difficulties: did we not,
in effect, just say that appearance is not reducible to appearance? We are at the
borderlands of sense here. Perhaps this explains why Bacon resorts, somewhat
tentatively, to characterizing appearance as “like a continuously floating thing.” This
formulation, along with his reference to an “emanation,” suggests some kind of gaseous
formation or cloud (recall the “cloud of sensation”), perhaps shot through with
variously colored light, ever shifting, yet fully visible and, unsurprisingly, almost
impossible to “trap” (it takes a “moment of magic”). Imagined this way, it is interesting
to recall that Bacon spoke approvingly of Monet’s sunsets, even expressing a desire to
paint a human mouth in the same way: “I like, you may say, the glitter and colour that
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comes from the mouth, and I’ve always hoped in a sense to be able to paint the mouth
like Monet painted a sunset” (IFB 50).
It would be easy to take Bacon’s way of characterizing appearances (as
“emanations” and “continuously floating things”) as indicative of some sort of occult or
spiritualistic views on his part, like those held by so many great modem painters before
him (Kandinsky and Mondrian, for example). At least this would free us from the
contradiction we found ourselves cornered into: understood spiritualistically, Bacon’s
appearances would not be reducible to physical appearances because the “appearances”
Bacon sees are of immaterial realities (psychic “auras,” perhaps). That is, Bacon sees
personality, but with a “sight” that is spiritual rather than mundane. But this reading
creates more difficulties than it resolves. Bacon, for one thing, despised all modem
“mystical” ideas. In response to a suggestion by Sylvester that one can be said to enter
a “trance-like state” while engaged in painting, Bacon’s response is telling: “I don’t like
using the word trance-like nowadays, because it comes too near to modem mysticism,
which I hate” (IFB 96). He also called himself a “non-believer” who professed a
radically disenchanted view of existence: “I think of life as meaningless; but we give it
meaning during our own existence. We create certain attitudes which give it a meaning
while we exist, though they in themselves are meaningless, really” (IFB 23, 133). He
also held a thoroughly naturalistic conception of the place of humans in the animal
world: nothing but random contingency differentiates us from the meat we see at the
butchers, he believed. Humans, after all, are but animals of another kind: “Well, of
course, we are meat, we are potential carcasses. If I go into a butcher’s shop I always

186

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

think it’s surprising that I wasn’t there instead of the animal” (IFB 46). Given the tenor
of these remarks, it is hard to imagine that Bacon would intend anything remotely
supernatural or spiritual in his remarks about “emanations” (or “continuously floating
things”). So if it is clear that the “emanation” that Bacon saw around Sylvester is not
reducible to the physical appearance of Sylvester’s face and body, it is just as dear that
it cannot be anything spiritual or mystical either. Perhaps it would help if we likened
Bacon’s notion of “appearance” to Wittgenstein’s theory of aspects, for aspects too are
neither purely physical nor ethereally spiritual. And like Bacon’s appearances, aspects
are what Wittgenstein said we see when we see a face as expressive of a person’s
thoughts and feelings: the affinities between the ideas of Wittgenstein and Bacon are
striking. Perhaps this is unsurprising when we consider that few people have spent as
much time and energy reflecting attentively upon the appearance of the human face as
did they (there is no reason, I should note, to suspect that Bacon read or was aware of
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspects: I think each came to their own views
independently, simply by means of intense observation and thought). That does not
mean, however, that their views are identical: that there are real differences in their
physiognomic views is as undeniable as the unmistakable points of resemblance.
Nothing is to be gained by forcing Bacon’s idiosyncratic ideas into a philosophical
mold, or by using his art as a mere illustration of a Wittgenstelnian theory. This would
add nothing to the cogency of Wittgenstein’s views nor augment the force of Bacon’s
art, the powerful immediacy of which is clear to anyone who cares to look.
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein’s notion of aspects allows us to see that much of what Bacon
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says about appearance is, in fact, rationally cogent (however odd and paradoxical much
of it may sound), and so can show us in what ways they are not “merely” idiosyncratic.
Bacon’s art and theory, should we say, touch upon something true about faces and their
appearances, and it is in their respective contact with the truth about faces that the work
of Bacon and Wittgenstein meet.
But does that mean that the truth of facial perception and recognition is
somehow fundamentally violent, as so much of Bacon’s art appears to say? Is there a
kind of epistemological brutality structuring intersubjectivity itself? Consider, for
example, the portrait triptych that he painted of Henrietta Moraes in 1969 (fig. 9).

Fig. 9 Francis Bacon, Three Studies o f Henrietta Moraes, 1969

Though criticism often finds the obvious a bit embarrassing to state, is it truly possible
to look at these portrait studies and not imagine physical violence? Do the various
bloodied faces of Moraes in this triptych series not clearly betray evidence of a terrible
and terrifying brutality that has flayed, mauled and twisted her physiognomy? We have
seen that Bacon does not shrink from the association of violence with his work. There
is no point, I think, saying that his work is not really violent, that this is somehow a
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naive response, that only “simple" people would see it that way. Not only does Bacon
himself speak of causing “injury” to his portrait subjects (“the injury that I do to them in
my work”), he also acknowledges that people who sense a “distinct presence or threat
of violence” when looking at his portraits may be on to something. He connects this to
his belief that we live “through screens - a screened existence”: “I sometimes think,
when people say my work looks violent, that perhaps I have from time to time been able
to clear away one or two of the veils or screens.” As we noted earlier, Bacon’s
formulation here suggests that personality, far from being visible and part of the realm
of appearances (i.e. emanations), is actually hidden and private, therefore requiring
invasive exploration in order to be successfully uncovered and captured in paint. This
would explain the violence people sense in his work: what they are responding to is the
psychological violation that is intrinsic to his method. And yet, interestingly, this is a
violation which, attempting to get at the personality underneath, only manages to mark
the surface of the body: what psychological content (fear, longing, hope, etc.) is ever
revealed by one of Bacon’s portraits?
One of the people who most forcefully and eloquently responded to Bacon’s
portraits as invasive works of violence was Milan Kundera, who has written one of the
most powerful yet disturbing essays on Bacon’s portraiture. In 1977, just after he had
emigrated to France, Kundera was given the task of writing an essay on Bacon for the
periodical L ’Arc. He decided to write a brief reading of Bacon’s 1969 portrait triptych
of Moraes, in which he interpreted Bacon’s “brutal” distortions of Moraes’ face as
evidence of the painter’s struggle to “seize hold of her essence, of that diamond hidden
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in the depths” (BPSP 10). Paced with the task of writing on Bacon’s triptych, Kundera
significantly resorts to the mode of autobiography and confession, as if, in order to
understand the paintings, one had to subjectively identify with the point of view of the
painter; as if that point of view, and the way it straggled to see or grasp the essence of
another person, was the true “subject” of the paintings. In order to convey the quality of
his response to Bacon’s work, Kundera tellingly says little about the appearance of the
paintings. There is no interpretation of form as such, for the meaning of Bacon’s
images lie not in their forms, but rather in the act of perception and response the
appearance records (the sensation). In order to be as faithful as possible to the
experience of response, Kundera spends much of the essay relating the “scandalous”
and “unconscionable” desire he felt during an encounter with a young woman in Prague
before he had emigrated to France:
It was 1972. I met with a girl in a Prague suburb, in a borrowed
apartment. Two days earlier, she had been interrogated by the
police about me for an entire day. Now she wanted to meet with
me secretly (she feared that she was constantly being followed) to
tell me what questions they had asked her and how she had
answered them. If they were to interrogate me, my answers
should be the same as hers.
She was a very young girl who had as yet little experience of
the world. The interrogation had disturbed her, and, after three
days, the fear was still upsetting her bowels. She was very pale
and during our conversation she kept leaving the room to go to
the toilet - so that our whole encounter was accompanied by the
noise of the water refilling the tank.
I had known her for a long time. She was intelligent, spirited,
she had fine emotional control, and was always so impeccably
dressed that her outfit, just like her behaviour, allowed not a hint
of nakedness. And now, suddenly, fear like a great knife had laid
her open. She was gaping wide before me like the split carcass of
a heifer hanging from a meat hook.
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The noise of the water refilling the toilet tank practically
never let up, and I suddenly had the urge to rape her. I know
what I’m saying: rape her, not make love to her. I didn’t want
tenderness from her. I wanted to bring my hand down brutally on
her face and in one swift instant take her completely, with all her
unbearably arousing contradictions: with her impeccable outfit
along with her rebellious guts, her good sense along with her
fear, her pride along with her misery. I sensed that all those
contradictions harboured her essence: that treasure, that nugget of
gold, that diamond hidden in the depths. I wanted to possess her,
in one swift moment, with her shit along with her ineffable soul.
But I saw those two eyes staring at me, filled with torment
(two tormented eyes in a sensible face) and the more tormented
those eyes, the more my desire turned absurd, stupid, scandalous,
incomprehensible and impossible to carry out.
Uncalled-for and unconscionable, that desire was nonetheless
real. I cannot disavow it - and when I look at Francis Bacon’s
portrait-triptych, it’s as if I recall it. The painter’s gaze comes
down on the face like a brutal hand trying to seize hold of her
essence, of that diamond hidden in the depths. Of course we are
not certain that the depths really do harbour something - but
whatever it may be, we each of us have in us that brutal gesture,
that hand movement that roughs up another person’s face in the
hope of finding, in it and behind it, a thing that is hidden there.
(rptd. in BPSP, 9-10)
Kundera’s understanding of Bacon’s artistic method (“the painter’s gaze comes down
on the face like a brutal hand”) implies, indeed presupposes, that violent and invasive
force is the only way to touch and grasp the mind of another: the only way we can truly
know another person, since the other’s self is understood to be a substantive essence
(like a “nugget of gold” or a “diamond”) that lies “hidden in the depths.” Understood in
such a way, how else except by means of force could one imagine seeing let alone
portraying the person beneath his or her “veils or screens,” as Bacon would later put it?
Perhaps this is one reason Bacon was so fond of the word “trap”: regarded this way,
painting might very well feel like a form of hunting. Either way, it is the meat we
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crave. But, of course, the kind of knowledge that is the epistemological goal of this
fundamentally Cartesian picture of mind is impossible to attain (for Cartesians, other
minds will always be a problem), and Bacon’s aesthetic “success” can therefore be seen
as a reflection of an epistemological failure: only the body is ever touched. The mind,
as Wittgenstein made clear, is not like a diamond or nugget of gold: it is not a thing at
all to be treasured in absolute privacy (“There are no such things as minds, but people
have mental properties,” as Davidson expressed this point). Bacon’s paintings, as
Kundera’s essay reveals, graphically shows the ethical stakes involved when we think
about the nature of mind. Is it private; is it public? Is it visible; is it hidden? Seeing it
as private and hidden, one gropes for the inner self only to find folds of flesh bloodied
and bruised by one’s fists, for there is nothing there: “Of course we are not certain that
the depths really do harbour something.” Bacon’s paintings can be read, in this light, as
ambivalent cautionary tales, the drama of other minds played out on the surfaces of
their faces: beware of going beneath the surface, his physiognomies seem to say, for
appearances are the only place mind can be seen (whether as aspects or emanations).
This reminds us of Nietzsche’s remarks about surfaces in the Gay Science
(unsurprisingly, Bacon read Nietzsche):
Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for
that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to
adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole
Olympus of appearance! Those Greeks were superficial—out o f
profundity\ And is not this precisely what we are coming back to,
we daredevils of the spirit who have climbed the highest and
most dangerous peak of present thought and looked around from
up there—we who have looked down from there? Are we not,
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precisely in this respect—Greeks? Adorers of forms, of tones, of
words? And therefore—artists?
It turns out that Bacon was quite fond of Kundera’s essay. After Bacon died, his
friend Michel Archimbaud even approached Kundera and asked him to write the
introduction to a planned collection of Bacon’s portraits and self-portraits. As Kundera
notes at the beginning of the introduction that he eventually wrote for that volume
(which reprints and expands upon his 1977 essay), Archimbaud assured him that “the
invitation was Bacon’s own wish”: “He reminded me of a short piece of mine published
long ago in the periodical L'Arc, a piece he said the painter had considered one of the
few in which he could recognize himself’ (BPSP 8). One wonders, even, whether
Bacon might not have had Kundera’s earlier essay in mind when he later spoke of “veils
or screens” in connection to those people who “say my work looks violent.” The
interpretation of his own art in implied by those remarks is certainly consistent with the
essential points of Kundera’s piece. That Archimbaud would entrust the introduction of
Bacon’s collection of portraits and self-portraits to Kundera’s hand shows how genuine
and deeply felt Bacon’s admiration for the L ’Arc essay must have been. However, as
we noted when we first discussed these remarks about “veils or screens,” this is but one
possible view of his art, essentially opposed to that which sees it as a faithful record of
the visible. Of course, Kundera’s reading itself implies this opposite interpretation
when he quite pointedly wonders out loud whether any kind of hidden self exists, for he
does not in fact endorse the idea that portraiture can “pierce” the surface of the persona
in order to uncover the person within. It is, in fact, the very impossibility internal to this
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way of thinking about other minds (“my desire turned absurd, stupid, scandalous,
incomprehensible and impossible to carry out”) that fuels much of the pathos of the
piece, the implication, of course, being that the same pathos (that is, impossibility)
underlies Bacon’s art as well. Like Bacon’s paintings themselves, Kundera wrote the
essay as a mirror of the sensations produced by the perceptual transaction he
experienced while beholding the triptych, and in this lies the significance of the way he
relates the remarks of Archimbaud about Bacon’s feeling for his 1977 essay: “a piece he
said the painter had considered one of the few in which he could recognize himself.”
Recognition (that is, the matching of “clouds of sensation”) is a key to Bacon’s art, and
the mirroring style Kundera chose for his response to Bacon is the most faithful
recognitional response Bacon could have hoped for. No wonder he admired it.
Significantly, this mirroring or matching dynamic already shows a way of perceiving
and representing others that is not invasive.
I do not think, however, that it is a matter of choosing decisively between
competing interpretations. Bacon’s art is powerful not because it is consistent - after
all, it is not philosophy, though it is theoretical - but rather because it dramatizes with
great intensity different ways of approaching and perceiving the human face. In one
respect, it is injurious: flaying, cutting, digging through the flesh. In another respect, it
is not: faithfully recording the transient appearances of emanations of the self as they
continuously float across and about the surface of the face. Both of these possibilities
are simultaneously recorded by Bacon’s portraits, and it is to a great extent the tension
between the two that lends them not only such affective, but also, conceptual power.
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They make us think, not just feel - though we should add that they make us think by
making us feel. However, I think these two opposed ways of thinking about the face,
even taken together, do not yet adequately account for the meaning of Bacon’s
physiognomies. There is at least one other important aspect of his art, which has to do
with the meaning of chance in his practice and theory. For though we have referred to
chance repeatedly throughout the course of this discussion, we have not yet fully
accounted for its frequency in Bacon’s remarks about his own practice. What does
chance mean for him? At times, it seems as if it means absolutely everything: “in trying
to do a portrait, my ideal would really be just to pick up a handful of paint and throw it
at the canvas and hope that the portrait was there” (EFB 107). We have already read
enough of his other remarks to know that this is an artistic ideal that Bacon quite clearly
knew was unachievable and unrealistic. As he put it elsewhere, “I’m quite prepared to
believe that mine is a really far-out and impossible theory.” However, his theoretical
fantasies about paintings of absolute accident are nonetheless telling indices of how
strongly he felt about the matter. In response to his acknowledgement that such ideas
are probably “far-out and impossible,” Sylvester says: “Nevertheless, it’s obviously of
great importance for you to think in those terms.” Bacon’s response shows clearly how
much the possibility of a wholly irrational and accidental painting meant to him:
“Certainly. It’s one of the reasons that I go on painting, because it haunts me so much”
(IFB 126).
But just why did it haunt him so? In order to answer this question, I think we
need to return to the radically disenchanted views he held about human life, though
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instead of “disenchanted,” we should probably use more precise terms like “accidental”
or “contingent.” That is to say, for Bacon there is no underlying reason things are as
they are, and not otherwise, which explains his constant existential surprise in the
presence of slaughtered meat: “If I go into a butcher’s shop I always think it’s
surprising that I wasn’t there instead of the animal.” His is a post-Darwinian and
entirely atheistic worldview, absolutely devoid of design, though one that seems (like
the later Nietzsche’s)102 to be based on the acceptance of the truth of the natural
sciences (to the exclusion of all religious belief systems) rather than deriving from a
skeptical commitment to a total absence of truth altogether: hence, his frequent and
positive references to nervous systems, sensations, instincts and drives. Indeed, perhaps
such biological truths are the only ones he fully believed in: “we are bom and we die,
but in between we give this purposeless existence a meaning by our drives” (IFB 134).
But if the drives are real, the meanings they make are not: “I think of life as
meaningless,” he said quite succinctly.103 There is no non-naturalistic teleology
underlying biological life or existence in general. He clearly felt the force of these ideas
quite intensely, and they appear to have permanently colored his adult existence. He

102 On Nietzsche’s naturalistic commitment to the findings of the empirical sciences, see Maudemarie
Clark’s Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy and Christopher Cox, Nietzsche and Interpretation.
103 That Bacon’s use of the word “drives” is not intended in a psychoanalytic sense is made clear by an
exchange with Sylvester, in which Bacon strongly resists Sylvester’s attempts to read his portraits
psychoanalytically: as signs of ambivalence and contradictory feelings towards his subjects. Here is
Sylvester’s suggested interpretation: “do you not think, since you talk about recording different levels of
feeling in one image, that, among other things, you may be expressing at one and the same time a love of
the person and a hostility towards them - that what you are making may be both a caress and an assault?”
Bacon’s response is quite clear and direct: “I think that is too logical. I don’t think that’s how things
work. I think it goes to a deeper thing: how do I feel I can make this image more immediately real to
myself? That’s all.” Of course, this does not mean that Bacon’s art cannot or should not be interpreted
psychoanalytically, it just means that Bacon’s conscious use of the word “drive” should not be taken in
that light, since he clearly put no stock in psychoanalytic theories.
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told Sylvester that this Mod of knowledge first came to him one day when, he was
seventeen:
I remember it very, very clearly. I remember looking at a dogshit on the pavement and I suddenly realized, there it is - this is
what life is like. Strangely enough, it tormented me for months,
till I came to, as it were, accept that here you are, existing for a
second, brushed off like flies on the wall. (IFB 133)
If in the face of its obvious meaninglessness life nonetheless seems to have some sort of
meaning, Bacon saw that as simply due to our own projections: and such fictional
meanings “in themselves are meaningless, really.” That does not mean, however, that
Bacon is unequivocally contemptuous of such fictions. He admits that he has greater
respect (despite his great distaste for all forms of religion) for those who hold
tenaciously to religious beliefs (forms of “total falseness,” as he called them) than those
who, thinking themselves free of morality, “just live a kind of hedonistic and drifting
life” (IFB 134). After all, it takes dedication to hold even to illusions, and “the only
thing that makes anybody interesting is their dedication” (IFB 134). But he admits that
his ideal (or at least “more exciting”) person would be one who could do “totally
without belief,” but nonetheless be “totally dedicated to futility” (IFB 134).
Bacon’s “haunting” theory of the role of accident in art (“one of the reasons that
I go on painting”) derives from this ultimate understanding of the radical contingency of
reality. Crudely put, we might say that on the side of total falseness is illustration, on
the side of truth is chance. Radical contingency, after all, is the only thing undeniably
true about existence. As Gloucester, from Shakespeare’s King Lear, said in lines that
Bacon was fond of quoting: “As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods; i They kill us
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for their sport.” Imposed or willed meaning (that is, illustration) is therefore to be
firmly resisted in favor of an absolute artistic dedication to accident - the practical
aspect, one might say, of a clear-eyed theoretical acceptance of the “futility” of life.
Here we hear Bacon describe how his commitment to accident translated into actual
studio practice: he would, as he explained, “do almost anything to get out of the formula
of making a kind of illustrative image - 1 mean, I just wipe it all over with a rag or use a
brush or rub it with something or anything or throw turpentine and paint and everything
else onto the thing to try to break the willed articulation of the image” (IFB 160). But
what is fascinating is that Bacon did not follow these ideas and practices into total
abstraction, as might initially seem their obvious theoretical and visual endpoint; after
all, what else could be left in the image once illustration is thus banished? On the
contrary, however, he held tenaciously to the appearance of the human figure. Indeed,
not only did he remain committed to the figure as such, but even to the traditional genre
of the portrait, which not only foregrounds figuration but is generically defined by the
resemblance or likeness of the figures portrayed. And as we have seen, Bacon was
surprisingly traditional in his conception of what a portrait properly was. Speaking of
portraiture, we recall that he said “there’s no point in doing a portrait of somebody if
you’re not going to make it look like him” (IFB 146). One might see this as an
inconsistency in his personal philosophy, seeing his devotion to figural resemblance as
at odds with his devotion to accident and chance. For isn’t resemblance necessarily on
the side of illustration? This would be a terribly mistaken inference, however. For
what is so powerful about Bacon’s theory of art is that he sees absolutely no
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inconsistency at all in the imagining of a purely accidental form of portrait painting.
Indeed, by devoting himself so often to the painting of portraits, he demanded of
himself that he practice within the zone of this apparent, but only apparent, paradox:
that individual resemblance could come about wholly by accidental means.
That Bacon’s devotion to figuration and portraiture is not a theoretical
inconsistency, however, requires that we grasp the extent to which Bacon saw reality as
such as wholly accidental. In other words, that particular humans live lives as the
particular humans they are in the first place is the most remarkable piece of
(meaningless) luck one could imagine. “If I go into a butcher’s shop I always think it’s
surprising that I wasn’t there instead of the animal,” is Bacon’s more striking way of
putting the same point. It follows then that a form of portrait painting that devotes itself
to accident should be able to faithfully record the “fact” of this absolute chance, since
the fact of personhood itself is absolutely accidental. What, after all, is an individual
person but a wholly contingent kind of biological entity, which typically exhibit
particular, characteristic, mental properties, sometimes called a personality if they
display a sufficient degree of consistency and coherence over time? If the universe can
give rise, in the total absence of design, to such patterns of organic matter as we are,
then why cannot a totally random painting accurately record their appearance as well?
Hence, his dream of painting a portrait by simply picking up a handful of paint and
throwing it at the canvas. Patterns themselves, Bacon appeared to sense, are absolutely
accidental. Bacon so clearly saw' chance at work everywhere that at times he literally
believed this kind of portraiture should be possible. Indeed, can we say, with certainty,
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that it is not? Consider, for a moment, a mathematical analogue to Bacon’s idea.
Imagine flipping a coin one hundred times and writing down the results, denoting heads
by the number 1 and tails by the number 0. We would not be surprised if, after all the
tosses were recorded, we saw the following numerical sequence, which we will call (R):

11000011010110001101111111010001100011011001110111
00011001000010111101110110011111010010100101011110
Consider, on the other hand, the following sequence of one hundred coin tosses, which
we will call (N):
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
Which sequence of coin tosses is more random than the other? Though (R) intuitively
looks much more random than (N), and though we would be suspicious of anyone who
told us they had honestly recorded one hundred coin tosses that turned out to correspond
to the sequence (N), according to probability theory, neither is more random than the
other. Each sequence of one hundred tosses has exactly the same, very small,
probability of occurrence: [Vi]100, or approximately 1 in lO30.104 In the very way that
this example contradicts our intuitive notions of what randomness “looks like,” Bacon’s
ideas about chance contradict our intuitive notions of what accidental painting will
“look like” as well. Just as the one hundred heads in (N) are just as likely (or rather,
unlikely) as the one hundred tosses recorded in (R), Bacon saw biological patterns (e.g.,

104 This mathematical point and example are taken from an intriguing essay on the relation between
randomness and patterns: William A. Dembski, “Randomness by Design” in Nous 25, No. 1 (March
1991), pp. 75-106, p. 80.
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a person) as just as likely (or unlikely) as anything else that could possibly come into
existence.
O f course, despite the fact that we cannot a priori rule out the possibility that
someone might successfully create the Mud of accidental portraiture Bacons often
fantasized about, such chance likenesses were and are, it goes without saying, highly
unlikely to come about simply by throwing paint at a flat surface. That the fantasy
nonetheless had a strong grip upon Bacon’s imagination (“it haunts me so much,” he
said) meant inevitably that despair would be a constant companion in the studio. And
indeed, few mental states are invoked more often in his interview transcripts than
despair. What is intriguing is the positive, productive uses to which Bacon channeled
this dark feeling. Discussing his desire to feel “freer” while engaged in the act of
painting, at one point he mentions to Sylvester that he uses his “will” to achieve this
goal. Sylvester asks: “The will to lose one’s will?” Bacon’s considered reply - he
decides in the midst of his response that “will” is the wrong word - tells us a great deal
about the role of despair in his art: “Absolutely. The will to make oneself completely
free. Will is the wrong word, because in the end you could call it despair. Because it
really comes out of an absolute feeling of it’s impossible to do these things, so I might
as well just do anything. And out of this anything, one sees what happens” (IFB 13).
The psychological and practical arc described by these remarks is crucial to
understanding Bacon’s art: impossibility leads to despair, which leads to freedom
(“might as well just do anything”), which leads to the unwilled creation of new
painterly possibilities. His ideas about chance, because they are theoretically
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Intelligible but practically impossible, put him in a terrible bind: as he himself
acknowledged, “I think what I very often have talked about has been perhaps a
particular theory of mine which is impossible to achieve.” Impossible to achieve, but
not impossible to believe. These remarks suggest how the practical impossibility of
Bacon’s theory is, in a way, the enabling condition for his art as a whole: for his “far out
and impossible theory” forces him inevitably into practical situations of desperation,
which then lead to moments of absolute painterly freedom. Would Bacon even have
been able to experience such moments of freedom at all without this feeling of
impossibility reducing him to despair in the first place?
Bacon’s theory of art, I suggest, was a crucial practical element of his everyday
studio practice (and not, for example, something extrinsic or after the fact: merely
theory, that is). For this reason, it is important to integrate his remarks into any reading
of his art, not because his statements are privileged interpretations of his images, but
because his ideas played an essential practical role in their creation (without them, I
wonder whether he would have painted the paintings he did). By being so frank about
his ideas, it is as though Bacon had invited us into his studio and allowed us to see him
mix his pigments and stretch his canvases. That is, theory was a kind of “tool” right
alongside his paints, brushes and rags. Drink, of course, also played an important
liberatory role in his studio practice during the creation of some early works, such as the
Three Studies fo r Figures at the Base o f a Crucifixion (1944). Speaking of this work,
he told Sylvester: “It was a thing that I did in about a fortnight, when I was in a bad
mood of drinking, and I did it under tremendous hangovers and drink; I sometimes
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hardly knew what I was doing,... I think perhaps the drink helped me to be a bit freer”
(IFB 13). However, he came to feel that drink’s artistic utility was ultimately quite
limited: “Sometimes it loosens you, but again I think it also dulls other areas. It leaves
you freer, but on the other hand It dulls your final judgment of what you hold. I don’t
actually believe that drink and drugs help me. They may help other people, but they
don’t really help me” (IFB 54). Alcohol produced (at great cognitive cost) the kind of
freedom which his theory would later, by way of despair, come to supply in a more
practically useable fashion (that is, without loss of critical acuity). In this light, it makes
sense to think of Bacon’s theory as a more reliable substitute for drink: though alcohol
helped him achieve the freedom to paint the Crucifixion triptych (“drink helped me to
be a bit freer”), he told Sylvester that “it’s one of the only pictures I’ve been able to do
under drink” (IFB 13, emphasis added). The most telling part of his explanation of why
he came to view alcohol as unhelpful is his observation that it “dulls your final
judgment of what you hold”: drink may have helped Bacon paint unwilled images, but
it also dulled his ability to respond to them. And, as I have been arguing, perceptual
response is the key to Bacon’s art - it is in his response to what he has put on a canvas
(whether willed or not) that his “cloud of sensations” (which he also calls “instinct”)
comes to life. Sober despair, unlike sheer intoxication, leads to the creation of images
to which he is then capable of perceptually responding: “At that moment I’m thinking
of nothing but how hopeless and impossible this thing is to achieve. And by making
these marks without knowing how they will behave, suddenly there comes something
which your instinct seizes on as being for a moment the thing which you could begin to
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develop” (IFB 54). And what he sees on the canvas, when “luck” is on his side, is an
unexpected image which hits his “nervous system” with a sensation of presence, or life:
part of the original goal of the impossible theory, it turns out. In the following remarks,
of which we have already quoted a small part, Bacon puts all of this even more clearly:
... you don’t know how the hopelessness in one’s working will
make one just take paint and just do almost anything to get out of
the formula of making a kind of illustrative image - 1 mean, I just
wipe it all over with a rag or use a brush or rub it with something
or anything or throw turpentine and paint and everything else
onto the thing to try to break the willed articulation of the image,
so that the image will grow, as it were, spontaneously and within
its own structure, and not my structure. Afterwards, your sense
of what you want comes into play, so that you begin to work on
the hazard that has been left to you on the canvas. And out of all
that, possibly, a more organic image arises than if it was a willed
image. (IFB 160)
Illustration is inevitable, for our will is impossible to wholly disengage: it is not as
though Bacon unrealistically imagines that it is possible to consistently paint without
will. He longs for this, but knows it is impossible. But this very knowledge is a source
of great despair, which opens up - in the midst of periods of illustration - moments
beyond willing. And here, in the volatile interaction between illustration and chance,
new accidental images, with a life of their own, find room to grow: they constitute “the
hazard that has been left to you on the canvas.” And when all goes well, these organic
images produce sensations that approximate those produced by the appearance of the
original subjects, though without being wholly illustrational: “suddenly I have found
that the thing comes nearer to the way that my visual instinct feel about the image I am
trying to trap” (IFB 54). (Here we see again how surprisingly conventional is his notion
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of resemblance and portraiture: his portraits would not appear so novel if they were not,
at the same time, so essentially traditional.) Clearly, this process can be repeated over
and over, either until an image successfully traps “the fact at its most living point” or
until it is abandoned and destroyed. Leiris, we will recall, described the uncanny “life”
of Bacon’s images perfectly, when he wrote, “As if the picture had its own life, and
constituted a new reality instead of being a mere simulacrum” (Leiris 6).
Illustration, as Bacon acknowledged, plays an important and inescapable role in
this creative process: in order to maintain the recognizability of the image he will even
introduce ears, eyes, and other “illustrational” elements into his images. Unfortunately,
it appears that he may at times have felt that this was a compromise of his personal
philosophy: his acknowledgement to Sylvester that his theory is “far-out and
impossible” has the ring of a confession (of course, if he was not so emotionally
invested in his theory, it probably would not have worked so well for him: a certain
blindness to its limits may have been the psychological condition of its practical utility).
But far from being an unnecessary and extrinsic element in his artistic practice - despite
whatever Bacon may have believed at times - the role of “illustration” is absolutely
crucial, for the perceptual recognizability of his human figures (especially their faces) is
a fundamental source of the “sensations” he traps in his portraits in the first place.
Bacon’s complicated and unpredictable use of chance distortions was a powerful way of
tuning and altering the sensations we naturally perceive in physiognomic patterns in
order to more powerfully and accurately convey the sensations he perceived when
looking at the subjects portrayed: their personalities, however conceived (as emanations
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or hidden substances). That he married chance and portraiture is essential to the power
and meaning of his art. As I have suggested all along, it is because he represents human
figures and faces that he can so readily speak of his images as being “organic” in the
first place: we naturally respond to such images as presences, as Gombrich put it, with a
life and mind of their own. That is to say, Bacon’s intent was simply to create portraits
that could be seen as the persons portrayed.
Following up on this last point, I would like to close this discussion of Bacon by
suggesting that we see him as a fundamentally Romantic artist working under
conditions of modem disbelief, a late and quite altered exemplar, that is, of the creative
powers of the primary Imagination described in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria. Here
is Coleridge’s well-known definition from chapter 13:
The IMAGINATION, then, I consider either as primary, or
secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living
power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the
infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the former,
co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree,
and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates,
in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible,
yet still, at all events, it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is
essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially
fixed and dead.
If we replace Coleridge’s references to divinity with accident, I think we are left with a
good picture of one aspect of Bacon’s artistic project: by using chance to create images
that trapped the sensation of life - that is, by creating images that could be seen as
having a life of their own - Bacon participated in the same contingent processes that
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first gave rise to individual human lives in the first place. At those moments of despair
when he let himself “do anything,” Bacon was at one with the only creative force that
exists in the universe: chance (“a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of
creation”). Patterns exist: that is a fact, truly, beyond belief. It is as though each act of
painting is, at some level, an act of wonder: wonder at the fact that life exists at all.
And not only life in general, but these particular lives: George Dyer, Isabel
Rawsthome, Henrietta Moraes, Michel Leiris, Lucien Freud, himself. Bacon’s portraits
and self-portraits are re-creations in the most literal sense. And by preserving the
aspects that emanate from each face that he saw, he was preserving the presence (for
him) that was each individual person. And when we feel our own “cloud of sensation”
stir when beholding these portraits, that is a bit of their lives come alive in each of us.
Despite Bacon’s disdain for conventional morality, I believe that his pictorial
preservations of the “fact” of each person “at its most living point” is art at its most
ethical (beyond good and evil).
The various ways of reading Bacon’s art that I have presented do not, I know,
easily coexist with one another. But as I suggested earlier, it is not the consistency of
Bacon’s art that matters to anyone who feels the force of his paintings: the force itself is
what is at stake. That various, and perhaps conflicting, theoretical ideas are interwoven
with the affective force of his images does not detract from their artistic value, and I
hope that a reading that is faithful to the multiple theories and perspective that inform
their creation will not be dismissed for that very reason. Indeed, I think it is part of the
strength of his images that they sustain such widely varying (though narrowly
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circumscribed) Interpretations. It is not that anything goes when interpreting Bacon’s
art, but rather that a limited number of ideas and feelings appear to be suggested
simultaneously. What unifies much of his work is not a uniform theory, but the
consistent presence of the human face, and his portraits are one of the greatest
twentieth-century artistic testaments to the importance of the face itself.
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5. Face Value

As with the work of the many other figures already surveyed in this dissertation,
Emmanuel Levinas’ reflections on the ethical dimensions of the face-to-face relation
likewise signals the special importance of the human countenance to modem thought/05
The “epiphany of the face qua face,” as Levinas puts it, “opens humanity,” proclaiming
the ethical responsibility of the self for all others ( T I194). However, those familiar
with Levinas’ now quite popular and influential work will already know that in his
philosophy the face (visage) is a deeply equivocal term: on the one hand, empirical and
available to sensibility (but only as frozen “caricature” [TI 198]), while on the other
hand, transcendent and “neither seen nor touched—for in visual or tactile sensation the
identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object” (TI 194). Exceeding the
“enveloping,” and thus violent, grasp of an objectifying sensibility, the face (in the latter
sense) appears as an “epiphany” within the face (in the former): ‘T he face resists
possession, resists my powers. In its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still
graspable, turns into total resistance to the grasp” (TI 197). The transcendent face of
the other appeals to the self and calls it to an absolute responsibility: “Before the hunger
of men responsibility is measured only ‘objectively’; it is irrecusable. The face opens
the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation” (TI 201). More fundamental
than even existence is responsibility, or as Levinas puts it: “preexisting the plane of

105 See especially section 3 (“Exteriority and the Face”) of Levinas’ Totality and Infinity: An Essay on
Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1969). References to this text will
be given parenthetically with the abbreviation TI.
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ontology is the ethical plane” (TI 201). And so, unavoidable, yet “neither seen nor
touched,” and somehow both before and beyond Being itself, is the transcendent face of
the Levinasian other.
If the deconstructive literary criticism of Paul de Man can be seen as an
exemplary, if rather extreme, instance of modem skepticism about the face and the
personhood it has traditionally stood for, Levinas’ description of the epiphanic
appearance of the face as the very condition of possibility of ethics would seem to
position him diametrically opposite to de Man. And while in a sense this is so
(certainly in spirit),106 Levinas’ positioning of the face outside the field of human
perception is arguably symptomatic of a fundamentally anti-physiognomic orientation
not unlike de Man’s. It is worth asking why Levinas feels it necessary to relinquish the
visibility of the face, indeed to insist on its essential m-visibility. It is clear that his
bifurcated approach to the face is determined by his ambivalent allegiance to, and way
of overcoming, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. For Levinas, Husserl’s
model of intersubjectivity is essentially solipsistic, unable to regard the other person as
anything but an alter ego constituted by, and in the image of, the self. True alterity is
beyond the reach of the Husserlian “I”. And yet, because Levinas is faithful enough to
Husserlian phenomenology to continue producing descriptions from the perspective of
106 In his remarks about prosopopoeia in his essay on Shelley’s The Triumph o f Life, de Man explicitly
rejects the (“naive,” as he declares) notion that the endless tropological process of face-giving and
defacement has any “value” for us whatsoever (ethical or otherwise), since “we are its product rather than
its agent”: “... to read is to understand, to question, to know, to forget, to erase, to deface, to repeat—that
is to say, the endless prosopopoeia by which the dead are made to have a face and a voice which tells the
allegory of their demise and allows us to apostrophize them in our turn. No degree of knowledge can
ever stop this madness, for it is the madness of words. What would be naive is to believe that this
strategy, which is not our strategy as subjects, since we are its product rather than its agent, can be a
source of value and has to be celebrated or denounced accordingly” (RoR 122; italics in original).
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that “I”, he must regard the alterity of the other person (in the epiphany of her face) as a
radical, or as he sometimes said traumatic, interruption of what Husserl terms the
“primordial sphere” of the transcendental ego, and thus as beyond the reach of
description of any kind. The “view” he thereby achieves of the face is therefore
necessarily vacuous. But is Levinas’ way of approaching the face necessary?
Moreover, by taking a path first determined by Husserl’s transcendental solipsism (if far
beyond its original horizons), does Levinas not risk misdescribing our experience of
other persons and thus the nature of ethical action in the world? Before considering
these questions further, and so as to better appreciate the climate of thought that
motivated Levinas to formulate his radical alternative to Husserl’s phenomenological
epistemology, I think it may be helpful to take a step back in order to reflect upon the
philosophical, and particularly ethical, stakes involved.
Wittgenstein, to use John Ashbery’s memorable phrase, thought of persons (and
their faces) as “visible cores”: mental privacy, according to Wittgenstein’s view, is a
philosophical illusion deriving from a faulty conceptual picture of the nature of thought
and meaning. For Wittgenstein, consciousness in the face of another is directly visible:
as he put it in Zettel, “Look into someone else’s face, and see the consciousness in it,
and a particular shade of consciousness.... Do you look into yourself in order to
recognize the fury in his face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast” (Z 220). In
his later writings, Wittgenstein was self-consciously breaking from a still dominant
Augustinian-Cartesian tradition that pictured the self, to simply reverse Ashbery’s
terminology, as a hidden core; that is, as radically private, precisely in the way that
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Augustine describes his own infant mind in the following passage, which we considered
in chapter one, from the Confessions:
Little by little I began to realize where I was and to want to make
my wishes known to others, who might satisfy them. But this I
could not do, because my wishes were inside me, while other
people were outside, and they had no faculty which could
penetrate my mind. So I would toss my arms and legs about and
make noises, hoping that such few signs as I could make would
show my meaning, though they were quite unlike what they were
107
meant to mime.
It is historically momentous—but perhaps unsurprising given his novel commitment to
the priority of first-person cognition—that Augustine was the first thinker in the western
tradition to formulate the argument from analogy to the existence of other minds. Here
is the way he formulates the argument in his De trinitate :
For what is known so intimately, and so perceives itself to be
itself, as that by which also all other things are perceived, that is,
the mind itself? For we recognize the movements of bodies also,
by which we perceive that others live besides ourselves, from the
resemblance of ourselves; since we also so move our body in
living as we observe those bodies to be moved. For even when a
living body is moved, there is no way opened to our eyes to see
the mind, a thing which cannot be seen by the eyes; but we
perceive something to be contained in that bulk, such as is
contained in ourselves, so as to move in like manner our own
bulk, which is the life and the soul. Neither is this, as it were, the
property of human foresight and reason, since brute animals also
perceive that not only they themselves live, but also other brute
animals interchangeably, and the one the other, and that we
ourselves do so. Neither do they see our souls, save from the
movements of the body, and that immediately and most easily by
some natural agreement. Therefore we both know the mind of
any one from our own, and believe also from our own of him
whom we do not know. For not only do we perceive that there is

10/ St. Augustine, Confessions (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 25.
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a mind, but we can also know what a mind is, by reflecting upon
our own: for we have a mind. (De trinitate, viii.6.9)
The existence of other minds, according to this argument, can only be established by
means of a process of analogical inference: 1 must infer by virtue of the movements of
another’s body, that he or she—Just like me—must have a mind as well. But as
Wittgenstein observed in the Philosophical Investigations, in reference to the common
idea that it is only by analogy from our own private experiences that we can know what
the word “pain” means, then “must I not say the same of other people too? And how
can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?” (PI §293). A generalization made on
the basis of one instance to all entities of a certain class is, as Wittgenstein puts it,
logically irresponsible. If we know that others have mental experiences, and we
certainly do (just as we can recognize quite readily that others feel pain), this cannot be
the result of an analogical inference, which would be rationally unjustifiable in any
case.
It is not that the problem of other minds is intractable, but rather that there is no
real problem to begin with. For Wittgenstein, the “problem” of other minds was
anything but: far from being a pressing philosophical question, it was a delusional
“picture” to be therapeutically dispelled. On the other hand, for the AugustinianCartesian tradition (of which Husserl is arguably the most important modem
representatives), there were few more urgent questions than how one could know the
mind of another person (after all, a self-consciously systematic philosophy such as
Husserl’s that had no convincing account of the experience of intersubjectivity could
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hardly be considered “complete”). One purely quantitative indication of the importance
of the problem of other minds for Cartesian thinkers such as Husserl is the fact that the
fifth lecture of his Cartesian Meditations, specifically devoted to the explanation of
intersubjectivity, is nearly as long as the other four lectures put together. For those who
accepted the Augustinian concept of mind consolidated in the writings of Descartes, in
other words, the problem of other minds was quite real, perhaps even insoluble.
After all, according to Descartes’ ontology the universe was composed of only
two different substances— res cogitans (thinking matter) and res extensa (extended
matter)—with all traffic between the two necessarily ruled out (except, of course,
through the pineal gland, an implausible “solution” not even Descartes himself seems to
have wholeheartedly believed). If thought itself, according to the Cartesian system, can
have no connection to the extended matter of the body, then there would be no reason to
trust that the behavior (verbal or otherwise) of those around us revealed anything
reliable about the contents of their minds: indeed, there was no reason to believe there
even were other minds. Who was to reassure us that those around us were not, in fact,
automatons? Indeed, Descartes’ third Meditation made clear that only reasoned faith in
the existence of a benevolent God was sufficient to settle the extreme form such
epistemological skepticism was bound to take if left theologically unchecked. But even
with the intersubjective world won back by means of faith, radical contingency between
inner and outer would still determine the nature of our access to other minds. As we
noted near the beginning of this study, this is a conceptual situation about which the
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melancholy Hamlet would have shown little surprise: “I have that within which passes
show7,” is the way he succinctly expressed this essentially Augustinian idea.
Consider, then, what it would mean for our understanding of intersubjectivity if
minds were private in the very way described by the subjectivist tradition founded by
Augustine and later consolidated by Descartes. This is the situation Levinas felt he had
inherited from his teacher, Husserl, who, at least as far as Levinas knew, had expounded
his fullest treatment of the problem of other minds in the Cartesian Meditations.
Levinas would often repeat the fact that it was his disappointment with the results of the
fifth of these lectures, about intersubjectivity, that provoked him to leave the
phenomenological fold (though perhaps more in the manner of a nostos-bound
Odysseus than the wandering Abraham he regarded himself to be). But so as to
understand Levinas’ grasp of the philosophical stakes, it is worth pausing to consider
seriously the conceptual “picture” he had been taught. How, under conditions of
modem skepticism about both God and pineal glands, might the problem of other minds
look? What, in other words, if the self was in fact a hidden core which therefore must
be rendered visible (perhaps even by means of rending) in order to be understood?

• Picturing Privacy: Rilke, Bacon and Coetzee

Unsurprisingly, in the twentieth-century it was various works of literature and
art that expressed most powerfully the tragic pathos of the “theoretical” situation with
which Levinas had to grapple. For example, in a passage from Rainer Maria Rilke’s
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novel, The Notebooks ofMalte Laurids Brigge, the speaker, a Danish writer living in
Paris named Brigge, describes a disturbing encounter that provocatively stages the
possibility that a person, or psychological subject, is indeed an absolutely private
substance and therefore detached from all material reality, including even the
corporeality of the face (staging, in an aesthetic register, the Cartesian problem of other
minds):
Have I said it before? I am learning to see. Yes, I am beginning.
It’s still going badly. But I intend to make the most of my time.
For example, it never occurred to me before how many faces
there are. There are multitudes of people, but there are many
more faces, because each person has several of them. There are
people who wear the same face for years; naturally it wears out,
gets dirty, splits at the seams, stretches like gloves worn during a
long journey. They are thrifty, uncomplicated people; they never
change it, never even have it cleaned. It’s good enough, they say,
and who can convince them of the contrary? Of course, since
they have several faces, you might wonder what they do with the
other ones. They keep them in storage. Their children will wear
them. But sometimes it also happens that their dogs go out
wearing them. Any why not? A face is a face.
Other people change faces incredibly fast, put on one after
another, and wear them out. At first, they think they have an
unlimited supply; but when they are barely forty years old they
come to their last one. There is, to be sure [natiirlich], something
tragic about this. They are not accustomed to taking care of
faces; their last one is worn through in a week, has holes in it, is
in many places as thin as paper, and then, little by little, the lining
shows through, the non-face [Nichtgesicht], and they walk
around with that on.
But the woman, the woman: she had completely fallen into
herself, forward into her hands. It was on the comer of rue
Notre-Dame-des-Champs. I began to talk quietly as soon as I
saw her. When poor people are thinking, they shouldn’t be
disturbed. Perhaps their idea will still occur to them.
The street was too empty; its emptiness [Leere] had gotten
bored and pulled my steps out from under my feet and clattered
around in them, all over the street, as if they were wooden clogs.
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The woman sat up, frightened, she pulled out of herself, too
quickly, too violently, so that her face was left in her two hands.
I could see it lying there: its hollow form. It cost me an
indescribable effort to stay with those two hands, not to look at
what had been tom out of them. I shuddered to see a face from
the inside, but I was much more afraid of that bare flayed head
[faloBen wunden Kopf] waiting there, faceless [ohne Gesicht].
(93, trans. Mitchell)
One of the most striking things about this passage is the sudden and sharp tonal shift
that comes at the moment that Brigge recalls the pensive woman at the comer of rue
Notre-Dame-des-Champs. Before the woman is introduced, a disarming levity
characterizes his remarks on faces. He toys playfully with the idea that a face is but a
fashioned thing: it can fit one’s head like a glove, split at the seams, wear thin with use,
and can even be worn by one’s dog - “And why not? A face is a face.” There is no
need to take faces too seriously, he implies; after all, each one of us has many of them,
as an actor might carry around a store of masks in a trunk. Even the suggestion that
there is something “tragic” about those who run too quickly through their finite supply
is qualified by a rather facetious “natiirlich” that deflates the sentiment and works to
maintain the note of supercilious detachment that colors the first half of this passage.
And the sight of those who have used up their supply of faces, thus forced to walk
around with the non-face (Nichtgesicht) showing through, seems to leave Brigge
unperturbed (moreover, the pat internal rhyme between “nicht” and “gesicht” also
works subtly against any inflation of tragic pathos). The tone remains unremittingly
cool, as though Brigge were engaged in a bit of light-hearted cultural critique that did
not threaten to rebound upon himself in any way (the detail of the pet dog walking
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around wearing one of its thrifty owner’s faces is perhaps intended to indicate that the
speaker’s target is something like the Parisian petit bourgeoisie in general). Indeed, the
light tone of the remarks in the first half of this passage makes It easy to read Its
references to faces in a purely allegorical fashion: of course they are not about real
faces, but rather “Identities” or personae in an entirely figurative sense.
With the introduction of the woman, however, all this changes. Attention is
suddenly narrowed down from broad generalities onto a single, and singular, person,
who occupies a concrete and specifically named, but at the same time surreal, urban
location. The most salient fact about the woman herself seems to be her immersion in
thought: “she had completely fallen into herself,” as Brigge puts it. Thinking (denken)
is figured as afall out of the shared world of the social into a deep and absolutely
private interiority. A surreal emptiness (Leere) haunts the street: its cause is left
undetermined, but it is difficult not to feel that it is somehow linked to the figure of the
pensive woman, as though absorption in thought resulted in the evacuation of the
fullness of the world, leaving the street itself “bored,” indicative perhaps of an
insufficiency of human life and interaction. It appears that the woman is meant to stand
parodically for a kind of philosopher, and Brigge seems to have walked into an
agonistic and characteristically modem struggle between mind and world, a struggle
tellingly mapped onto the fleshly contours of a human face.
The contrast between the treatment of the woman and the earlier remarks on
mask-like faces is highlighted by the difference in the way defacement is figured in
each instance. As noted already, the non-face in the earlier part of the passage is
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described with neutral straight-forwardness, the tone suggestive even of a kind of
deadpan and clear-eyed humor (after ail, the joke’s on them). But the description of the
woman’s loss of face at the end is clearly altogether different, and the way Brigge
characterizes it makes it difficult to read the closing lines in anything but the most
literal way. The interpretive strategy of allegoresis comes to feel profoundly inadequate
to, and almost like a defense against, the corporeal particulars of the moment (we might
think of this as an analogue to the hermeneutic difficulty posed by Bacon’s canvases of
flayed and wounded physiognomies). Perhaps most significant is the fact that Brigge
does not actually see what the woman’s head looks like without her face: with an
“indescribable effort” he manages not to look at her head, though he nonetheless goes
on to describe it as “bare” and “flayed [wunden],” conjuring forth, as if despite himself,
images of exposed viscera and streaming blood. Defacement here is rendered
shockingly literal, and the cool detachment of the earlier part of the passage is
completely lost.
But of what does the conclusion of this passage gives us an oblique glimpse?
(A sight that we must keep in mind is acknowledged to be wholly imaginary, not
grounded in an actual visual perception, even within the terms of the fictional world
described.) It is difficult to say: the ending is profoundly suggestive, affectively
charged, and yet conceptually vague. We are left certain that this flayed head must
mean something, and yet we are left with images of gore obstructing our interpretive
speculations. Despite the fact that the closing lines are explicitly not based on any
perceptual facts, it seems as though the description is intentionally engineered to
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overload the sensory aspects of our imagination with pictures of flesh, blood and,
perhaps most importantly, intimations of bodily pain. For how can we imagine what we
are asked to imagine (violent tearing m d flaying, to use variations on three words
Brigge himself resorts to) without, at the same time, imagining excruciating pain: the
kind of overwhelming pain that can temporarily annihilate our very sense of self and
world? (And isn’t some of the disorientation that we feel in response to this scene due
to our bewilderment as to where the woman’s self or mind in fact resides: in her head or
on her face? And, between these two possibilities, are we not being asked to make an
absolutely impossible judgment, which only feeds back into the feeling of disorientation
that colors the whole conclusion of the passage in the first place?). If the affective tone
of this closing description is so charged, it is surely not simply because Brigge claims to
be “afraid” (though we can certainly sympathize with that response!), but rather
primarily because we are being coerced into picturing a sight that cannot fail to elicit
sensations of pain and aversion that blur the boundaries between ourselves and the
imagined woman. It goes without saying that our only access to the scene is through
the viewpoint of the narrator, Brigge, and so we inevitably experience affective
identification with the fear and disorientation he feels before the strange event that he is
witnessing. And yet, the corporeal intensity of the image that he relates splits, or rather
stretches, our imaginative consciousness to contain (in an indeterminate form: we don’t
know what she looks like or is thinking about) the bodily experience of the faceless
woman as well (and that there is a distinction between body and mind, in the case of the
woman, is something, I think, that we cannot take for granted: in fact, perhaps one point
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of the passage is to put that distinction into question, if not necessarily to resolve the
issue either way). The surrealism of this passage (e.g., the personified “emptiness”
clattering around in Brigge’s “steps”) does not soften the impact of the reader’s
empathetic response to an imagined body in pain: indeed, the disorientation that the
surrealistic elements of the passage introduce has the opposite effect, rendering the
reader’s imagination susceptible and vulnerable to images that would ordinarily be
patently unbelievable.
But what are we seeing (or not seeing) in the woman’s “bare flayed head”? One
thing the whole passage seems to suggest (though in an equivocal way) is that faces are
only contingently related to persons: faces are like masks that can be removed, worn
through, or even violently tom off - the difference between the last possibility and the
first two, however, is obviously significant and seems to be linked to the absorption in
thought the woman was experiencing at the moment she was startled. She had
completely disengaged from the world, “had completely fallen into herself [in sich],”
and at the jarring sound of clattering steps “pulled out of herself [aus sich], too quickly,
too violently.” The sense of movement in and out of the mind is carefully signaled by
prepositional markers in the description that paint a picture of deep psychic interiority
(a sense of spatial depth that, by contrast, seems utterly lacking in the descriptions of
those who walk around with a non-face earlier in the passage: perhaps their loss of face
is so undisturbing because there is no “inner” self—only absence or nothingness
[Nicht]—lying behind or beneath their social personae). When the thoughtful woman
is startled, she is deep within herself and pulls out violently without making adequate
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adjustments for being in the world: without, that is, donning her face or persona.
Person and persona are imagined as radically distinct and incommensurable. Her “bare
flayed head,” therefore, seems to show us a gory literalization of what personhood
might look like (though of course we cannot actually see it) if we conceive of the self as
a private inner substance: that is, a hidden core that we might imagine can be rendered
visible only by means of a kind of rending.
But we must be careful to keep in mind that the entire passage is mediated by
the consciousness of the narrator, Brigge. In other words, if we are being presented
with a description in which the woman’s “bare flayed head” literalizes—that is,
incarnates— a Cartesian conception of the self as a private inner substance (a hidden
core), then this is so only from a particular point of view: a point of view that lies
outside the unseen self of the woman, which therefore explains why that self must
necessarily remain unseen. For no matter how thoroughly one may rend the contingent
shells (whether body or face) that exist around a Cartesian self, that self cannot—by
definition—ever be seen or touched by another person. The epistemological distance
between two such selves is infinite and unspannable (for, of course, such selves are not
extended things, and thus lie outside space altogether). In a Cartesian universe, there is
no non-theological resolution to the epistemological problem of other minds.
Of course, that doesn’t mean that we cannot try (or imagine trying) to see, truly
see, another Cartesian self. But Rilke seems to suggest that such imaginings, such
attempts at “seeing,” will inevitably be tainted or contaminated by a kind of
epistemological violence; and, we might add, the fact that the violence in Brigge’s
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description of the woman has no physical agent does not in any way lessen the
atmosphere of violence that suffuses the closing description, for the violent force
resides in the imagination of the scenario itself. Force cannot span the epistemological
chasm between two Cartesian selves, but an attempt by one such self to reach out and
grasp another will very likely, and symptomatically, take the form of force. The
attempt being futile, force will be a measure of, and kind of rage against, that futility
itself.
Rilke’s passage, therefore, can be read as a cautionary tale against such
Cartesian imaginings in the first place. For the descriptive violence that erupts in the
closing of that passage is indicative not of some kind of truth about the self, but rather is
symptomatic of a particular way of thinking about the self. Brigge’s encounter with the
woman suggests that if we think of the self as a hidden core, this (the unseen head of the
woman) is what it might look like to actually see one. But we cannot! And indeed, the
passage seems to say, if given the opportunity, one would avert one’s eyes however
“indescribable” the effort necessary. The point, however, is not that we should or
should not look away, but rather that we ought to reconsider the concept of self that
underwrites such unbearable imaginative alternatives in the first place. That is why it is
so important that the whole of the passage is mediated by Brigge’s consciousness: for it
is the way personhood is envisaged by a particular consciousness (by any
consciousness) that constitutes the true point of the passage. The woman’s “bare flayed
head” can therefore be read as a symptom of, and warning against, a Cartesian
understanding of mind that reifies mentality as such. Do we imagine the self to be a
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hidden core? If so, what are the implications? What are the stakes? Surely, what
Brigge sees (as well as what he does not) gives him good reason to feel “afraid.”
sfc

As I already suggested in an earlier chapter on Francis Bacon’s portraiture,
various aspects of Bacon’s artistic practice can also be seen as a testimony to the fact
that violent force haunts the epistemology of other minds when the person is imagined
as a kind of hidden substance. It is worth briefly recalling in the context of the present
discussion that Milan Kundera’s unsettling essay on Bacon’s 1969 portrait-triptych of
Henrietta Moraes posited a compelling link between mental privacy and aesthetic
violence, when he interpreted Bacon’s distortions of Moraes’ face as evidence of the
painter’s struggle to “seize hold of her essence” (BPSP 10). “The painter’s gaze comes
down on the face,” wrote Kundera in that piece,
like a brutal hand trying to seize hold of her essence, of that
diamond hidden in the depths. Of course we are not certain that
the depths really do harbour something - but whatever it may be,
we each of us have in us that brutal gesture, that hand movement
that roughs up another person’s face in the hope of finding, in it
and behind it, a thing that is hidden there, (rptd. in BPSP, 9-10)
Kundera’s interpretation of Bacon’s artistic method presupposes that violent and
invasive force is the only way to touch and grasp the mind of another: the only way we
can truly know another person, since the other’s self is understood to be a substantive
essence that lies “hidden in the depths.” Understood in such a way, as we noted earlier,
how else except by means of force could one imagine seeing, let alone portraying, the
person beneath his or her “veils or screens,” as Bacon himself put it? But, of course, the
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kind of knowledge that is the epistemological goal of this fundamentally Cartesian view
of intersubjectivity is impossible to attain (for Cartesians, that is, other minds will
always be problematic), and Bacon’s aesthetic “success” can therefore be seen as a
reflection of an epistemological failure: only the body is ever touched. The mind, as
Wittgenstein’s later writings make clear, is not like a diamond or a nugget of gold that
might be treasured in absolute privacy: indeed, it is not a “thing” at all (whether
substance, essence or fact). Bacon’s paintings, as Kundera’s reading suggests,
graphically show the ethical stakes involved when we think about the nature of mind. Is
it a hidden thing; is it a thing at all? Is it public; is it private? Seeing it as radically
private, one gropes (like Othello) for the true inner self only to find folds of flesh
bruised by one’s conceptual graspings, for there is nothing there: “Of course we are not
certain that the depths really do harbour something,” as Kundera himself acknowledged.
Like Rilke’s vignette about the faceless woman, Bacon’s paintings can be read, in this
light, as ambivalent cautionary tales, the drama of other minds played out on the
surfaces of their faces. Beware of going beneath the surface, the distorted likenesses of
Moraes seem to say, for it is only in the realm of appearances that one can see another’s
mind: “the light in other people’s faces,” as Wittgenstein suggestively put it.
*

*

*

Following on this point, and before finally returning to Levinas, I would like to
look at the role of the face in J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting fo r the Barbarians, another work
of the modem imagination that, like those of Rilke and Bacon, engages critically with
the Cartesian view of mind that I have been discussing. At one point in the novel, the
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Magistrate even experiences a feeling of “dry pity” for torturers such as Colonel loll
that could just as well have been provoked by Kundera’s reading of Bacon: “how
natural a mistake,” the Magistrate thinks to himself, “to believe that you can bum or
tear or hack your way into the secret body of the other!” (43), In the character of M l, a
representative of the fictional Empire’s “Third Bureau” (the division of the “Civil
Guard” charged with intelligence and security), Coetzee presents us with a savage
caricature of the Cartesian theory of mind, transposed into a political register.
Convinced of the privacy of other minds, M l resorts to quite literally invasive means in
order to extract the “truth” that he assumes is hidden deep within his victims. As he
explains his interrogation methods to the Magistrate: “First I get lies, you see - this is
what happens - first lies, then pressure, then more lies, then more pressure, then the
break, then more pressure, then the truth. That is how you get the truth” (5). In other
words, appearances are necessarily associated with deception: as a matter of principle,
prima facie evidence is to be rejected. First lies, then pain, and then only after much
more pain, does one ever arrive at the “truth”: at the “diamond hidden in the depths,” as
Kundera might have put it. For M l, it is axiomatic that truth can only be found beneath
a surface that must first be forcefully penetrated; his theory of mind, therefore, has no
room for the possibility that a prisoner might simply tell the truth. Indeed, the
Magistrate contemplates this very possibility with horror, and asks M l about it: ‘“What
if your prisoner is telling the truth,’ I ask, ‘yet finds he is not believed? Is that not a
terrible position? Imagine: to be prepared to yield, to yield, to have nothing more to
yield, to be broken, yet to be pressed to yield more!”’ (5). M l is unmoved, and his only
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response to this hypothetical query is the methodological declaration that deceit
inevitably precedes the disclosure of truth. After hearing loll explain the logic of his
method, however, the Magistrate naturally remains uneasy, and concludes that Joll (like
anyone who uses torture) has mistakenly equated truth with pain: “Pain is truth; all else
is subject to doubt. That is what I bear away from my conversation with Colonel loll”
(5). And indeed, the reader soon learns that the Magistrate is quite right to worry about
the soundness of the Empire’s methods.
Just after this conversation, Joll tortures a young barbarian boy and his uncle,
both of whom had originally ventured near the town simply in order to find a cure for a
skin infection that would not heal on its own: “We were on the road,” the uncle
explained to the Magistrate and Joll, “coming here to see the doctor... He has a sore that
does not get better” (3-4). Disregarding the obvious truthfulness of this explanation (the
boy even peels aside a bandage to show them the angry sore), and fully consistent with
his theoretical distrust of prima facie evidence, Joll later subjects the two barbarians to
further “questioning,” during which he brutally kills the older man and repeatedly cuts
into the flesh of the young boy with a very small knife, in order, by means of the
traumatic infliction of pain, to extract from him the very “truth” Joll was hoping to hear
(indeed, was sent to the frontier to find) in the first place: that the barbarians were
secretly “arming themselves” and preparing “to join in a great war on the Empire” (1011). In the character of Joll, Coetzee makes even more graphic and explicit the
conceptual correlation between epistemological violence and Cartesian pictures of
mental privacy that Rilke, Bacon and Kundera had already suggested.
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It would be easy, but only partially correct, to see the liberal-minded Magistrate
as structurally opposed to the torturer Joll in the moral economy of Coetzee’s novel. In
fact, however, the Magistrate’s momentary sympathy for loll (“how natural a mistake to
believe that you can bum or tear or hack your way Into the secret body of the other!”)
hints at the extent to which these two antagonists share the very same concept of inind.
And it is from this common Cartesian ground that spring the Magistrate’s own
“inexplicable attentions” directed towards the barbarian woman, which treat her as an
enigma to be deciphered, a mystery to be comprehended, or better yet, an obdurate shell
to be penetrated in order to access the psychological kernel within. And consistent with
our discussion so far, it is the way he pictures her face that betrays the Magistrate’s
essentially Cartesian understanding of the nature of mind. Having explored how the
treatment of the human countenance in Rilke and Bacon dramatizes the terrible ethical
consequences of a theoretical commitment to mental privacy, we already have a good
grasp of the meaning of the face in Coetzee. Indeed, everything that I have said about
Rilke and Bacon applies quite directly to the role of the face in Coetzee’s novel, so
much so that I would be surprised if Coetzee did not have Rilke and Bacon in mind
when he wrote those passages that describe the Magistrate’s obsession with the face of
the tortured woman (in fact, I suspect that Coetzee may even have known Kundera’s
L ’Arc essay on the Moraes triptych: the crucial role of state interrogation in Kundera’s
essay, considering Coetzee’s characterization of Joll, is striking).
At one point, deeply frustrated by his feeling that the barbarian woman is
“beyond comprehension,” the Magistrate pictures the features of her face altering in
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terms that bring to mind Bacon’s canvases: “I have a vision of her closed eyes and
closed face filming over with skin,” he thinks. “Blank, like a fist beneath a black wig,
the face grows out of the throat and out of the blank body beneath it, without aperture,
without entry” (42). And reminiscent of Bacon’s predatory approach to painting (“as an
artist, you have to, in a sense, set a trap by which you hope to trap this living fact alive”
[EFB 57]), the Magistrate later complains that “with this woman it is as if there is no
interior, only a surface across which I hunt back and forth seeking entry. Is this how
her torturers felt hunting their secret, whatever they thought it was?” (43). And as if all
this were not disturbing enough, he goes on to identify his erotic “attentions” to the
woman’s body with the interrogation methods used by Joll: “The girl lies in my bed,”
he thinks, “but there is no good reason why it should be a bed. I behave in some ways
like a lover - 1 undress her, I bathe her, I stroke her, I sleep beside her - but I might
equally well tie her to a chair and beat her, it would be no less intimate” (43).
This, I suggest, is Coetzee’s point. There could be nothing less intimate than
thinking of another person’s mind as a hidden, private thing, encased in a shell,
“opaque” and “impermeable,” or like “an urn or a ball,” as the Magistrate variously
describes the woman’s face and mind. On the very next page, he recoils from the
association he had just posited between himself and Joll, but we readers know it is too
late to take the comparison back: “There is nothing to link me with torturers,” he
exclaims to himself. “How can I believe that a bed is anything but a bed, a woman’s
body anything but a site of joy? I must assert my distance from Colonel Joll! I will not
suffer for his crimes!” (44). Of course, it would be absurd (and cynical in the extreme)
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to claim that the Magistrate and loll are really not at all different. Nonetheless, Coetzee
has made clear that the concept of mind that informs the Magistrate’s treatment of the
woman is isomorphic with that which the Empire uses to rationalize the brutal
interrogation practices exercised in the name of state power: the very practices, of
course, that left the woman maimed in the first place and her father dead. It is this that
the Magistrate had suddenly realized, and his later protestations to the contrary,
however forceful, come too late.
And, in any case, when the Magistrate insists that a “bed is... but a bed” and a
“woman’s body... but a site of joy,” the “joy” that he speaks of, which is linked to his
nightly ritual of cleansing and oiling the woman’s body, merely confirms our general
point about the Magistrate’s Cartesian understanding of mind. Here is one typical
description of the ritual: “[I] begin to wash her feet.... I lose myself in the rhythm of
what I am doing. I lose awareness of the girl herself. There is a space of time which is
blank to me: perhaps I am not even present... I push the basin aside and dry the foot...
My eyes close. It becomes an intense pleasure to keep them closed, to savour the
blissful giddiness” (28). The “bliss” the Magistrate experiences here is brought about
by the rhythmic regularity of his hand movements upon the woman’s body, but oddly
enough the pleasure is not at all sensual but rather characterized by a withdrawal from
sense-perception and the experience of time-consciousness. “[Ojften in the very act of
caressing her,” as he says in another description of the ritual, “I am overcome with sleep
as if poleaxed... These dreamless spells are like death to me, or enchantment, blank,
outside time” (31).
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Those familiar with that locus classicus of Romantic inwardness, the fifth
promenade of Rousseau’s Reveries o f a Solitary Walker, will recognize in these
characterizations of the Magistrate’s state of mind a parodic allusion to the “sentiment
of existence” that Rousseau felt while listening to the rhythmic “ebb and flow” of the
waters of Lake Bienne: “I liked then to go and sit... in some secluded spot by the edge
of the lake,” we read in the fifth promenade:
there the noise of the waves and the movement of the water,
taking hold of my senses and driving all other agitation from my
soul, would plunge it into a delicious reverie in which night often
stole upon me unawares. The ebb and flow of the water, its
continuous yet undulating noise, kept lapping against my ears and
my eyes, taking the place of all the inward movements which my
reverie had calmed within me. (86-7)
And as with the Magistrate’s nightly ministrations, these experiences of Rousseau by
the lake provide his soul access to spots, as it were, outside of time: “where time is
nothing to it,” as Rousseau explains, “where the present runs on indefinitely but this
duration goes unnoticed, with no sign of the passing of time... Such is the state which I
often experienced on the Island of Saint-Pierre in my solitary reveries” (88-9)
Like these solitary reveries enjoyed by Rousseau, the rhythmic “pleasure” the
Magistrate enjoys while caressing the woman’s body is a solitary pleasure. Indeed, the
perverse solipsistic experience of the nightly ritual is but the first-person correlate to his
third-person perception of the woman’s face as an “urn or a ball”: both picture mind
itself (whether his or hers) as a monad that is private and closed off from the world.
That is to say, these two textual moments, both the rhythmic bliss and the woman’s
filmed-over face, are vivid expressions of two sides of a single conceptual logic. The
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problem that Coetzee draws our attention to in this novel is the Cartesian picture of
mind, shared by both Joll and the Magistrate, that underlies the entire spectrum of
unethical actions that constitute its narrative arc. Waiting for the Barbarians has often
been referred to as an allegory about the politics of imperialism, and certainly it is that;
but I would urge that we consider it also, and perhaps even primarily, as an allegory
about the philosophy of mind. Coetzee’s novel, I suggest, sees imperialism as an
extension into the field of politics of a mistaken view of intersubjectivity and other
minds that operates first at the level of interpersonal relations between two individuals.
As with Rilke and Bacon before him, though perhaps even more directly and self
consciously, Coetzee’s imaginative representations of the barbarian woman’s face
dramatize, and thereby warn us against, the moral and epistemological pitfalls of our
Cartesian modernity. Beware the seductive picture of mental privacy that is our
common philosophical inheritance, Coetzee’s novel suggests, lest we lose ourselves in
solipsistic fantasies, whether the domestic ones of someone like the Magistrate, or
imperialistic ones such as those of Colonel Joll. Either way, we risk overlooking the
truth about those around us, perhaps simply (and somewhat surprisingly) because we
insist on looking too hard. The Magistrate describes well the sort of self-blinding gaze
(this “looking too hard”) that he suffers from when, in the following passage, he thinks
about how he hopes the barbarian woman regards his obsessive attention: “I have
hitherto liked to think that she cannot fail to see me as a man in the grip of a passion,
however perverted and obscure that passion may be, that in the bated silences which
make up so much of our intercourse she cannot but feel my gaze pressing in upon her
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with the weight of a body” (56). It is the very intensity of his gaze—intent on
fathoming her psychological depths—that obscures from sight whatever might simply
be there to be seen on the surface in the first place.
Near the end of the novel, the Magistrate thinks sadly to himself: “There has
been something staring me in the face, and still I do not see it” (155). But is it not the
woman’s face itself that has been staring him in the face, as in the dream sequences that
he obsessively revisits night after night? Is it not the face itself that he does not seel
Which he cannot see because he refuses to take her at face value, since (like Joll) he
believes that the truth about persons must be hidden, buried, and mysterious? At
various moments throughout the course of the novel, the Magistrate—relentlessly selfreflective as he is—insightfully glimpses (however dimly and briefly) his own
complicity in this fundamentally projective and fantasmatic interpersonal dynamic, in
which he “constructs” the barbarian woman as an enigma to be deciphered. It is not
she who is “without aperture, without entry,” but he who insists on seeing and treating
her that way (42). It is not she who has “no interior, only a surface across which I hunt
back and forth seeking entry,” but he who approaches her in that way, and then, in
exasperation, expresses sympathy for those, like Joll, who make the “natural” mistake
of believing that one can “hack” one’s way into the “secret body of the other” (43). In
one of his passing moments of lucidity, the Magistrate revealingiy characterizes his
treatment of the woman this way: “So I continue to swoop and circle around the
irreducible figure of the girl, casting one net of meaning after another over her” (81).
The Magistrate, in other words, senses what he is doing to the “girl”: that he is treating
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her as a theoretical object suited to bear his meanings rather than express her own
(though it is essential to this psychological dynamic that he believe he is trying to
understand her on her own terms: that is. he imagines her to have a deeply hidden self
which he then must forcefully struggle to disclose). Perhaps all this can make sense of
the following recurring dream, in which what one might call the semantic fluidity or
plasticity of the girl-figure in the Magistrate’s psychic economy becomes terrifyingly
evident: “There are other dreams in which the figure that I call the girl changes shape,
sex, size. In one dream there are two shapes that arouse horror in me: massive and
blank, they grow and grow till they fill all the space in which I sleep. I wake up choked,
shouting, my throat full” (87; italics in original). This nightmarish dream makes all too
clear that “the girl” that inhabits the Magistrate’s thoughts is not the barbarian woman
at all, but something like pure unformed matter, indeterminate, suited to take whatever
conceptual determination best meets the Magistrate’s theoretical compulsion to imagine
mind as such as radically private. It is this “massive and blank” formlessness—which
brings to mind the “bare flayed head” of the faceless woman in Rilke’s Notebooks—and
not some true hidden essence, that lies “behind” or “beneath” the filmed-over face the
Magistrate pictures to himself when he thinks of the woman.
Derek Abridge, in his recent monograph on Coetzee, sees the significance of the
girl and the dreams quite differently.108 Opposing a critical tendency to read Waiting
fo r the Barbarians in an allegorical fashion, he argues that the difficulties that the
dreams pose for the Magistrate’s (and the reader’s) drive to interpret should be seen as
108 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics o f Reading: Literature in the Event (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 2004).
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an ethical lesson about the virtues of semantic uncertainty and open-endedness.
According to Abridge, it is in “the girl’s” very resistance to signification that her true
significance lies. That is, the Magistrate’s “failure to interpret” gives us access to a
literary and intersubjective experience that is “important” and “emotionally powerful”
precisely because it is, and must be, a failure:
Take the dreams: there are several in the novel, including a series
of related dreams set in the town square, usually seen as snowcovered and always involving a figure that the Magistrate refers
to as “the girl.” .... The reader is, of course, invited to interpret
them, and to relate them to aspects of the Magistrate’s waking
life (such as his frequent vision of the barbarian girl’s face as
blank), but part of their haunting power derives from their refusal
to succumb completely to the interpretive drive.... The point I
wish to make is that allegorical reading of the traditional kind has
no place for this uncertainty and open-endedness, this sense that
the failure to interpret can be as important, and quite as
emotionally powerful, as success would be. (47-48)
I have no complaint with Attridge’s dissatisfaction with allegorical readings of the
“traditional kind,” which, as he describes them further, attempt to definitively link
elements within the novel to “parallels outside the world of the book” (48). But as I
hope is clearly evident from my reading of the novel so far, I believe that his
explanation of the significance of “the girl” misses Coetzee’s point. Indeed, Attridge’s
reading badly distorts a matter of fundamental importance to the novel, for by
championing the girl’s resistance to interpretation as an ethical virtue, he is actually
identifying with the Magistrate’s Cartesian prejudices, the very ones that originally
transformed her into an incomprehensible entity that so obdurately resists interpretation
in the first place. If she were actually as enigmatic or opaque as the Magistrate finds
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her to be, then Attridge would have a point: but the real point of Coetzee’s
characterization of the barbarian woman is that the Magistrate, by casting his “nets of
meaning” upon her, has made her otherness into a metaphysical problem. That “the
girl” seems so resistant to the Magistrate’s interpretive gaze is not evidence of the
irreducibility and value of alterity, but the result of a solipsistic constraal of the problem
of other minds.
What the Magistrate blinds himself to in his rush to penetrate to the barbarian
girl’s hidden psychic essence is necessarily unclear, since this novel about solipsism is
appropriately and strategically narrated in the first-person. Like him, we have no
privileged access to the minds and thoughts of others. Even still, Coetzee provides us
with enough clues to suggest rather clearly how badly mismatched are the Magistrate’s
thoughts and the intersubjective reality they intend to interpret. For example, consider
the interaction in the following passage, in which it becomes clear that the Magistrate
would prefer the barbarian woman to remain an interpretive enigma rather than assert
herself as a real flesh-and-blood presence with thoughts, emotions and desires of her
own:
“Wouldn’t you like to do something else?” she asks.
Her foot rests in my lap. I am abstracted, lost in the rhythm
of rubbing and kneading the swollen ankle. Her questions takes
me by surprise. It is the first time she has spoken so pointedly. I
shrug it off, smile, try to slip back into my trance, not far from
sleep and reluctant to be diverted.
The foot stirs in my grip, comes alive, pokes gently into my
groin. I open my eyes to the naked golden body on the bed. She
lies with her head cradled in her arms, watching me in the
indirect way I am by now used to, showing off her firm breasts
and her sleek belly, brimming with young animal health. Her
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toes continue to probe; but in this slack old gentleman kneeling
before her in this plum dressing-gown they find no response.
“Another time,” I say, my tongue curling stupidly around the
words. As far as I know this is a lie, but I utter it: “Another time,
perhaps.” Then I lift her leg aside and stretch out beside her.
“Old men have no virtue to protect, so what can I say?” It is a
lame joke, poorly expressed, and she does not understand it. She
slips open my gown and begins to fondle me. After a while I
push her hand away. (55)
The Magistrate’s refusal, which even he regards as rather lame, understandably pains
the woman, who heatedly reproaches him for deflecting her advances when she knows
that he regularly visits “other girls”: ‘“Do you also treat them like this?’ she whispers,
and starts to sob” (55).
Sensing the turn that this quarrel marks in their relationship, though not
understanding it, the Magistrate sees to it that this “is the last night [they] sleep in the
same bed” (55). It is important to appreciate that the Magistrate does not clearly grasp
his own obscure erotic motivations: he, who has been an easy and promiscuous lover
his entire adult life, has no explanation for why he does not desire to have sex with this
particular woman, though she herself expresses a desire to do so. After having returned
one night to the bed he shares with the barbarian woman after a visit to a favorite
prostitute (the one he calls the “Bird”), the Magistrate ponders this very question,
asking after the perplexing nature of his desire for the barbarian woman:
The girl I have just left, the girl she may perhaps (I suddenly
realize) smell on me, is very pretty, there is no question about
that: the acuteness of my pleasure in her is sharpened by the
elegance of her tiny body, its manners, its movements. But of
this one there is nothing I can say with certainty. There is no link
I can define between her womanhood and my desire. I cannot
even say for sure that I desire her. All this erotic behavior of
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mine is indirect: I prowl about her, touching her face, caressing
her body, without entering her or finding the urge to do so. 1
have just come from the bed of a woman for whom, in the year I
have known her, I have not for a moment had to interrogate my
desire: to desire her has meant to enfold her and enter her, to
pierce her surface and stir the quiet of her interior into an ecstatic
storm; then to retreat, to subside, to wait for desire to reconstitute
itself. But with this woman it is as if there is no interior, only a
surface across which I hunt back and forth seeking entry. Is his
how her torturers felt hunting their secret, whatever they thought
it was? (43)
The Magistrate’s “interrogation” of his own desire is revealing but inconclusive: about
the barbarian woman “there is nothing [he] can say with certainty.” It is not that he
finds her w/tdesirable. Rather, it appears that his desire takes a different direction: not
aiming to enter her literal body but rather to penetrate to something mysterious (like the
“secret” her torturers sought) that he assumes is hidden deep within her mind.
Strikingly, however, though his desire is not literally carnal, he imagines his goal (her
“secret”) in corporeal terms: the psychological distinction between inner and outer is
rendered literally palpable (later he will also imagine even his own “gaze” as “pressing
in upon her with the weight of a body”). But so mysterious is this secret of hers—this
secret that she has become for him—that he can perceive her only as a surface (“as if
there is no interior”): obdurate, enigmatic, unyielding. It is unsurprising then, that it is
immediately following this very passage that he experiences his feeling of “dry pity” for
torturers like Joll who attempt to “tear” their way into the “secret body of the other”
(43). For it is at moments like this, when he imagines her as holding a secret that must
be disclosed, that he reveals how deeply he shares Joll’s Cartesian theory of mind.
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So Intent Is he on gaining “entry” Into her “secret body” that he rashly overlooks
the way she expresses her mind, quite dearly with her actual body, whether with her
actions, words, or tears. It Is as though he were following M l ’s method for torture, by
methodically rejecting all prima facie evidence, in order to get at a latent and private
inner truth (and Is it not clear that the Magistrate’s method of “interrogation” thereby
inflict its own kind of pain as well?). Near the very end of the novel, after he has been
sleeping with Mai, the cook at the town’s inn, she remarks to him that he always seems
distant in bed, just as the barbarian woman used to say he often was with her:
“I don’t make you happy,” she says. “I know you don’t enjoy
it with me. You are always somewhere else.”
I wait for her next words.
“She told me the same thing. She said you were somewhere
else. She could not understand you. She did not know what you
wanted from her.”
“I didn’t know you and she were intimate.”
“I was often here, downstairs. We talked to each other about
what was on our minds. Sometimes she would cry and cry and
cry. You made her very unhappy. Did you know that?”
She is opening a door through which a wind of utter
desolation blows on me.
“You don’t understand,” I say huskily. She shrugs. I go on:
“There is a whole side to the story you don’t know, that she could
not have told you because she did not know it herself. Which I
don’t want to talk about now.” (152)
The testiness of his final response indicates how deeply Mai’s remarks have cut him,
that indeed (as melodramatic as it m

ay

sound) it is as though a door had been opened in

his monadic ego through which the painful truth about the outer world were rushing in.
But has Coetzee not made it clear that if the Magistrate did not appreciate the pain he
was causing the barbarian woman, it was simply because he refused to acknowledge it?

239

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Far from being secreted away, her state of mind was readily accessible by the most
mundane and straightforward of means (as Mai observed, “We talked to each other
about what was on our minds” !). Between the Magistrate and the woman, however, it
was not speech but “bated silences” that constituted their form of “intercourse,” lest talk
interfere with his attempts to enter her “secret body” with his “gaze” But could
anything in Mai’s remarks truly have surprised him? The desolation the Magistrate
feels as he listens to her might just as well derive from the shame of self-recognition as
it could from the shock of some radically new knowledge. It is probably a bit of both.
So though I do not dispute the truism that interpretation must necessarily remain
uncertain and open-ended, I cannot agree with Abridge’s argument that the Magistrate’s
“failure to interpret” the dreams or “the girl” constitutes some sort of positive ethical
lesson of the novel: that “the failure to interpret can be as important, and quite as
emotionally powerful, as success would be” (48). There are clearly limits to what we
can know about one another, which at times can be painful to accept, but these limits
are not those that Coetzee makes the Magistrate confront. I hope I have demonstrated
that Coetzee’s point is not that we, like the Magistrate, must come to terms with the
irreducible opacity of the barbarian woman. On the contrary, if the Magistrate had not
insisted on imagining the girl as an enigma, he might have been able to see, and
acknowledge, their common humanity (by which I mean nothing metaphysically
elevated, but only such everyday things as thoughts, emotions, and desires). In recent
decades, the related concepts of “otherness” and “difference” have been elevated to
theoretical and political fetishes of sorts, but we do an injustice to Coetzee’s text by
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imagining that it reflects or participates in this intellectual, trend. Far from insisting on
the woman’s radical alterity, Waiting fo r the Barbarians strongly suggests that we are
not nearly as different from one another as we often like to imagine. By identifying
with the Magistrate’s frustrated hermeneutic point of view, Attridge shows how difficult
a lesson this can be to leam.

• Levinas: Phenomenology and the Other

Levinas, whose philosophical writings have played a major role in focusing
critical attention onto the concept of alterity in recent decades, might very well have
sympathized with Attridge’s interpretation of Coetzee’s novel: in fact, it is probably the
mediated influence of Levinas’s own ideas about otherness (transmitted by way of his
influence upon Derrida) that informed Attridge’s interpretation of Coetzee in the first
place. Having considered how Coetzee’s Magistrate solipsistically transforms the
barbarian woman into a psychic enigma that mirrors his own Cartesian picture of
mental privacy, it is time finally to return to Levinas’ ethics of the face. Levinas would
regard the Magistrate’s mistreatment of the tortured woman as a typical instance of
western thought’s stubborn inability to think of another person without ensnaring him or
her in “nets of meaning” woven by the intentional consciousness of the sense-bestowing
self.
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The phenomenological investigations of Levinas5 teacher, Husserl, had made
clear that mental life as a whole is characterized by object-directedness or intentionality,
a fundamental and far-reaching claim that Levinas explains as follows:
The famous proposition that “all consciousness is consciousness
of something,” or that intentionality essentially characterizes
consciousness, sums up the Husserlian theory of mental life:
every perception is perception of a perceived, every judgment is
judgment of a state of affairs judged, every desire is desire for a
desired. This is not a correlation of words, but a description of
phenomena. At all levels of mental life, whether at the stage of
sensation or of mathematical thought, thought is aim and
intention. (DEH 58; italics in original)
Phenomenology is intended to be radically presuppositionless, producing “descriptions”
(as Levinas emphasizes) of how things appear to us in consciousness rather than
formulating theoretical explanations based upon metaphysical or scientific claims about
the nature of perception or the physical structure of the material world. As Dan Zahavi
explains this aspect of phenomenological method:
Husserl wants to describe our experiences as they are given from
a first-person perspective, and it is no part of my experience of,
say, a withering oak tree, that something is occurring in my brain.
Thus, already early on Husserl stresses the (metaphysical)
presuppositionlessness of phenomenology. Phenomenology is
supposed to be neither more nor less than a faithful description of
that which appears (be it subjective acts or worldly objects), and
should, as a consequence, avoid metaphysical and scientific
postulates or speculations. (HP 13-14; italics in original)
Phenomenological description thus begins with our conscious experiences as they are
experienced: nothing that cannot be validated in one’s own experience is to be accepted.
This includes even the ordinary (but, in fact, “metaphysical”) assumption that a real
world, external to the mind, exists in itself. All theories, however seemingly innocent,
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are to be validated by experience; experiences are not to be interpreted with the aid of
theories. As Dermot Moran puts it, “Phenomenology is a return to ‘phenomena’.
Husserl understands phenomenon as ‘what appears as such’; in other words, everything
that appears, including everything meant or thought, in the manner of its appearing, in
the ‘how’ (Wie) of its manifestation” (IP 127). Or as Heidegger would sum up this
aspect of Husserl’s teachings in a well-known passage of Being and Time: “Thus
‘phenomenology’ means apophainesthai ta phainomena - to let that which shows itself
be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself’ (BT §7).
Husserl encapsulated his methodological stress on the presuppositionlessness of
phenomenological description in his famous “principle of principles” in Ideas I §24:
Enough now of absurd theories. No conceivable theory can make
us err with respect to the principle o f all principles: that every
originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source o f
cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak in its
“personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition ” is to be accepted
simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the
limits in which it is presented there. (IP 127; italics in original)
In order to purify oneself of all “absurd theories” that might prejudice or contaminate
one’s descriptions of mental life, Husserl recommended a set of procedures he called
“reductions” (from the Latin reducere, “to lead back”) that were designed to lead us
back, as it were, from received theory to naked experience. Moran explains the
motivation for the reductions this way:
Husserl had a number of different theoretical reasons for
introducing the notion of reduction. First it allowed him to
detach from all forms of conventional opinion, including our
commonsense psychology, our accrued scientific consensus on
issues, and all philosophical and metaphysical theorising
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regarding the nature of the intentional. We must put aside our
beliefs about our beliefs, as it were. Secondly, it allowed him to
return to and isolate the central structures of subjectivity. By
putting aside psychological, cultural, religious, and scientific
assumptions, and by getting behind or to one side of the meaningpositing or thetic acts normally dominant in conscious acts, new
features of those acts come to the fore. (IP 146)
What Husserl found left in his consciousness, when by means of his various reductions
he had purified himself of all metaphysical, scientific and religious presuppositions, was
that consciousness was always consciousness of: that is, that consciousness was
characterized by object-directedness or what (barkening back to a Scholastic term of art
revived by Brentano) he also called “intentionality.” As Zahavi explains the objectdirectedness of the intentional relation: “Regardless of whether we are talking of a
perception, thought, judgment, fantasy, doubt, expectation, or recollection, all of these
diverse forms of consciousness are characterized by intending objects and cannot be
analyzed properly without a look at their objective correlate, that is, the perceived,
doubted, expected object” (HP 14). Husserl discovered that once one grasps
consciousness as thoroughly intentional, the characteristic modem rift between subject
and object is healed, for every intentional correlation contains as an essential part of it
both intending act and intended object. Though these two components (which he would
later term “noesis” and “noema”) are distinguishable in theory, in actuality they
constitute two inseparable poles of one noetic-noematic correlation. Thus, my (noetic)
perceiving of a tree is bound inextricably to the (noematic) tree that I perceive. Though
act and object can be artificially teased apart for theoretical consideration, there is no
actual rift between the subjective act and the object perceived. As Levinas put it,
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phenomenology “leads as outside the subject-object categories and topples the
sovereignty of representation. Subject and object are only the poles of this intentional
life” (DEH 119).
What is important to keep in view, however, is that this “intentional life” in
which the metaphysical distinction between subject and object is transcended is one that
is strictly immanent to the consciousness of the intending self. As I noted earlier, one of
the various “presuppositions” that Husserl’s reductions were designed to bracket out
was the “metaphysical” belief that an objective world exists in itself, regardless of our
consciousness of it. After the phenomenological reduction, the “reality” of the
objective world remains, of course, but only as an intentional object immanent to the
phenomenologically purified consciousness. The “objectivity” of the world survives
the reduction, that is, but the reduction helps us to see its objectivity as nothing other
than a meaning the world has fo r me. The same is obviously true for any phenomena
that has the “appearance” of objectivity: after all, the very idea of appearance is
inherently indexed to a subjective consciousness. A phenomenologically clarified
understanding of “objectivity,” therefore, shows it to be nothing but the manner in
which certain phenomena immanentiy appear to a subjective consciousness as
transcendent to it, and it is in this way that the modem rupture between subject and
object is “healed” by the phenomenological discovery of intentionality.
Because all phenomena are understood as immanent, and essentially indexed, to
an intending consciousness, Husserl also often said that whatever meanings they have
are therefore “constituted” by the intending self. Since they do not have their meanings
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in themselves, where else could their meaning come from? Meaning, according to
Husserl, can only be meaning/or us, and so it is simply a different way of expressing
this same point when he claims that meaning is given or constituted by us. As Moran
explains the important phenomenological notion of “constitution”:
For Husserl, “constitution” expresses the manner in which
objects of consciousness come to have the kinds of “sense and
being” that they do, the manner in which subjectivity carries out
its function of giving sense. Husserl’s notion of constitution
should perhaps be thought as a kind of setting out or “positing”
(,Setzung), as a giving of sense, “sense-bestowing” (Sinngebung).
(IP 164-5)
Or as Levinas put it, the “relation of intentionality is nothing like the relations between
real objects. It is essentially the act o f bestowing a meaning (the Sinngebung)” (DEH
59; italics in original).
I should pause to note that the reading of Husserl’s theories of intentionality and
constitution that I have been developing is a contentious one, tending to portray his
understanding of constitution as more idealist in nature than many of his supporters
would accept. For instance, Zahavi (citing Heidegger in support), argues against
idealist interpretations of constitution and instead suggests that we should rather regard
constitution as a way of letting objects show themselves as what they are:
Constitution must be understood as a process that allows for
manifestation and signification, that is, it must be understood as a
process that permits that which is constituted to appear, unfold,
articulate, and show itself as what it is. As Heidegger was to
observe: “ ‘Constituting’ does not mean producing in the sense of
making and fabricating; it means letting the entity be seen in its
objectivity” (HP 73; italics in original)
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However, there is room for interpretive disagreement here. Even though Moran himself
does not support an idealist reading of the notion of constitution, he nonetheless points
out that Husserl “does actually speak of transcendental consciousness giving both
meaning and being to the world, but ‘being’ here means the manner in which beings
appear to consciousness, being-for-us as opposed to being-in-itself (terms Husserl
himself employs)” (IP 165). Summarizing his own positive and supposedly non-idealist
interpretation, Moran writes:
Husserl’s stress on constitution does not rule out the recognition
of the facticity of the world, and the manner in which contents
appear in consciousness over which it has no control.
Constitution includes a kind of passive construction of all the
meanings found in consciousness. Rather the whole object as
such is experience as given from the world. (IP 166)
It is unclear to me how far this actually differs from an idealist reading of Husserl: after
all, even an idealist understanding of constitution would acknowledge that external
objects are experienced “as given from the world,” as Moran puts it. “Facticity” might
simply be a meaning objective reality has for us, rather than in itself. But any attempt at
reaching a definitive interpretation of the Husserlian concept of constitution is far
beyond the scope of this study. As Zahavi says, Husserl himself “never gave a clear-cut
answer to the question of whether constitution is to be understood as a creation or a
restoration of reality,” and thus “one of the recurrent problems in Husserl research has
been the question of how exactly to understand Husserl’s notion of constitution,
particularly in its implications for the discussion between realism and idealism” (HP
72). If I have chosen to emphasize the idealist way of reading Husserl’s theory of

247

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

mental life, I have done so not only because I tend to find it persuasive, but more
importantly, because it is clearly the view taken by Levinas, and it is this interpretation
of Husserl that fundamentally determined the development and eventual shape of his
own later phenomenology of the face.
According to Levinas’ reading of Husserl, that is, intentional consciousness
cannot help but understand the Other according to terms originating in what Levinas
calls the Same (that is, the constituting “primordial sphere” of the monadic
transcendental ego).

1fK)

Thus, when I perceive another person, I constitute him or her in

my mind as a kind of alter ego: in other words, a different me (somewhat like
Augustine’s analogical inference to the existence of other minds). Intentionality, as
Levinas put it, is “essentially the act of bestowing a meaning (the Sinngebung).” That
which is truly Other than the Same, by definition absolutely—or as Levinas liked to say,
“infinitely”—exterior to it, by being made the intentional object of the consciousness of
the self, is reduced to a mere structural moment in the closed conceptual totality that
characterizes the essentially monadic consciousness of the transcendental ego: hence the
antinomic terms that make up the title of one of Levinas’ major texts, Totality and
Infinity. In this difficult work, Levinas would defend the ethical claims of the infinitely
Other against the encroachments of all forms of theoretical (that is, intentional)
totalization.

109 On Husserl’s use of the Leibnizian term “monad,” Dermot Moran writes: ‘T he ‘monad’ is Husserl’s
name for the whole concrete conscious life of an ego taken as the full set of all its intentional experiences,
both actual and possible (CM § 33, 68; Hua 1 102). It is the complete draft of a life as it were. Husserl
speaks of ‘monadisation’ of the transcendental ego and of the self as a ‘monad with windows’” (Moran
174).

248

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Obviously, Levinas believes that it is somehow possible to come into actual
contact with radical alterity, otherwise the complaints he levels against the
phenomenological tradition would remain purely formal and empty. A form of
“alterity,” however conceivable, that had no role in our lived experience—that was
simply an abstract idea—could exercise no obligatory force upon us and should
therefore have no bearing on our ethical thought or conduct. But Levinas insists that we
can indeed experience (and not simply think about or imagine) absolute alterity, and he
argues that the “infinitude” defining the otherness of the other can be directly sensed in
the appearance of his or her face: “the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the
face of the Other” (T I24). Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that the radical
alterity Levinas speaks of could only be “experienced” and not ever faithfully “thought”
in the first place, since any “idea” of the other would already be an objectified ideality,
a concept (and therefore absorbed into the totality of the Same). But if alterity can
somehow be directly experienced, how do we “see” this “gleam” of the face, since
Levinas appears to accept the idealist findings of phenomenology, from which it
follows that “in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of
the object” (TI 194)? In other words, like all forms of consciousness and thought,
perception is intentional in nature, and works by synthesizing together various
perspectivally given adumbrations of perceptual objects into cognitive unities (“The
identity of a unity across multiplicity represents the fundamental event of all thought.
For Husserl, to think is to identify,” notes Levinas [DEH 59]). Because the face of the
other, when approached in an ethical manner, cannot (according to Levinas’ definition)
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be intended like any ordinary object of cognition, whatever epiphanic “vision” we
might have of the other’s face must therefore be highly peculiar.
In his preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas summarizes as follows the
paradoxical phenomenology of “vision” (which he tellingly associates with
eschatoiogy) that informs his understanding of the face-to-face relation:
The first “vision” of eschatoiogy (hereby distinguished from the
revealed opinions of positive religions) reveals the very
possibility of eschatoiogy, that is, the breach of the totality, the
possibility of a signification without a context. The experience of
morality does not proceed from this vision—it consummates this
vision; ethics is an optics. But it is a “vision” without image,
bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of
vision... (TI 23, italics in original)
“Ethics is an optics,” we are told, but the “vision” of the other’s face that opens, indeed
“consummates,” the ethical relation between two persons is perceptually empty:
“without image.” That is to say, the face of the other, when seen aright, is not seen at
all. The face-to-face encounter has nothing to do with perception (facial or otherwise),
and indeed Levinas repeatedly associates sensory perception with epistemological
violation: vision is “totalizing” and “objectifying,” as he puts it here. In other words,
Levinas’ ethics of the face is essentially iconoclastic: as with the face of God in the
Hebrew Bible, one respects the otherness of the Other by refusing to draw it into the
field of representation. But Levinas’ phenomenological understanding of the reach of
representation is wide indeed: “all mental life participates in representation,” as he
wrote in one of his essays on Husserl (DEH 59; emphasis added). Therefore, according
to his own iconoclastic logic, the unrepresented and ethically unrepresentable otherness
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of the Other must lie outside the bounds of cognition (“mental life”) as a whole. If
Levinas nonetheless insists that ethical contact with the Other is possible, it can only be
so beyond perception, intentionality, and thus thought itself. No wonder he thought of
the epiphany of the face as a kind of eschatological vision: to take Levinas’ notion of
the face seriously is to entertain the possibility of a revelation beyond the scope of
philosophy, reason and even thought as such.
And yet he did not want to see himself as having abandoned philosophy for
religion: as is well known, he repeatedly insisted on a strict difference in his writings
between his philosophical reflections and his Talmudic interpretations. Levinas argued
that he had discovered a philosophical explanation for how we can sense the alterity of
the other person in Husserl’s various writings on time-consciousness, particularly in the
concept of the primal impression (Urimpression) that plays such an important role in
Husserl’s analyses of the experience of time. That is, Levinas believed he had
discovered within Husserl’s own philosophical system a description of an experience
that exploded the egological bias of phenomenology. In finding such rich conceptual
possibilities in Husserl’s writings on time-consciousness, Levinas was far from alone:
Heidegger before him, and Derrida after, are just two of the many phenomenologically
oriented thinkers who based their own original philosophies upon what they believed
were untapped conceptual possibilities latent in Husserl’s probing reflections on time.
The distinguished Husserl scholar Rudolf Bemet notes the irony of this philosophical
legacy:
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It is almost as if the Husserlian descriptions of the experience of
time contained within themselves the seeds of a surpassing of the
philosophical framework in which Husserl had inserted them.
We are then confronted with the paradox whereby an analysis of
time that was to have provided a foundation for a phenomenology
of an egological transcendental consciousness constitutive of
objects by justifying their epistemological validity also retains a
large part of its value in an ontological phenomenology of Dasein
or in an ethical phenomenology of the other person who appears
in the form of the ‘face’ or the ‘appeal’. (CCL 82)li0
But what philosophical and ethical possibilities did Levinas in particular discern in
Husserl’s writings on time-consciousness, especially in his conception of the primal
impression? In order to understand and evaluate Levinas’ challenging reading of
Husserl’s already dense reflections on time-consciousness, however, I think it would be
helpful to first sketch out the basic outlines of Husserl’s own views.
Like many of his fellow modems (such as William James and Henri Bergson),
Husserl considered constitutive consciousness to be temporal in nature: consciousness,
as he liked to say, is a constantly streaming flux (Fluss). According to Husserl, every
phase of consciousness has a tripartite temporal structure: (1) the primal impression (our
consciousness of the now-moment), (2) a retentional moment (the continuing presence
in consciousness of a prior now-moment), and (3) a protentional moment (the present
expectation or anticipation of a now-moment yet to come). Though these three
“moments” can be theoretically distinguished, they are actually inextricably woven
together in each lived phase of consciousness. The constantly streaming present, past
and future are all aspects of a single present, or as Dan Zahavi aptly puts it, Husserl

li0 The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Eds. Simon Critchley and Robert Bemasconi (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002). References to this text will be parenthetically cited as CCL.
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insists on “the width of presence” (HP 82; my emphasis). That is to say, the temporal
present is not punctual In nature. We can therefore perceive temporal objects, such as
musical melodies, because “consciousness Is not caught in the now,” contrary to the
view' of thinkers like Brentano, who argued that we can indeed immediately “perceive”
each punctual now-moment but can only imagine the immediate past and future.
Husserl, arguing against Brentano’s position, held that consciousness is clearly able to
directly perceive—as an essential part of a “thick” present—notes that have faded into
the past as well as anticipate notes that will come in the near future. As Bemet
explains:
It is not for no reason that Husserl speaks of the ‘flux’ (Fluss) of
consciousness. The rhythm of this flux is articulated by the
emergence of a new intentional act succeeding the previous one,
which is thus pushed into the past. In most cases, this new act is
not without links to the previous act; it was already present in the
form of an anticipated future before being effectively realized in
the present. And what is true of the act in its temporal duration is
equally true of each instant within this duration: consciousness of
the present is always intertwined with consciousness of the past
and of the future, and this is the very reason why consciousness is
a flux and not a succession of separate punctual instants. (CCL
84)
It is within the context of such a tripartite temporal horizon that objects which endure in
time are intended and constituted as cognitive unities. Indeed, absent this temporal
horizon, we would only be able to experience a series of disconnected and punctual
“nows.” Even the simple visual perception of physical objects, such as tables, can only
be accomplished because the synthesizing powers of consciousness, which work by
uniting various perspectival views of an object, are not limited to the disjointed
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perception of punctual “snapshots.” Object-constitution, that is, presupposes that
consciousness can reach through, and synthesize together, individual appearances and
perceptual acts extended in a temporal manifold. Thus, as Zahavi notes, “temporality
must be regarded as the formal condition of possibility for the constitution of any
objects,” indicating one reason for the immense importance Husserl attributed to his
analyses of time-consciousness (HP 80).
What Husserl came to realize, however, is that not only are transcendent objects
(such as melodies) constituted in a temporal fashion, but that our consciousness of our
own subjective awareness of these objects (the experience of the hearing of the melody,
for instance) is temporally constituted as well. As Zahavi explains: “Our acts and
experiences are themselves temporal unities which arise, persist, and perish. They are
also constituted in a network of primal impressional, retentional, and protentional
intentions, and are only given, only self-aware within this framework” (HP 85).
Therefore, we are aware not only that a melody we have just heard “ages” or “fades”
with the passing of time, but that the various subjective acts that constituted our
awareness of the melody also age with the temporal streaming that characterizes our
mental life (once the melody has passed, we don’t simply “remember” the melody
itself, but our awareness of the actual experience of aural perception palpably fades too
with the passage of time). As Husserl puts it: “Hence the flow of consciousness
obviously becomes constituted in consciousness as a unity too. The unity of a toneduration, for example, becomes constituted in the flow, but the flow itself becomes
constituted in turn as the unity of the consciousness of the tone-duration” (EH 216).
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Husserl thus found it necessary not only to analyze the experience of time that underlies
our constitution of objects, but also the experience of time that underlies the self
givenness (or self-constitution) of subjectivity itself.
Yet, Husserl discovered that he could not simply explain the temporal
constitution of subjective acts of awareness in the same way that he had explained the
constitution of transcendent temporal objects, for this would lead to an infinite
explanatory regress. Consciousness, that is, cannot be temporally constituted in the
very same way as transcendent temporal objects (such as melodies) unless something
stands to our constituting-consciousness as our constituting-consciousness stands to the
temporal objects, in which case we would then have to ask what constitutes that which
constitutes our consciousness (and so on and so forth). In order to block the possibility
of this kind of dizzying conceptual regress, Husserl felt compelled to posit an absolute
consciousness that stands outside the constituted stream of time itself; in fact, Husserl
concluded that this absolute consciousness is itself the origin of the temporal stream of
constituting-consciousness in the first place. It is worth reading the following gloss by
Zahavi, who explains this difficult idea with characteristic clarity:
The first and decisive point to make is that our consciousness of
that which is given in constituted time... is not itself given in the
same kind of time, since this would lead to an infinite regress. If
time-constituting consciousness were itself given in constituted
time, it would be necessary to posit yet another higher-order
time-constituting consciousness, and so forth. It is for this reason
that Husserl denies that the time-constituting consciousness, the
absolute stream as he also calls it, is simultaneous with that
which is temporally constituted. To speak of simultaneity is to
posit a common temporal denominator, which is exactly what has
to be avoided. The stream is not influenced by temporal change;
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it does not arise or perish in objective time, nor does it endure
like a temporal object. Occasionally, Husserl will speak of the
stream as if it were atemporal or supratemporal, but this should
not be misunderstood. The stream is atemporal in the sense of
not being in time, but it is not atemporal in the sense of lacking
any reference to time. On the contrary, the stream is always
present, and this standing now (nunc stans) of the stream is itself
a kind of temporality. (HP 86-7)
What Levinas found profoundly suggestive in Husserl’s writings on time-consciousness
is that Husserl placed at the origin of this streaming absolute consciousness a primal
impression (Urimpressiori) which, because it is somehow “prior” to the constitution of
inner time as such, is not itself an object of an intentional relation (as we noted earlier,
intentionality presupposes a temporal horizon). Emerging at what Husserl terms the
“originary source point” (Urquellpunkt) of absolute consciousness, the primal
impression thus occupies a somewhat odd and anomalous position in the
phenomenological system: without it, there can be no intentional consciousness, and yet
the Urimpression itself cannot be intended and thus is not a phenomenal part of the
consciousness to which it gives rise. Remarkably, Husserl felt compelled to found
phenomenology itself (conceived of as purely descriptive) upon a conceptual item that
was explicitly non-phenomenal and thus beyond description (it is surely worth asking
whether the very positing of an Urimpression does not violate Husserl’s “principle of
principles,” thus undermining the foundation of his entire theoretical edifice, but that is
a question that will have to be left for another day). Husserl explained that this
Urimpression could be intended only once it had been “pushed” into the retentional past
by the emergence of a new Urimpression, thereby giving rise to the possibility of both
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inner time and self-consciousness; prior to that elapsing, however, the primal
impression is strictly beyond the reach of objectifying intentionality (i.e. consciousness
as a whole).
The role of the Urimpression at the atemporal origin of absolute consciousness,
Levinas argued, showed that “consciousness is delayed in relation to itself’ (DEH 144):
Husserl himself had expressed a similar thought when he wrote that, “We therefore owe
it to retention that consciousness can be made into an object” (EH 220). In Husserl’s
Urimpression (Levinas calls It the “proto-impression”), Levinas claimed to have found,
at the very origin of phenomenological subjectivity, a phenomenon that was irreducible
to the subject-object dichotomy that characterized the objectifying intentionality of
subjective mental life. In the Urimpression, Levinas argued, “perceived and perceiver
are simultaneous,” and thus the “proto-impression alone is pure of all ideality” (DEH
144). If, as Levinas argued, the meaning or sense of all intentional objects are
idealistically bestowed by the consciousness that intends them, then at least in this
proto-impression he had found a “phenomenon” (which he would term the face
[visage]) that transcended (even if only “momentarily”) the violent reach of the
meaning bestowal (Sinngebung) of intentionality. It is worth noting that so much, and
no more, is justified by Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness: that is, Husserl shows
us that at the origin of absolute consciousness is a phenomenon that lies outside the
bounds of consciousness and intentionality, period. But precisely because this
“phenomenon” lies beyond the reach of intentionality (and therefore mental life as a
whole), we cannot justifiably make any substantive claims about it, let alone on its
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behalf. As we already know, however, Levinas insists on pushing the matter much
farther than this logical limit, reading the proto-impression in a heterological light as the
ethical contact of the self with an absolute exteriority: indeed, it is his heterological
reading of Husserl’s Urimpression that leads Levinas to feel phenomenologically
justified in claiming that one can be touched by the alterity of the Other person in a way
that escapes the objectifying nature of perception and intentionality. When he suggests
that we can sense the “gleam” of exteriority and infinitude in the face of the Other, it is
the non-intentional experience of the proto-impression that Levinas has in mind. Prior
to cognition, prior even to the emergence of subjectivity as such, Levinas declares that
we are always already in relation to the infinitely Other, who can therefore hold us
infinitely responsible because the very constitution of our own transcendental
subjectivity is based on an originary contact with the Other’s face: thus, “the face opens
the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation” (TI 201). Beyond the reach of
reason, the face therefore also cannot be touched by the judgements of logic: “The
presentation of the face is not true, for the true refers to the non-true, its eternal
contemporary, and ineluctably meets with the smile and the silence of the skeptic. The
presentation of being in the face does not leave any logical space for its contradictory”
(TI 201). By placing the “vision” of the face far beyond the grasp of reason, Levinas
appears to believe he has guaranteed the ethics it is said to “consummate” an absolute
certainty completely immune to skeptical challenge. The first sentence of the preface to
Totality and Infinity seems to invoke the genealogical spirit of Nietzsche: “Everyone
will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped
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by morality” (TI 21). Because it is neither true nor non-true, the Urimpression would,
Levinas appears to hope, preserve his ethics of the face from the ravages of a
Nietzschean critique.
Bemet, however, has tactfully rioted the obvious fact that there is no reason to
assume that Husserl’s Urimpression has anything to do with another person. It does not
even follow from Husserl’s analyses, he goes on to say, that this primary impression
must even originate from outside the self at all: it could very well be the result of a kind
of auto-affection. In Bemet’s own words:
One hardly need point out, however, that this form of alterity
which is constitutive of the originary impression is not yet the
alterity of another man or woman for whom I might feel
responsible. There is nothing in Husserl that would permit us to
conclude that it is another subject that affects me in this originary
impression [Urimpression]. Even if we were to extrapolate from
the letter of Husserl’s texts and admit that originary impression is
indeed the experience of a hetero-affection, and not an auto
affection, it would still need to be established that this initial form
of temporal hetero-affection maintained an essential link with the
traumatic hetero-affection by the suffering of the other person.
(CCL 91)
Bemet’s understated and respectful, but I think devastating, criticism of Levinas’
elaboration of Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness makes clear that by making
recourse to a conceptual item (the Urimpression) that, by definition, lies outside the
sphere of the conceptual, Levinas is basing his ethics upon a kind of bare X about which
we can say nothing with good reason. Even if we accept Levinas’ argument about the
sheer possibility of an experience of radical alterity, there is no reason at all for us to
accept his ethical claims on behalf of that “brute” non-conceptual Other. By feeling
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compelled to place the face of the Other outside of the field of meaning in order to save
it from the supposedly violent intentionality of thought, Levinas has reduced the Other
to an empty and strictly meaningless philosophical construct (ironically, Levinas
appears to have saved the Other from the reach of theory by identifying the Other with a
theoretical posit). When understood this way, Levinas’ rhetorical recourse to the
religious concepts of epiphany and eschatoiogy appears both telling and unsurprising:
having placed the face-to-face relation outside the bounds of reason, anything
substantive he nonetheless goes on to assert about this rigorously non-rational relation is
bound to have the ring of a religious experience. What, after all, can we meaningfully
say about an intersubjective experience that cannot, by definition, be an object of
thought? Therefore, despite his repeated protestations to the contrary, Levinas’
iconoclastic approach to the face forces us to leave the field of philosophy and find
moral refuge in the dictates of religion.
The problem, however, lies not so much with Levinas’ paradoxical findings (as
logically unacceptable as they now appear to be), but in the philosophical compulsion
that originally drove him to search them out. That is, I would argue that it was by
assuming that consciousness is inherently imperialistic (enveloping others in nets of
meaning woven by the self), that he created a situation for which there was no other
solution than the iconoclastic one he eventually resorted to. For there is, according to
Levinas’ strict phenomenological understanding of intentionality, no way to relate to the
Other (even perceptually) without betraying his or her alterity. The only way to respect
the other’s face is therefore, we might say, to turn one’s own away. But was he not
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driven to associate consciousness with an inability to relate ethically to the Other only
because he accepted the solipsistic Cartesian starting point bequeathed to him by the
idealist methodology of his teacher, Husserl? If the very fact of consciousness in fact
cuts us off as radically from one another as Levinas’ phenomenological understanding
of intentionality would suggest, his iconoclastic solution, however extreme it might
seem, could very well still compel theoretical consent; after all, what other way could
we then imagine the possibility of relating to other people if each of us is truly trapped
in his or her own monadic consciousness? But, as we have argued all along, this picture
of mental life is false. The problem, therefore, is not his paradoxical solution, but the
Cartesian picture of mind that underlies it.
*

*

In this closing section, I would like to propose an alternative to Levinas’
iconoclastic ethics, one which also sees a deep analogy between morality and the way
we respond to the human countenance, but which follows Wittgenstein in
acknowledging—by taking at face value—the meaningfuiness of the face’s appearance.
However, I will arrive at my positive argument somewhat indirectly, for in order to
explain the motivation for, as well as to develop, this alternative conception of moral
values, I will need to consider the historical roots of some characteristic features of our
philosophical modernity: especially the interrelated conceptual distinctions between
facts and values, subjects and objects, and reason and mechanism. I will begin by
considering some of the historical developments that originally led to the modem
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rupture between subject and object, a major problem for modem thought, which
Husserl’s theory of intentionality was designed to resolve.
Few ideas have had as immense an impact on the development of twentiethcentury philosophy as did Husserl’s notion of intentionality, though the directions this
idea was taken in have been quite various: just think, for example, of the very different
roles of the concept of intentionality in the writings of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,
Sartre, Levinas, Searle, Derrida, Marion, Taylor, Dennett and Dreyfus. Perhaps the
most important reason for the philosophical importance of the idea of intentionality is
that it appeared to offer an elegant way of healing the characteristically modem—that
is, post-Cartesian—rift between subject and object. After Descartes’ postulation of a
radical separation between “thinking” and “extended” matter, it became a difficult
conceptual problem to explain how the subject or “cogito” could ever accurately know
anything about the objective world from which it was absolutely distinguished (thus the
branch of philosophy known as epistemology came to assume unprecedented
importance in this new post-Cartesian philosophical world). Prior to Descartes,
meanings were understood to inhere in a Ideologically structured nature: the logos, that
is, was still woven into the substance of the cosmos. The “material universe,” as
Charles Taylor puts it, was regarded “as a kind of medium, in which psychic contents
like heat and pain, or the supposed Forms or Species of scholastic tradition, could be
lodged or embodied or manifest themselves” (SoS 146). The perception of meaning,
according to this expressive—or, following Weber, “enchanted”—conception of nature,
was therefore unproblematic: meaning, that is, was something that might simply be
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perceived. The meaning of the natural world was, we might say, self-diselosive: one
simply needed to look in order to understand. But against this pre-modem view,
Galileo and his contemporaries (Descartes included), argued that the materia! universe
should be understood mechanistically: as Galileo famously put it, the natural world is
“written in the language of mathematics,” thereby memorably expressing the new' antiAristotelian view of nature that would drive the scientific revolution. The law-governed
regularities of cause and effect, rather than teleology, would from then on constitute the
kind of intelligibility proper to the natural world. However, our first-person experience
of thinking feels free, and our thoughts seem accountable only to the justificatory
structures of rationality, and therefore do not seem reducible to the causal processes of
the space of nature (our brains included), which is why Descartes quite reasonably
argued that mind cannot be identified with the body. But his substance dualism left it
mysteriously unclear how body and mind can then ever interact, such that sensations
might affect the mind and the mind move the body: as we noted earlier, his eventual
postulation of the pineal gland as the point of mind-body interaction was hardly a
satisfactory resolution of this conceptual difficulty.
Descartes, therefore, had rescued thought from the reductive net of efficient
causation, yet at the price of making the mind a radically private thing, setting the stage
for much of the drama of modem philosophy to come, A key recurring element of that
drama was the repeated investigation of how the subject could ever come to have
knowledge about anything outside itself (not simply other “subjects,” but even the most
basic elements of objective nature, such as quantity and extension). The Platonic Ideas,
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once inhabiting a transcendent realm of Forms, were now stripped from that
supernatural pedestal and turned into intra-mental entities: ideas (we still use the same
word) are in our heads, as we would now say. Knowledge, then, became conceived of
as the creation of “representations” in the mind that, when true, map accurately onto
features of the external world. As Taylor describes this momentous transformation:
A representation of reality now has to be constructed. As the
notion of ‘idea’ migrates from its ontic sense to apply henceforth
to intra-psychic contents, to things ‘in the mind,’ so the order of
ideas ceases to be something we find and becomes something we
build. (SoS 144; italics in original)
Philosophers would from then on frequently take it for granted that a mind (understood
as rational) can have no other source of knowledge about objective reality than by
means of constructed representations of an external world (understood as mechanistic).
As Wilfrid Sellars explained this conceptual dichotomy in his classic essay,
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” on the one hand we have a logical space of
nature (structured by the laws of causality) and on the other, a logical space of reasons
(structured the laws of rationality).
Because of the binary nature of this basic conceptual picture, modem philosophy
(as John McDowell has forcefully argued) has compulsively oscillated between two
equally untenable pictures of the way mind relates to world: empiricism and
coherentism. According to the empiricist, knowledge can only count as knowledge if it
is answerable to the world which it purports to represent. McDowell explains the
importance of the idea of answerability to the empiricist as follows:
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Now how should we elaborate the idea that our thinking is thus
answerable to the world? In addressing this question, we might
restrict our attention, at least tacitly, to thinking that is
answerable to the empirical world; that is, answerable to how
things are in so far as how things are is empirically accessible.
Even if we take it that answerability to how things are includes
more than answerability to the empirical world, it nevertheless
seems right to say this: since our cognitive predicament is that we
confront the world by way of sensible intuition (to put it in
Kantian terms), our reflection on the very idea of thought’s
directedness at how things are must begin with answerability to
the empirical world. And now, how can we understand the idea
that our thinking is answerable to the empirical world, if not by
way of the idea that our thinking is answerable to experience?
How could a verdict from the empirical world—to which
empirical thinking must be answerable if it is to be thinking at
all—be delivered, if not by way of a verdict from (as W.V. Quine
puts it) “the tribunal of experience”?111 (MW xii)
And therefore, at the far reaches of our cognitive access to the world (the place where
mind “experiences” the world, if you like), thought must ultimately touch upon, and
thereby be answerable to, some kind of pre-conceptual “Given.” It is because this brute
Given lies outside the sphere of the conceptual that our concepts can be answerable to
it, according to the empiricist. Otherwise, there would be no way of determining
whether our thoughts about the world are true or false: we could conceivably think
anything we like! Empirical experience, as Quine put it, serves as a “tribunal” that has
the power to declare a “verdict” upon our thoughts. One way of picturing this
epistemological transaction is by considering the idea of sensory impressions: according
to the empiricist view, impressions or impacts from the space of nature (outside the

111 The famous quotation from Quine is from “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in W.V. Quine, From a
Logical Point o f View (Harvard Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 20-46, p. 41.
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reaim of the conceptual) are what ultimately ground and justify our beliefs (in the space
of reasons) about the external world.
But Sellars saw this is a radically incoherent picture of the nature of human
knowledge, for it confuses “happenings” in the space of nature with “justifications” in
the space of reasons. Happenings in the space of nature, that is, are governed by
efficient causation: they are written, as Galileo would have put it, in the “language of
mathematics.” The logical space of reasons, however, is structured by normative
relations such as “one thing’s being warranted, or—for the general case—correct, in the
light of another” (MW xv). As McDowell summarizes Sellars’ negative point:
“whatever the relations are that constitute the logical space of nature, they are different
in kind from the normative relations that constitute the space of reasons” (MW xv). Put
differently, Sellars writes: “In characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing,
we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in
the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (cited
in MW xiv). Experience as conceived of by the empiricist, that is, cannot serve as a
tribunal upon our conceptualizations (at best the notion of a pre-conceptual Given might
provide an exculpation for those beliefs we continue to hold anyway: “The trouble with
the Myth of the Given,” writes McDowell, “is that it offers us at best exculpations
where we wanted justification” [MW 13]). Which is just to say that nothing outside the
realm of the conceptual can justify or invalidate that which lies within the realm of the
conceptual. This argument about the incoherence of the idea of a brute Given, it should
be noted, applies just as much to the inner psychological realm as it does to the realm of
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external perception. Indeed, McDowell reads Wittgenstein’s “private language
argument” precisely as an attack on the idea that non-conceptual entities of any kind can
ground our understanding of mental state terms (such as the concept of pain). As he
explains:
... the main point of the conception Wittgenstein attacks is to
claim that “judgements of inner sense” are ultimately grounded
on bare presences, rather than to devise a way to put the bare
presences into words. If someone in the grip of the [private
language] conception was convinced by an argument that
language could not embrace the supposed items she insists on,
she might reply that that is really just her point. If language
could embrace them, that would mean they were within the
conceptual sphere, and the point of acknowledging them is to
acknowledge something that constrains spontaneity, which
moves within that sphere, from outside. So certainly language
cannot capture them; but still, it can seem necessary to insist,
they are there to be pointed to as the ultimate justifications for
judgements of “inner sense.” The fundamental thrust of
Wittgenstein’s attack is not to eliminate the idea of a private
language, which by itself would merely push the line of thought
that he opposes to this point. Wittgenstein’s attack undermines
even this position, which has already given up the idea of a
private language, by applying the more general moral: a bare
presence cannot be a ground for anything. (MW 19)
The idea of a brute given, which Sellars liked to call a mythological construct, “cannot
be a ground for anything,” whether we are thinking of introspection or external-world
perception.
On the other hand, those philosophers that McDowell labels coherentists share
with empiricists the modem belief that there is a radical distinction between the rational
mind and mechanistic world, yet they have come to appreciate the unworkability of the
idea of the “given” that underlies empiricist epistemology and so have felt compelled to
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renounce the concept of empirical “experience” entirely. McDowell portrays Davidson
as an exemplary coherentist (unfairly so, I think, but that is unimportant for our
immediate concerns, since it is the basic outlines of coherentisirs in general that are at
stake), and he characterizes Davidson’s position this way:
... Davidson thinks experience can be nothing but an extraconceptual impact on sensibility. So he concludes that
experience must be outside the space of reasons. According to
Davidson, experience is causally relevant to a subject’s beliefs
and judgements, but it has no bearing on their status as justified
or warranted. Davidson says that “nothing can count as a reason
for holding a belief except another belief,” and he means in
particular that experience cannot count as a reason for holding a
belief. (MW 14)
McDowell agrees with Davidson’s assessment of the unintelligibility of empiricism’s
recourse to a notion of a brute given (i.e. sensory impacts) for the purposes of
epistemological justification, yet McDowell worries that Davidson’s solution produces
a picture of rationality that is equally unworkable since it is unconstrained from outside
itself: Davidson, that is, offers a picture of concepts as spinning in a frictionless void.
This latter picture, as McDowell notes, is just what gives empiricism its allure in the
first place, for it is an essential element of our understanding of thought as such that it
be answerable to how the world is, not simply accountable to other beliefs we may have
about the “world” as it is represented in our thoughts alone. Coherentism, in other
words, invites a philosophical recoil back to empiricism:
Davidson’s picture depicts our empirical thinking as engaged in
with no rational constraint, but only causal influence, from
outside. This just raises a worry as to whether the picture can
accommodate the sort of bearing on reality that empirical content
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amounts to, and that is just the kind of worry that can make an
appeal to the Given seem necessary. (MW 14)
The problem with the coherentist alternative to empiricism, McDowell argues, is that it
does not adequately appreciate, and therefore does not address, the fundamental
motivation for empiricism, which is a perfectly reasonable desire that our knowledge be
answerable to a real world, and not merely reflect the structure of our own thoughts.
Coherentism, that is, finds that the idea of an epistemologically grounding Given is
unintelligible, jettisons that concept, and acts as if a nettlesome philosophical problem
had been definitively resolved. The coherentist solution, however, will inevitably leave
us dissatisfied (since it is at odds with our very understanding of what thought and
knowledge are in the first place) and philosophy will therefore continue to suffer from a
conceptual pendulum swing from one untenable position to the other.
In Mind and World, McDowell observes that as long as we hold on to the
modem belief that mind is rational and nature entirely mechanistic, we will continue to
oscillate between these two positions. It is this characteristically modem dichotomy
between reason and mechanism, he believes, that underlies the philosophical oscillation
he hopes to put to rest: that is, the idea of the “given” makes sense, and acquires its
theoretical allure, only because we are under the sway of a post-Galilean scientific
worldview. He therefore argues that we can hold on to the two equally compelling
ideas (1) that the normative structure of rationality is sui generis when judged against
the law-govemed interactions of the space of nature and (2) that our thoughts are
answerable to our experience of how the world truly is, only if we let go of the radically
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disenchanted view of nature as wholly mechanistic which was bequeathed to us by
Galileo and the modem scientific revolution (a theoretical position that he labels “bald
naturalism”). What the scientific image of nature—nature as governed wholly by the
laws of efficient causation—leaves out is the fact that for humans, nature includes a
conceptually saturated second nature: “Human beings acquire a second nature in part by
being initiated into conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the logical
space of reasons” (MW xx). In other words, our phenomenological experience of the
world is not of a causal law-governed “environment” but of a world that is infused with
the concepts of whatever culture we are raised in, a maturation process of cognitive
development and socialization succinctly captured by the German notion of bildung.
Therefore, experience need not be solely equated with the causal impacts of brute
givens (as Sellars was right to argue, the idea of the Given is indeed a myth), but can be
understood as our phenomenological openness to a world thoroughly imbued with
conceptual meaning, at least as long as we have been provided with a “good enough”
upbringing and enculturation. As McDowell explains:
Once we remember second nature, we see that operations of nature
can include circumstances whose descriptions place them in the
logical space of reasons, sui generis though that logical space is.
This makes it possible to accommodate impressions in nature
without posing a threat to empiricism. From the thesis that
receiving an impression is a transaction in nature, there is now no
good inference to the conclusion drawn by Sellars and Davidson,
that the idea of receiving an impression must be foreign to the
logical space in which concepts such as that of answerability
function. Conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the
sui generis logical space of reasons, can be operative not only in
judgements—results of a subject’s actively making up her mind
about something—but already in the transactions in nature that are
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constituted by the world’s impacts on the receptive capacities of a
suitable subject; that is, one who possesses the relevant concepts.
Impressions can be cases of its perceptually appearing—being
apparent—to a subject that things are thus and so. In receiving
impressions, a subject can be open to the way things manifestly are.
(MW xx; italics in original)
It follows from McDowell’s conception of second nature that when we see that
something is “thus and so”, we have good reason to believe that things are “thus and
so”: “That things are thus and so,” writes McDowell, “is the conceptual content of an
experience, but if the subject of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that
things are thus and so, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world”
(MW 26; italics in original). Or as Wittgenstein put it in the Investigations, in a passage
that McDowell cites in support of his position: “When we say, and mean, that such-andsuch is the case, we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we
mean: this—is—so” (PI §95, cited in MW 27; italics in original).
Suggestively, McDowell finds the closest analogue in the philosophical tradition
to his notion of second nature in Aristotle’s writings on ethics. Attempting to explain
the kind of rational-and-perceptual capacities that allow us to directly see meaning in
the world, McDowell argues that we should take as a model for this type of rational
recognition the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, which is usually translated as
“practical wisdom.” The person of virtuous character in Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics is one who, through proper upbringing, has been sensitized to the demands of
reason in the world:
For Aristotle, virtue of character in the strict sense is distinct
from a merely habitual propensity to act in ways that match what
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virtue would require. Virtue of character properly so called
includes a specifically shaped state of the practical intellect:
“practical wisdom,” in the standard English translation. This is a
responsiveness to some of the demands of reason (though that is
not Aristotle’s way of putting it). The picture is that ethics
involves requirements of reason that are there whether we know
it or not, and our eyes are opened to them by the acquisition of
“practical wisdom.” So “practical wisdom” is the right sort of
thing to serve as a model for the understanding, the faculty that
enables us to recognize and create the kind of intelligibility that is
a matter of placement in the space of reason. (MW 79)112
McDowell clearly means “practical wisdom” (phronesis) to serve as a general model for
understanding of all kinds, not strictly ethical understanding: he is trying to elaborate
the concept of “second nature” as a whole, not simply those aspects of it relevant to our
grasp of ethical values. But by taking the Aristotelian notion of phronesis as a model
for how we can directly recognize (by analogy to visual perception) the claims of reason
in the world, McDowell’s argument suggests how we might make intelligible (and
therefore accept) a perfectly ordinary aspect of the phenomenology of moral evaluation:
the everyday fact that moral values that we perceive as features of the layout or
disposition of persons and events in the world strike us as really there (and do not seem

112 For reference, here is a relevant passage from the Nicomachean Ethics (Terence Irwin, the translator of
the following passage, prefers “intelligence” to “practical wisdom” as an equivalent for phronesis):
“Intelligence [phronesis] is evidently not scientific knowledge [episteme]; for, as we said, it concerns the
last thing [i.e. the particular], since this is what is done in action. Hence it is opposed to understanding
[nous]. For understanding is about the [first] terms, [those] that have no account of them; but intelligence
is about the last thing, an object of perception [aistkesis], not of scientific knowledge [episteme]. This is
not the preception of special objects, but the sort by which we perceive that the last among mathematical
objects is a triangle; for it will stop here too. This is another species [of perception than perception of
special objects]; but it is still perception more than intelligence is” (NE 1142a24-31; bracketed English
text is Irwin’s). From Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985).
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like merely subjective projections).11'1 As Maximilian de Gaynesford explains:
“McDowell is a realist about value, but of a sophisticated or qualified sort. And the
subtlety of his position depends on its appeal to second nature, to those rationalconceptual capacities that subjects and agents naturally have, but because they naturally
acquire them rather than because they are naturally bom with them” (JM 163).
If we witness someone physically harming another person on the sidewalk, we
do not think to ourselves: that’s terrible, but only because I subjectively project upon
this state of affairs an arbitrarily negative moral coloring. The “wrongness” of the
violence strikes us as immediately and quite directly real: as an actual, objective feature
of the events we are witnessing, which anyone who had eyes to see could, and indeed
should, perceive. If a friend who was standing next to us observed the same violence
and expressed indifference to the situation, we would likely fault him or her for not
perceiving a moral wrong: we would feel at that moment that we had discovered
something wrong with our friend, not simply with the situation. If at the grocery store
we witnessed a parent losing control and screaming at a young child (“You idiot!”),
causing the child to wilt and sob before our very eyes, we might sympathize with
whatever frustration caused the parent to lose control (perhaps we notice a broken jar of
jelly on the floor), but still we likely would (and should) perceive the action as simply
wrong. Again, it is not part of the phenomenology of our experience of such a situation
to regard our moral evaluation as a subjective projection upon a state of affairs that

113 For an excellent development of this notion by a student of McDowell’s and Martha Nussbaum’s, see
Bridget Clarke, The Lens o f Character: Aristotle, Murdoch and the Idea o f Moral Perception (Ph.D.
Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2003).
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objectively features no moral qualities. Ethical phenomenology—if it is to be
accepted— shows a world that has value as part of its very fabric.
In Ms Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, I.L. Mackie agrees that the
phenomenology of value shows values (not only moral but aesthetic as well) to be “part
of the fabric of the world” (Mackie 15), which is to say that they strike us as
“objective.” But because, according to Mackie, there is no way to find a place for such
values in a naturalistic ontology, thus rendering them ontologically “queer” as he liked
to put it, our evaluative phenomenology must be in “error”: values may appear real to
us, but that is only an illusion. Facts alone are real, of course. McDowell, however,
notes that Mackie’s argument achieves whatever conceptual force it has by mistakenly
presuming that for a value to be real it must be a “primary quality,” akin to solidity.
Taken this way, it is of course implausible that values are simply there to be seen like
the shape or size of the physical objects that make up the material furniture of our lives.
If we nonetheless insist that values are real, then Mackie would have a point when he
claims that our evaluative phenomenology is erroneous, however compelling that
phenomenology might seem regarded from a first-person perspective.
McDowell, however, argues that we do not need to accept Mackie’s association
of values with primary qualities (which makes them inevitably seem “queer”), and
rather suggests that we regard values as secondary qualities, akin to colors. Here is how
he defines secondary qualities, using the color “red” as an example:
A secondary quality is a property the ascription of which to an
object is not adequately understood except as true, if it is true, in
virtue of the object’s disposition to present a certain sort of
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perceptual appearance: specifically, an appearance
characterizable by using a word for the property itself to say how
the object perceptually appears. Thus an object’s being red is
understood as something that obtains in virtue of the object’s
being such as (in certain circumstances) to look, precisely, red.
(MVR 133)
Colors, like all secondary qualities, are not objective in the way that extension and
quantity are, for the definition of a secondary quality (such as “redness”) is inextricable
from our sense of how an appropriately sensitized subject would perceive a sample of
that color. Redness is not there like an object’s shape or size, but it is there nonetheless.
Secondary properties, that is to say, are “dispositional” in nature. For something to be
red is for it to be such that a properly sensitized person would see it as red. But this is
not to reduce “redness” to a merely subjective property or projection, for a red object is
not red only at those times when it is being observed. It is red (and disposed to be red)
even when no one is looking at it. As McDowell explains:
Secondary-quality experience presents itself as perceptual
awareness of properties genuinely possessed by the objects that
confront one. And there is no general obstacle to taking that
appearance at face value. An object’s being such as to look red is
independent of its actually looking red to anyone on any
particular occasion; so, notwithstanding the conceptual
connection between being red and being experienced as red, an
experience of something as red can count as a case of being
presented with a property that is there anyway - there
independently of the experience itself. (MVR 134)
And thus, redness is a real (though secondary) property of the object itself, and not
merely a subjective projection of a given beholder, though we cannot fully understand
the concept of redness without making reference to appropriately sensitized perceiving
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subjects. As de Gaynesford sums all this up, explicitly extending the analogy from
colors to values conceived of as secondary properties:
Moral and aesthetic properties are of the sort that are not fully
describable or intelligible without reference to the effect they
have on subjects of experience and agents. In that sense, they are
more like the colour- or taste-properties that an object might have
than like those shape- or size-properties it has. All these
properties are objective; but whereas shape- and size-properties
are fully describable and intelligible independently of our
sensitivity to them, colours, tastes and values are not.
This is because colours, tastes and values are a particular kind
of objective property: they are dispositions of objects to appear a
certain way to suitably sensitive observers in suitable
circumstances. An object’s having the colour-property ‘red’, for
example, just is its being such as to look red given these
circumstances. Given the same circumstances, an object’s having
the aesthetic value ‘beautiful’ just is its being such as to appear
beautiful, and a person’s having the ethical value ‘kind’ just is his
being such as to appear kind. So the existence of such properties
depends partly on the existence of beings with the capacity to
observe them and pick them out. (JM 163-4)
McDowell’s development of a secondary-quality construal of values allows him to
acknowledge the dependence of values on the contingent existence of certain forms of
human life (including societies that raise those “beings with the capacity to observe
[certain values] and pick them out”) yet at the same time to accept their reality. That is
to say, like colors values are secondary qualities that are there whether or not a given
individual notices them at a given time; they are real aspects of the world that await
recognition. According to his position, as de Gaynesford explains:
Ethical and aesthetic beliefs and judgements can be true or false.
Ethical and aesthetic properties really exist in the world. These
values are things to which moral agents and aesthetic judges can
be sensitive or insensitive. These values are really there to be
discovered; they are not projected onto the world, willed into
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existence or constituted by emotional reactions. They are distinct
from discrete affective experiences that individuals may or may
not have when confronted with them. They make a real
difference to the situation or individuals that possess or lack
them. (IM 167)
Given McDowell’s reliance on the analogy of value-perception to color-perception, it is
significant that there has been much dispute (and not simply in reference to his writings)
about whether or not colors themselves should be understood in a dispositional
manner.114 Perhaps, as some, like Locke, have maintained, the phenomenology of color
is itself simply illusory: Mackie, unsurprisingly, goes in for this very position. Others,
taking a physicalist line, argue that color is simply “the property of selectively reflecting
incident light at certain wavelengths,” and thus color is relational but non-sensory (cf.
JM 168). While still others take a “strong objectivist” position and “claim that objects
are coloured, and that the nature of this property is intrinsic” (JM 168).
If we could hold onto a dispositional understanding of values only if we were
able to establish the dispositional nature of colors, it would be essential that we address
and refute each of these competing ways of understanding color perception. De
Gaynesford, however, suggests that the analogy between colors and values, as
illuminating as it is in McDowell’s hands, does not need to be understood that strictly:
We can understand McDowell as saying the following: “Why
shouldn’t we understand value as we understand colour - in the
world, though internally related to the exercise of sensibility?” If
we respond: “because that is not how colour works”, that does
not undermine McDowell’s overall claim about value. Even if
colour does not work that way, other things might, and they
would provide an effective model for value. (JM 169)

114 S e e , e.g., de Gaynesford, pp. 168-170.
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I think the hypothetical response de Gaynesford suggests that we might make to the
skeptic about the dispositional nature of colors is true, but weak, for if we cannot point
to any “other things” that “might” work the way McDowell wants colors to work, then
we would have some reason to worry about the relevance and force of McDowell’s
argumentative strategy. However real values might appear to us, perhaps Maclde was
right all along. If nothing else is dispositional in the way McDowell claims values are,
then why should we believe values are that way in the first place, unless we made
argumentative recourse to the compelling force of our first-person evaluative
phenomenology? But that would hardly be a convincing move since it is that very
phenomenology that was originally at issue: after all, even Mackie agrees that values
appear real.
Whether or not colors work the way McDowell suggests (though I suspect they
do), I propose that we consider Wittgenstein’s aspect-seeing explanation of faceperception (as I have developed it in earlier chapters, especially chapter two) as a better
model than color perception for a realist construal of the recognition of values. Indeed,
I would argue that to some extent, face perception does not simply provide a good
analogical model for understanding how moral perception might function (as construed
by McDowell and others who subscribe to a perception-based model of ethics), but that
the aspect-seeing powers that enable face perception in general are the very cognitive
mechanisms that enable moral perception as well. Even if colors are not dispositional
in the way McDowell wants them to be, my reading of Wittgenstein has demonstrated
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that faces and the aspects that play across their features certainly are. There is nothing
“queer” about the fact that we can “see” the glance of the eye, for example, as
Wittgenstein caustically observed in a passage from Zettel that we looked at earlier:
“If you only shake free from your physiological prejudices, you
will find nothing queer about the fact that the glance of the eye
can be seen too.” For I also say that I see the look that you cast at
someone else. And if someone wanted to correct me and say that
I don’t really see it, I should take that for pure stupidity. (Z 223)
And yet, our ability to see sight itself—like our ability to perceive value—cannot be
explained by merely broadening the reach of the senses. As Wittgenstein put it
elsewhere, aspect-seeing implies a “modified concept of sensation” (PI p. 179; my
emphasis). The “glance” is not an empirical fact like the color of an iris, or the dilation
of a pupil: “I should contradict anyone who told me I saw the glance ‘just the way’ I see
the shape and colour of the eye” (Z 223). Wittgenstein’s passing negative remark here
about the perception of eye-colour suggests the extent to which even a compelling
argument for the dispositional nature of color-perception will not yet account for how
we can see mind in a face, without which it would be difficult to imagine a satisfyingly
full account of the nature of intersubjective moral perception. That is to say, while
certainly quite illuminating, the conceptual reach of McDowell’s suggestion that values
are secondary qualities like colors may ultimately be too limited. For instance, consider
how implausible it would be to claim that we see fear the way we see the color red; and
yet could we claim to have an adequate ethics that did not account for how we
recognize (and respond to) another person’s fearful state of mind?
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If we take Wittgenstein’s writing on face-perception as a model for the
perception of values, then we need not worry about the ontological status of colors. The
range of moral and aesthetic values that we recognize as part of the fabric of our world
can be regarded as just as real as the states of mind that we see flashing across the faces
of those around us (but no more real than they are either!). As we noted in chapter two,
recognizing the aspect of timidity in a face is something that one who has mastered the
concept of timidity can do without a thought, so to speak. We can have a “purely visual
concept... of a timid face”: wholly visual, yet conceptually rich. But for one who has
not mastered the concept of timidity, a timid aspect would not be directly recognizable
upon the face of another, and this “blindness” would be made evident by the fact that he
would “react to the visual impression differently”: perhaps, for example, showing
indifference (or even irritation or hostility) where another might have shown concern.
The way a person responds, or does not, to an aspect of mind in the face of another
shows whether that person can experience (that is, fully knows the concept for) that
aspect of mind at all. I would argue that the intersubjective responsiveness that is
internal to Wittgenstein’s way of understanding the possession of mental state concepts
is already substantially ethical in nature. To fully recognize something like fear is also
to be disposed to respond with concern and care to the presence of that state of mind in
another person, though in a fashion that cannot be specificed or predicted in advance by
the application of rules. This line of thought suggests how compatible is Wittgenstein’s
understanding of physiognomy with a realist model of moral perception: for if we saw
someone responding inappropriately (whether with indifference or annoyance) to
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another person whose face clearly expressed fear, we would say that there was
something at fault with the morally insensitive person’s character. Speaking in
Aristotelian terms, a person who did not recognize—and therefore did not appropriately
respond to—the fear in another person’s face could be said to suffer from an
impairment in Ms or her practical intellect. That is, blindness to the demands of moral
reasons can, and perhaps should, be understood as a form of aspect-blindness.
On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, the perception of the particulars
of another person’s facial expressions plays no positive role in Levinas’ ethical
phenomenology of the face. Levinas’ way of overcoming Husserl’s transcendental
solipsism shows him still to be in the grip of a fundamentally Cartesian picture of mind,
which as I have argued, explains why he would feel himself able to respect the alterity
of the other person’s face only by placing it beyond the reach of visual perception
altogether. Wittgenstein’s later writings, on the other hand, show how the expressive
meaningfulness of the face can play a positive, even essential, role in ethical life. His
theory of aspect-seeing explains not only how we can understand the expressions of a
face but also how we can perceive ethical truths, preserving the reality of moral claims
while steering clear of both ethical subjectivism and fundamentalism. Aspect-seeing,
that is, underlies not only facial perception but also practical wisdom as well (i.e.
phronesis): moral values, like the mental states in a face, are neither objective facts in
the world, nor subjective projections of the beholder, but they are real nonetheless. I
suggest that it is because of this deep cognitive link between face perception and the
way we recognize mind and value that the human countenance has been so important to
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modem aesthetic experimentation, and philosophical reflection: for face perception uses
the same powers of pattern recognition that enable us to perceive personhood and moral
truths. Indeed, it is because of the connections between face, mind and value that the
making and receiving of images of the human face can provide us ways to reflect
creatively upon the meaning of personhood in the skeptical and ethically disoriented
climate of our late modernity.
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